excuse me? would you mind standing still while we kill you?

[blackfox]

From NYT...

As U.S. Pushes Deeper Into Falluja, Rebels Attack Elsewhere


By EDWARD WONG

Published: November 11, 2004



BAGHDAD, Nov. 11 - Insurgents pressed attacks in the northern provincial capital of Mosul today, opening a major new front in the fighting, while American troops in Falluja began a push into the city's southern warrens, where an unknown number of guerrillas were believed to have barricaded themselves.

In Baghdad, a powerful suicide car bomb exploded on a busy commercial street this morning, killing at least 17 people and wounding at least 30 others, police and hospital officials said. In the evening, explosions rippled across the capital with an intensity not seen here since August, when American soldiers fought a Shiite uprising in the south.

Violence surged through the so-called Sunni triangle in central Iraq, with ambushes, bombings and mortar attacks jolting Tikrit, Kirkuk, Hawija, Samarra and the provincial capital of Ramadi, 30 miles west of Falluja, which is 35 miles west of Baghdad. Trying to halt the slide into chaos, the interim government imposed curfews across the string of cities.

American military officials have said in recent days that insurgent leaders probably fled Falluja before the American drive into the city and might try to organize a bloody counteroffensive of the sort that now appears to be unfolding across the country.

In Mosul, insurgents overran a half-dozen police stations and looted the buildings of weapons, ammunition and body armor, police officials and witnesses said. By the afternoon, they had seized five bridges across the Tigris, which splits the city in half. Columns of smoke snaked into the sky, and residents said the city, the third largest in Iraq, had been thrown into a whirlwind of chaos not seen since the Americans first invaded Iraq in March 2003.

The American military said it had launched a major counteroffensive in the southern parts of Mosul, to try to contain the violence and keep the guerrillas from seizing the government center. But by nightfall, carloads of guerrillas continued to roam the streets freely, melting away at the approach of American troops.

"It's very fluid," an Army spokesman, Lt. Col. Paul Hastings, said in a telephone interview near midnight. "It's been going on for much of the day, and it's still going on."

The new violence in the north of the country came as American marines and soldiers renewed their three-day-old push through Falluja, in central Iraq. The invasion began at the northern boundary of the city early Monday but had slowed considerably along a line marked by the main thoroughfare through town. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, said coalition forces now controlled well more than half of Falluja.
...SNIP

Anyone ever paly that game at Chucky Cheese where you try to bop the groundhog/golpher on the head with a mallet? Pops up one place, you strike, but now it's in another place, you strike, still another, etc.

Fun Game. Pretty Frustrating. Not the best strategy outside of the pizza parlor, however.

comments?

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/11/international/middleeast/11cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1100235600&en=b76e3d2520471f73&ei=5094&partner=homepage

[mactastic]

Whack-A-Mole? Fun game.

Yeah telegraphing your moves to your opponent is not the best strategy. But what's our other option? Not give the 200,000 or so residents of Falluja a chance to escape before we attack? Not good for PR, which really is a major factor in modern combat.

Did we ever really expect the resistance to stand and fight? I sure didn't.

[skunk]

Except they didn't get a chance to escape. All men under 45 were either turned back or arrested. So much for it being down to a couple of thousand "insurgents". The US have guaranteed a numerous and desperate enemy. My signature seems ever more appropriate.

[stubeeef]

I spent 3 years in a strategy group for an Admiral in the late 90's. These groups have representatives from special forces to the red cross, yes the red cross. The person giving advice on end game and civil reorganization, they are called a CIVIC, can't remember the anacronym. But the pr and civilian casualty thing is huge, it is a war not chess, innocents get killed-but I am proud to be from a country that not only includes but holds in esteem a position in the strategy group for the humanitarian efforts. This person might be the most powerful in a Haiti type operation, or in the back of the room for a desert storm 1 event till things cool. Do they always get it right, nope, but they are trying to.

[mactastic]

I believe the cordon has only been in effect for a few weeks now (although I'm not positive about that). The invasion has been on the back burner for months.

BTW, where are all the people who were claiming Kerry was the guy who let politics dictate his actions? Did Bush not push this invasion off until after the elections here specifically for his benefit and to the detriment of the overall war effort? Sounds like someone is playing politics with our troops....

[skunk]

This person might be the most powerful in a Haiti type operation, or in the back of the room for a desert storm 1 event till things cool.
Or in the next room but one when breaches of humanitarian law or Geneva Conventions are being discussed...

[stubeeef]

As far as the law goes, every operation has a plethera of JAG officers, you can't sling a buger with out hiting 3. They are always giving briefs from Geneva Convention to Rule of Engagement (who and why you can shoot at people or things). Have their been some lapses? NO QUESTION, is there in every war? PROBABLY. But when your enemy wears no uniform, has no flag, and no government, then all the edges go fuzzy.

