wwworry
Jun 1, 2004, 08:36 PM
You can't beat The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker.com) for in depth reporting about the Iraq fiasco. They broke the Niger Uranium story (just 16 words :rolleyes: ), one the first with the prison abuse story, the follow up on how Rumsfeld pushed for ways around the Geneva convention, documented the administration infighting that led to the tossing of a year of post-war planning (=$18 billion lost in looting), and now this
The Manipulator (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040607fa_fact1)
It's a pretty unsettling read. How the CIA was fooled. How he fed the hawks just what they wanted. Mis-steps beginning with the Clinton administration onward to the Bush rush to war. Here is a quote. read the rest...
“I should have asked him what he could give me,” Ritter said. “Instead, I let him ask me, ‘What do you need?’” The result, he said, was that “we made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps.” Over the next several hours, Ritter said, he outlined most of the U.N. inspectors’ capabilities and theories, telling Chalabi how they had searched for underground bunkers with ground-penetrating radar. He also told Chalabi of his suspicion that Saddam may have had mobile chemical- or biological-weapons laboratories, which would explain why investigators hadn’t been able to find them. “We made that up!” Ritter said. “We told Chalabi, and, lo and behold, he’s fabricated a source for the mobile labs.” (The I.N.C. has been accused of sponsoring a source who claimed knowledge of mobile labs.) When Ritter left the U.N., in August, 1998, there was still no evidence of mobile weapons laboratories. Chalabi’s people, Ritter said, eventually supplied detailed intelligence on Saddam’s alleged W.M.D. programs, but “it was all crap.”
In fact they have all their coverage online and it should be read by anyone who wants a truthful picture of what's going on there and here (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/previous/?040607frprsp_previous1)
The Manipulator (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040607fa_fact1)
It's a pretty unsettling read. How the CIA was fooled. How he fed the hawks just what they wanted. Mis-steps beginning with the Clinton administration onward to the Bush rush to war. Here is a quote. read the rest...
“I should have asked him what he could give me,” Ritter said. “Instead, I let him ask me, ‘What do you need?’” The result, he said, was that “we made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps.” Over the next several hours, Ritter said, he outlined most of the U.N. inspectors’ capabilities and theories, telling Chalabi how they had searched for underground bunkers with ground-penetrating radar. He also told Chalabi of his suspicion that Saddam may have had mobile chemical- or biological-weapons laboratories, which would explain why investigators hadn’t been able to find them. “We made that up!” Ritter said. “We told Chalabi, and, lo and behold, he’s fabricated a source for the mobile labs.” (The I.N.C. has been accused of sponsoring a source who claimed knowledge of mobile labs.) When Ritter left the U.N., in August, 1998, there was still no evidence of mobile weapons laboratories. Chalabi’s people, Ritter said, eventually supplied detailed intelligence on Saddam’s alleged W.M.D. programs, but “it was all crap.”
In fact they have all their coverage online and it should be read by anyone who wants a truthful picture of what's going on there and here (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/previous/?040607frprsp_previous1)