Can you site instances that things were handle wrong? Yes, and you probably will. The prisoner scandal is about the worst thing that could have happened. There are always two sides, sometimes three (is the glass half full, or empty, or twice as big as it needs to be).

The town was not attacked earlier at the behest of the acting PM if I remember correctly. (could be wrong). I didn't serve in Vietnam, some here did, they may be able to talk about the good and bad of politics and war better than anyone else here.

[blackfox]

While I do not wish to dismiss the obvious humanitarian concerns, I originally posted because of the impression of futulity and subsequently, idiocy, in this policy.

So you storm one city by force and many of the insurgents rise up in another city, you go there, they rise in a third...so you spend endless time chasing a fluid enemy.

Even if we had the capacity to occupy every city, then the insurrgents would probably just re-group in the rural areas, or outside of the borders.

Now, some may say that what choice do we have? I must say, that when something like this is your best choice, you should probably re-assess whether or not you should continue.

There is no shame in knowing when you are beaten. You can always come back and fight another day.

Personally, I feel that the US should leave immediately, let Iraq sort itself out between itself, and then we should offer tons of financial and logistical aid and support. Will it be messy and chaotic? Of course, but what is it now? Allow th Iraqis to exercise their right to self-determination, and then deal with that result in a respectful and helpful manner.

That's just me.

[IJ Reilly]

Interesting you should bring up the Vietnam comparison, since that's another war where the rules of engagement went haywire because it was so difficult tell the good guys from the bad guys. Iraq is very similar in this very important respect, and so might be the outcome. Trotting out a variation on "war is hell" is not an answer to the paramount question of whether US forces are in the right place doing the right thing (a civilian issue, not a military one). It took us more than ten years of death and destruction in Vietnam before we were able answer that question.

[stubeeef]

how would you feel if we left, and unspeakable horrors against humanity sprung up Sudan style, would we need to come back then, or were we negligant to leave?

[IJ Reilly]

I didn't know my feelings had any bearing on this question.

My point is, this war is clearly a horrible mistake, and flattening major cities is not very likely to end it -- if history is any guide, and it certainly should be. If Iraq turns into another Sudan or something like it, it won't be the fault of the people who thought it was a misguided effort from the start and poorly executed at nearly every step along the way.

[Thanatoast]

how would you feel if we left, and unspeakable horrors against humanity sprung up Sudan style, would we need to come back then, or were we negligant to leave?
Since we are currently doing more harm then good, we should leave. If things get even worse, a distinct possibility, then we could send troops back in in a non-invasion/occupation manner.

I'm obviously no military expert, but I would think that there are essential differences between an occupation and a humanitarian mission. If we sent troops to Sudan, would they act they same way, and under the same rules as in Iraq? What if we supplied only logistics/support and humanitarian aid? If other countries supplied only enough troops to protect humanitarian workers (having workers rather than soldiers would be an important difference) it wouldn't seem as if we were trying to occupy the nation and take over, as it seems now.

It's not a perfect solution, but since there's an obvious defficiency in our current methods, I'll put it forth for discussion.

[blackfox]

excerpt from a NYT Editorial:
...Free advice: until you have answers to the following six questions, don't believe any happy talk coming from the Bush team on Iraq.

Question 1 Have we really finished the war in Iraq? And by that I mean, is it safe for Iraqis and reconstruction workers to drive even from the Baghdad airport into town, and for Iraqi politicians to hold campaign rallies and have a national dialogue about their country's future?

Question 2 Do we have enough soldiers in Iraq to really provide a minimum level of security? Up to now President Bush has applied what I call the Rumsfeld Doctrine in Iraq: just enough troops to protect ourselves, but not Iraqis, and just enough troops to be blamed for everything that goes wrong in Iraq, but not enough to make things go right.

Ah, Friedman, what do you know about troop levels? Actually, not much. Never shot a gun. But I'm not a chef either, and I know a good meal when I eat one. I know chaos when I see it, and my guess is that we are still at least two divisions short in Iraq.

Question 3 Can Iraqis agree on constitutional power-sharing? Is there a political entity called Iraq? Or is there just a bunch of disparate tribes and ethnic and religious communities? Is Iraq the way Iraq is because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraqis are the way they are - congenitally divided? We still don't know the answer to this fundamental question because there has not been enough security for Iraqis to have a real horizontal dialogue.

Question 4 If Iraqis are able to make the leap from the despotism of Saddam Hussein to free elections and representative government, can we live with whomever they elect - which will be mostly politicians from Islamist parties? I take a very expansive view of this since it took Europe several hundred years to work out the culture, habits and institutions of constitutional politics. What you are seeing in Iraq today are the necessary first steps. If Iraqis elect Islamist politicians, so be it. But is our president ready for that group shot?

Question 5 Can we make a serious effort to achieve a psychological breakthrough with Iraqis and the wider Arab world? U.S. diplomacy in this regard has been pathetic. "It is sad to say this, but after 18 months the U.S. still hasn't convinced Iraqis that it means well,'' said Yitzhak Nakash, the Brandeis University expert on Iraq. "We have never been able to persuade Iraqis that we aren't there for the oil. There still isn't a basis for mutual trust.''

Question 6 Can the Bush team mend fences with Iran, and forge an understanding with Saudi Arabia and Syria to control the flow of Sunni militants into Iraq, so the situation there can be stabilized and the jihadists killed in Falluja are not replaced by a new bunch?

Good Questions, I think.
Perhaps it is overly hopeful, as "thoughtful" and "deliberative" took a beating at the recent polls.

[Desertrat]

Thanatoast, when all you send is food and suchlike to a place like Sudan, where the government is as nasty as any enemy, what happens is that this "duly constituted" government takes the aid for its own folks and everybody else does without.

Remember all the rock music concerts to raise money for food for Ethiopia? Some $50 million was gathered up. They sent shiploads of wheat to Ethiopia. The government first would not allow unloading. They then allowed the wheat to be unloaded and stored--in government warehouses.

As far as these attacks in Iraq, it's much like the Tet offensive of 1968. That was the last gasp of an organized Viet Cong. After that, the only effectives were the NVA's people. Prior to Tet, the VC was nearly ready to go to Phase 3+ of Mao's four phases of insurrection. Post-Tet, the VC was back to Phase 1.

I'm not predicting that a great killing of these "insurgents" will guarantee the same result, but they're certainly easier to kill when they're out in the open and attacking.

'Rat

[LethalWolfe]

I don't know if there are any really "good" choices right now, but leaving is definetly a bad one. If we leave, not only will it look like we cut and run, but if we come back the obvious Q will be, "Why the hell did you leave in the first place?" Plus, the role of the U.N. Peace keeper is a joke (unless the rules of engagement have had a major overhaul). And, as 'Rat mentioned, sending aid only helps those in power (food for oil anyone?). The situation in Iraq has crumbled into a catch-22. The only way I see it calming down is if Iraqi's who want a "free Iraq" stand up and actively help pacify their country. Of course any Iraqi who helps coalition forces instantly puts a big, fat bull's eye on their forehead. The fighting needs to go down so the common citizen will feel comfortable (safe) helping the coalition/new Iraqi government, but the fighting won't go down unless the common citizen feels comfortable (safe) in helping the coalition/new Iraqi governmnet. Chicken/egg, Chicken/egg.

As odd as it may sound blowing up their own country men is a very sound tatic for the militants. Not only does it deter people from helping the coalition and new Iraqi government but it also builds resentment. The common reaction is to blame the troops for not stoping the attackers instead of blaming the attackers themselves.


Lethal

[IJ Reilly]

It's called a civil war, and we started it. I don't think it makes sense to decide what the US should do next in Iraq until we've come to grips with this basic fact.

[mactastic]

Lethal, you just described one of the main objections myself, and a large number of those opposed to the Iraq invasion, voiced before it took place. We were roundly shouted down at the time, although that fear has now largely come true.

Now I realize that we can't go back and refight that battle, but it drives me crazy that those who were right about the results of an Iraq invasion are not being listened to now. The same people who were wrong about the WMDs and the likelihood of a civil war erupting are still in charge and dictating policy. To me that seems insane. Listen to the people who long ago said we needed another 100,000 to 150,000 troops to effectively control Iraq. Or the ones who predicted chaos within Iraq's factional groups. Or the ones who said it would take far more than a year to get Iraq's oil output to fund any portion of it's reconstruction and that America would be footing a very large bill until that happened. But the current leadership refuses to do so.

[Desertrat]

I"m not at all saying that the situation in Iraq is all wonderful, but it seems like there's a lack of perspective: Fallujah is but one city. There are some 25 million Iraqis. Yeah, there are other trouble spots, but nowhere near the magnitude of Fallujah.

The country's infrastructure is being rebuilt and/or improved. Away from the trouble spots, life is getting better for "Joe Iraqi"--according to various reports from either returned GIs or from guys who are now there.

Hell's bells, at least now they have the freedom to bitch about anything that doesn't suit'em. That's one helluvan improvement, considering that bitching used to carry a death penalty...

'Rat

[mactastic]

I"m not at all saying that the situation in Iraq is all wonderful, but it seems like there's a lack of perspective: Fallujah is but one city. There are some 25 million Iraqis. Yeah, there are other trouble spots, but nowhere near the magnitude of Fallujah.

The country's infrastructure is being rebuilt and/or improved. Away from the trouble spots, life is getting better for "Joe Iraqi"--according to various reports from either returned GIs or from guys who are now there.

Hell's bells, at least now they have the freedom to bitch about anything that doesn't suit'em. That's one helluvan improvement, considering that bitching used to carry a death penalty...

'Rat

Hey 'Rat, how come the US hasn't met the level of resistance we were expecting to find in Falluja?

Could the answer to that have anything to do with the recent surge in violence outside Falluja?

[Desertrat]

mac, damfino. I've seen some theorizing that some of the "Fallujahns" bailed out ahead of the attack, moving elsewhere. Lord knows, we sat around talking about the attack long enough...

However, Custer discovered that it's unwise to split your forces, as the hostiles have done.

'Rat

[mactastic]

Custer wasn't hiding amongst friendlies now, was he?

[skunk]

Custer wasn't the one whose land had been invaded.

[Chip NoVaMac]

II am proud to be from a country that not only includes but holds in esteem a position in the strategy group for the humanitarian efforts. .

This from the same country that has supported dictators around the globe? Only because those countries offer something like oil or more? THe US is nothing more than a whore in the streets. No wonder there is so little world respect for the US. Trie to defend that...

[Chip NoVaMac]

how would you feel if we left, and unspeakable horrors against humanity sprung up Sudan style, would we need to come back then, or were we negligant to leave?

I wish I had the Parade Magazine list of the worst "dictators". Many are supported by your (our) government. We choose our "enemies" for what the "winner" can give us. That makes us a whore of a country IMO.

[Chip NoVaMac]

As far as these attacks in Iraq, it's much like the Tet offensive of 1968. That was the last gasp of an organized Viet Cong. After that, the only effectives were the NVA's people. Prior to Tet, the VC was nearly ready to go to Phase 3+ of Mao's four phases of insurrection. Post-Tet, the VC was back to Phase 1.

And we left as the "loser" just 4 years later as I recall. The Tet Offensive was a moral victory for the enemy. It was anything but a "last gasp". It showed the US and the world that they were here to stay. And in the end they "won". Tet broke the "spirit" of the US military.

[Chip NoVaMac]

I"m not at all saying that the situation in Iraq is all wonderful, but it seems like there's a lack of perspective: Fallujah is but one city. There are some 25 million Iraqis. Yeah, there are other trouble spots, but nowhere near the magnitude of Fallujah.

The country's infrastructure is being rebuilt and/or improved. Away from the trouble spots, life is getting better for "Joe Iraqi"--according to various reports from either returned GIs or from guys who are now there.

Hell's bells, at least now they have the freedom to bitch about anything that doesn't suit'em. That's one helluvan improvement, considering that bitching used to carry a death penalty...

'Rat

No offense you need to go on the Sunday talk shows for Bush & Co. 20 to 40 years from now, we will see history (unless rewritten by Mrs. Cheney) that the US failed. An that the future generations will pay the price.

[Desertrat]

20 or 40 years from now, Chip? You might be right. But, after all, doesn't that make Bush a good liberal Democrat, wanting to be judged by his stated intentions? :D

As far as "Tet broke the "spirit" of the US military." Unequivocally, NO. The spirit of the military was broken by the civilian reaction in CONUS. The military knew they'd won; even the Vietnamese at Paris so commented.

Paraphrased real-world conversation at Versailles: US Colonel, "You never defeated us in any battle." Vietnamese counterpart, "Yes, but that's irrelevant." (From an essay by an ex-VC, in a Pournelle collection.)

'Rat

[mactastic]

However, Custer discovered that it's unwise to split your forces, as the hostiles have done.


'Rat, do you not understand that this is a guerilla war? No offense, but it doesn't make any sense for a guerilla army to band together and fight. Guerillas by definition fight in small groups.

I think many Americans haven't quite wrapped their mind around the fact that there is no real military solution to a popular guerilla insurgency. At best we manage to find a face-saving exit strategy now after the elections. But that probably leaves us with a fragile situation fraught with the peril of the rise of Islamic rule and the potential to have actually made things worse in the long term in terms of security from terrorism. Otherwise we keep troops there for years, losing a few a week and spending billions in the process. Which plays right into bin Laden's hand, seeing as how he'd like to bankrupt us. Not that a prolonged war bankrupts us of course, but any other problems or attacks would be greatly magnified if our budget is stretched tight by continual war and homeland hardening. Guerilla wars aren't easy to win, you have to win over the population. And we aren't going about doing that real well.

[IJ Reilly]

In a country where the military is responsible to the civilian government, I don't think it makes much sense to talk about the military knowing it prevailed in a battle when the civilian leaders have concluded that the war can't be won. This was the impact of the Tet Offensive. It brought the war into American's living rooms like no other battle in Vietnam had before, ended the Johnson presidency, and started the peace talks. No matter who can be said to have "won" the battle, it completely changed the direction of the war.

[skunk]

The military knew they'd won; even the Vietnamese at Paris so commented.

Paraphrased real-world conversation at Versailles: US Colonel, "You never defeated us in any battle." Vietnamese counterpart, "Yes, but that's irrelevant." (From an essay by an ex-VC, in a Pournelle collection.)

'Rat
I'm afraid you haven't grasped the meaning of this exchange at all.

[Desertrat]

Hey, I fully understand a guerilla war. The Fallujah deal isn't guerilla warfare. Other facets of the troubles in Iraq are indeed guerilla-style warfare. But Fallujah has been a stand-up-and-fight deal.

It appears that those who've bailed out are gathering elsewhere, in fairly large groups. Again, that's not the wisest way to wage guerilla warfare.

Guerilla warfare? I've studied it quite a bit. From the western Russian efforts against the Nazis to the British efforts in Malaysia. And, of course, the efforts of Mikhalovic, et al and the Vietnamese. We have our own Swamp Fox, of course.

Sun Tzu was pretty smart fellow...

Art

[skunk]

It appears that those who've bailed out are gathering elsewhere, in fairly large groups. Again, that's not the wisest way to wage guerilla warfare.
Has it occurred to you that these might not be "those who've bailed out", but a whole new group of resisting citizens?

[mactastic]

Come on 'Rat, house to house fighting in a city of some 200,000 people isn't guerilla war? That's no conventional war I've ever heard of.

[Thanatoast]

Come on 'Rat, house to house fighting in a city of some 200,000 people isn't guerilla war? That's no conventional war I've ever heard of.It's the closest to conventional war this adventure has come since May of last year. True, guerilla warfare is generally terroristic in nature - singletons, bombs, no real definable enemy to attack, but this is not the way Fallujah is going. There's a defined field of battle, and actual gun fights between groups of combatants.

Personally, if I were the leader of the insurgents in Falluja, I would've cleared out everyone as soon as I realized the massed attack was coming. Let the Americans have the city, and go hurt them somewhere else.

We're still fighting a traditional war, but our enemy isn't. We've spent a hundred and twenty billion dollars (how much after we "won"?) and the enemy has no budget at all. We can't win this war by military might. As mentioned above, I think, we have to win over the populace, as they are the ones who support the insurgents. Levelling another Iraqi city and (not purposefully, but inevitably) killing innocent civilians is not the best strategy for accomplishing this.

I think it would be cheaper to rebuild the country and have the insurgents destroy it, both politically and in monetary terms, than to destroy it ourselves.

[pseudobrit]

I think many Americans haven't quite wrapped their mind around the fact that there is no real military solution to a popular guerilla insurgency.

Populicide.

[LethalWolfe]

Come on 'Rat, house to house fighting in a city of some 200,000 people isn't guerilla war? That's no conventional war I've ever heard of.

That describes urban combat, not guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is a tactic, not a setting. Ambushes, hit-and-runs, quick raids, death by 1,000 cuts, harassing the enemy... that describes gureilla warfare. Sustatined fighting is not a guerilla tactic. In fact it's the very opposite of guerilla warfare. And if you are a conventional force figthing guerillas this is what you want to do, because forcing guerillas into a conventional fight puts them at a disadvantage. Although it's a mixed bag I think the militants in Falluja are being forced to fight a more conventional fight at this time.


Lethal

[zimv20]

The spirit of the military was broken by the civilian reaction in CONUS. The military knew they'd won; even the Vietnamese at Paris so commented.
how does that jive w/ my understanding of the end of the US involvement? saigon was overrun, the american embassy was airlifting out civilians from its rooftop as the embassy was under fire.

how can this be characterized as a US military victory?

[zimv20]

We've spent a hundred and twenty billion dollars
we're coming up on $145 billion now.

http://www.costofwar.com/

[pseudobrit]

how can this be characterized as a US military victory?

revision

[mactastic]

That describes urban combat, not guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is a tactic, not a setting. Ambushes, hit-and-runs, quick raids, death by 1,000 cuts, harassing the enemy... that describes gureilla warfare. Sustatined fighting is not a guerilla tactic. In fact it's the very opposite of guerilla warfare. And if you are a conventional force figthing guerillas this is what you want to do, because forcing guerillas into a conventional fight puts them at a disadvantage. Although it's a mixed bag I think the militants in Falluja are being forced to fight a more conventional fight at this time.


Lethal

Ok, have it your way. Tactics I see: Small groups of fighters sniping at our troops from barricaded positions. The main force melting away and then when the main column of troops passes by they regroup and harass our flanks and rear. Using civilians for shields.

Why have we met such light resistance in Fallujah? Seems to be only a token resistance, but it has created a situation where we are sending reinforcements into other cities now.

And what when we have pacified Fallujah? Do you not expect to see the 'death by a thousand cuts' happen? Will the civilians whose city we have flattened be ready and willing to help us, or will they still be in fear of their lives if they help us, were they so inclined? Will there be continued car bombs (hit and run tactics) and ambushes particularly aimed at the police?

This is just high intensity guerilla combat. This is still a highly asymmetrical war. Just because we are corraling the men of Fallujah and shooting at those that move doesn't mean we have a conventional force arrayed against us. The sooner people stop pretending this isn't what it is the sooner we can get to work on a face-saving exit strategy.

[LethalWolfe]

Ok, have it your way. Tactics I see: Small groups of fighters sniping at our troops from barricaded positions. The main force melting away and then when the main column of troops passes by they regroup and harass our flanks and rear. Using civilians for shields.

Why have we met such light resistance in Fallujah? Seems to be only a token resistance, but it has created a situation where we are sending reinforcements into other cities now.

And what when we have pacified Fallujah? Do you not expect to see the 'death by a thousand cuts' happen? Will the civilians whose city we have flattened be ready and willing to help us, or will they still be in fear of their lives if they help us, were they so inclined? Will there be continued car bombs (hit and run tactics) and ambushes particularly aimed at the police?

This is just high intensity guerilla combat. This is still a highly asymmetrical war. Just because we are corraling the men of Fallujah and shooting at those that move doesn't mean we have a conventional force arrayed against us. The sooner people stop pretending this isn't what it is the sooner we can get to work on a face-saving exit strategy.

What am I pretending it is? The only part of my post that had to do w/Falluja was the very last sentence which was, "Although it's a mixed bag I think the militants in Falluja are being forced to fight a more conventional fight at this time."

Please point out where I said we were fighting a conventional army in Falluja. Please point out where I said there are no guerilla tactics being used currently and there will never be any guerilla tactics in the future.

Your post that I quoted in my last post was very vague and did not describe guerilla warfare. It described urban warfare (which is all together different than fighting in rural areas). Urban warfare is a slow, building-to-building crawl thru the city. It's pockets of troops fighting here and there because there simply isn't nearly enough room for large troop and vehicle formations.

There is a difference between guerilla figthers, guerilla tactics, a conventional army, and conventional tactics. Just because you are a guerilla force doesn't mean you can only use guerilla tactics and just because you are a conventional force doesn't mean you can only use conventional tactics. The US Military, a conventional force, did a good job of using guerilla tactics in Afghanistan (using special forces units instead of large, forward troop positions). And guerilla fighters in Iraq have done a good job using guerilla tactics, although in Falluja now they have been forced, to a degree, into more of a conventional head-to-head situation.


Lethal

[Desertrat]

(Sigh) I'll try again: Tet was in '68. Post-Tet, the VC was largely ineffective. The VC goofed up big time and lost, moving back to Phase I, as I said. IOW, the VC was back to 1950s-size efforts. The US public was persuaded that Tet was a military loss as a battle. Thus the whole change in attitude that led to the winding down of our efforts and our exit in 1972. When the populace no longer believes that the efforts of its military is worthwhile, it's reasonable to say the spirit of the military is broken, although that's not totally true for all the military...

Congress recanted and decided to no longer fund the South Vietnamese, and two years later the NVA moved in. The embassy scene and all that. FWIW, the total amount of NVA armor exceeded that of the USSR when Berlin was overrun...

The summary of Vietnam is that a war can be lost even though no battles were lost. Regardless, I was trying to limit "my deal" to ONLY the battle that was Tet, and its after-effects on the VC. Others have tried to expand the meaning into areas of irrelevancy.

As to Fallujah, there is no way anybody here can know just how many hostiles were there before this apparent Exodus. The only thing that's sure is that it has been a deliberate stand-up fight against superior forces--and that ain't guerilla warfare.

Again, if those who've moved out go elsewhere and gather up again, they're repeating the mistake, only with fewer people--hence the Custer remark. The issue of who invaded whom is irrelevant to the comment. Tactics have zilch to do with morality.

Another big mistake the hostiles are making, generally, is in using too many "to whom it may concern" attacks. They're killing too many Iraqis who just happen to be near target areas. They're thus not following the dictum of being as fish in the sea; they're making enemies of the general populace. They are cutting themselves off from future inclusion in whatever political process develops in Iraq.

Everything I can see about the scene is that the leadership of the hostiles knows little or nothing about tactics in the field. They may be somewhat competent at political strategy, but that doesn't translate into long term successful warfare--either conventional or guerilla.

Possession of a firearm and knowledge of the location of the trigger does not create an effective fighting man.

'Rat

[skunk]

Possession of a firearm and knowledge of the location of the trigger does not create an effective fighting man.
Flattening a major city full of civilians does not create an effective fighting strategy.

[IJ Reilly]

(Sigh) I'll try again: Tet was in '68. Post-Tet, the VC was largely ineffective. The VC goofed up big time and lost, moving back to Phase I, as I said. IOW, the VC was back to 1950s-size efforts. The US public was persuaded that Tet was a military loss as a battle. Thus the whole change in attitude that led to the winding down of our efforts and our exit in 1972. When the populace no longer believes that the efforts of its military is worthwhile, it's reasonable to say the spirit of the military is broken, although that's not totally true for all the military...

Congress recanted and decided to no longer fund the South Vietnamese, and two years later the NVA moved in. The embassy scene and all that. FWIW, the total amount of NVA armor exceeded that of the USSR when Berlin was overrun...

The summary of Vietnam is that a war can be lost even though no battles were lost. Regardless, I was trying to limit "my deal" to ONLY the battle that was Tet, and its after-effects on the VC. Others have tried to expand the meaning into areas of irrelevancy.

Not sure what you mean by the last bit, but Tet was a turning point in the war for reasons you apparently aren't prepared to admit. Johnson essentially recoiled in horror at what had happened, and as a consequence refused to give the Pentagon the additional ground troops they'd requested. It was the first time he'd done so, IIRC -- and a tacit acknowledgment that the war was going badly in a way that throwing more bodies at it would not fix. Shortly after the US "victory" in the Tet Offensive, he gave the speech on TV where he withdrew his name from nomination. All of this came as a direct result of the impact of the Tet Offensive on the public's opinion about the war. What it did to the "sprit" of the US military I have no idea, but to the extent that the military reflected public opinion about the war, Tet still should be seen as the event that alerted many people to its utter hopelessness.

[Desertrat]

Dang it, IJ, get off the political effects! I was ONLY talking about the physical effects of the battle itself. That's ALL! I KNOW what the political aftermath was, and how it affected the scene here. I said that, fer chrissakes! But the politics are totally irrelevant to the point I was trying to make.

'Rat

[IJ Reilly]

Dang it, IJ, get off the political effects! I was ONLY talking about the physical effects of the battle itself. That's ALL! I KNOW what the political aftermath was, and how it affected the scene here. I said that, fer chrissakes! But the politics are totally irrelevant to the point I was trying to make.

Calm down there guy. If you're going to say things like,

The US public was persuaded that Tet was a military loss as a battle. Thus the whole change in attitude that led to the winding down of our efforts and our exit in 1972. When the populace no longer believes that the efforts of its military is worthwhile, it's reasonable to say the spirit of the military is broken, although that's not totally true for all the military...

Then you are no less talking about the political effects of the event than I am.

[zimv20]

The US public was persuaded that Tet was a military loss as a battle.
i was under the impression that it took the US military some time (like years) to understand the extensive toll the tet offensive took on the north. further, had the military known that toll at that time, the military strategy would have been different.

seems this is different from your understanding of the events. i'm not sure where i learned this, perhaps a documentary about the vietnam war?

[IJ Reilly]

A few years ago PBS produced a lengthy documentary series on the Vietnam War. I think they devoted at least a full hour to the Tet Offensive and its aftermath, both military and political. It can probably be found online.

Tet was a classic Phyrric victory.

[skunk]

That's "Pyrrhic" :)

Classical References R Us

[IJ Reilly]

If it's a misspelling, then it's a very, very common one...

[skunk]

Word of the Day for Wednesday July 16, 2003

Pyrrhic victory \PIR-ik\, noun:
A victory achieved at great or excessive cost; a ruinous victory.

http://dictionary.reference.com/wordoftheday/archive/2003/07/16.html

I rest my case.

[IJ Reilly]

I'm not debating this question, councillor, I'm merely pointing out that the other spelling, correct or not, can be found in use in a great many places.

[skunk]

Which in itself is rather odd, as it would be pronounced "Firrick" rather than "Pirrick"...

[IJ Reilly]

Hmm, a word not spelled as it's pronounced. Very odd indeed.

[Chappers]

Maybe this thread should be renamed 'excuse me? would you mind lying still while we kill you'.

[skunk]

Ouch!

[mactastic]

What am I pretending it is? The only part of my post that had to do w/Falluja was the very last sentence which was, "Although it's a mixed bag I think the militants in Falluja are being forced to fight a more conventional fight at this time."

You and others are pretending this is a winnable war.

Please point out where I said we were fighting a conventional army in Falluja. Please point out where I said there are no guerilla tactics being used currently and there will never be any guerilla tactics in the future.

So you're saying that using civilians as shields is what the US military would do if we were in the defensive position? You actually think the US would hide troops in churches and amongst civilians if we were defending a city? Are you actually saying that we would use hospitals as a base of military operations? You have a low opinion of our military if that's the case. And if it's not the case you can argue semantics all you want, but this is a guerilla war. Calling it anything else is dishonest.

As for all your other blather about showing where you said this and that there will never be any of that, it has nothing to do with my point. I never said anything to the effect that you swore there would never be any guerilla attacks and you know it. My point is that there IS a guerilla war going on, and popular guerilla wars are (by the laws of war) unwinnable. You can't win without killing everyone, which is the definition of the pyrrhic victory talked about here. If you wish to deny that a guerilla war has moved into an urban setting and call it 'urban combat', go ahead and put your head in the sand. It doesn't change the reality on the ground.


And I quote:
That describes urban combat, not guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is a tactic, not a setting. Ambushes, hit-and-runs, quick raids, death by 1,000 cuts, harassing the enemy... that describes gureilla warfare. Sustatined fighting is not a guerilla tactic. In fact it's the very opposite of guerilla warfare. And if you are a conventional force figthing guerillas this is what you want to do, because forcing guerillas into a conventional fight puts them at a disadvantage. Although it's a mixed bag I think the militants in Falluja are being forced to fight a more conventional fight at this time.

Not only did I point out that 'death by 1000 cuts' is ongoing and highly likely to continue (a tactic that you yourself admit is a guerilla tactic, and which I mentioned and you ignored) I also pointed out the use of roadside bombs (Ambushes), letting the enemy pass intact and harassing their flanks (harrassing the enemy). You chose to ignore all those examples and instead go off on a rant about how I said you never said this wasn't a guerilla war. If it walks like a gorilla and talks like a gorilla, what is it likely to be?

Your post that I quoted in my last post was very vague and did not describe guerilla warfare. It described urban warfare (which is all together different than fighting in rural areas). Urban warfare is a slow, building-to-building crawl thru the city. It's pockets of troops fighting here and there because there simply isn't nearly enough room for large troop and vehicle formations.

There is a difference between guerilla figthers, guerilla tactics, a conventional army, and conventional tactics. Just because you are a guerilla force doesn't mean you can only use guerilla tactics and just because you are a conventional force doesn't mean you can only use conventional tactics. The US Military, a conventional force, did a good job of using guerilla tactics in Afghanistan (using special forces units instead of large, forward troop positions). And guerilla fighters in Iraq have done a good job using guerilla tactics, although in Falluja now they have been forced, to a degree, into more of a conventional head-to-head situation.


Lethal

Thanks for the lesson professor. I just have one question for you. Do you view the total package of fighting in Iraq to be a popular guerilla insurgency, or do you not?

IOW are you arguing against this being a guerilla war, or are you arguing semantics with me?

[blackfox]

Putting aside for a moment the possibility (or lack thereof) of an ultimate US military victory, does anyone else see the paradoxical and cylical nature of these latest developments? It is like it is 2003 all over again.

While the US is able to defeat it's opposition with all of it's high-tech weaponry and superior forces, it leaves a trail of destruction in it's wake.

We may have taken Falluja, but unless we are able to rebuild it quickly and competently, then we will merely breed more resentment and resultant resistance from the displaced populace.

Isn't this what happened the first time? Does anyone believe that we will do a better job this time around?

[Chip NoVaMac]

We may have taken Falluja, but unless we are able to rebuild it quickly and competently, then we will merely breed more resentment and resultant resistance from the displaced populace.

Isn't this what happened the first time? Does anyone believe that we will do a better job this time around?

Were there not promises before the start of the war, to rapidly rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure afterwards? Wasn't that a major portion of the $80B US?

[LethalWolfe]

mactastic,

Okay, this is just getting absurd. In my first post that quoted you I made a specific comment about a specific subject and, out of that comment, you've manufactured what you assume is my view of Iraq. You are agrueing w/me over things I didn't say and positions I never took. I don't know what kind of baggage you are latching onto my posts but I'd appriciate if you'd take it off. If you are going to quote me, and make posts directly to me, focus on what I've said, not what other people, who you assume I agree with, have said.

Anyway...
Here is, short and simple, my take on Iraq currently. We are fighting a guerilla war in Iraq. The battle in Falluja forced the militants there to fight a more conventional fight. Was it entirely conventional? No, of course not (I never said that it was). There were sustained fire fights, there was ground to be gained and lost (both elements of a more conventional fight). There were also the hit-and-runs and hidden bombs etc. (one might say the figthing in Falluga was a "mixed bag" of conventional and guerilla fighting). Now that it's "over" the militants are going to resorte back to completely guerilla tactics. It's what they can afford and it is effective. I do think it is winnable in Iraq, but it's gonna take a long time and not gonna be easy (assuming it ever happens). But I'm biased. I always hope for the best and prepare for the worst.


Lethal

[mactastic]

mactastic,

Okay, this is just getting absurd. In my first post that quoted you I made a specific comment about a specific subject and, out of that comment, you've manufactured what you assume is my view of Iraq. You are agrueing w/me over things I didn't say and positions I never took. I don't know what kind of baggage you are latching onto my posts but I'd appriciate if you'd take it off. If you are going to quote me, and make posts directly to me, focus on what I've said, not what other people, who you assume I agree with, have said.

Anyway...
Here is, short and simple, my take on Iraq currently. We are fighting a guerilla war in Iraq. The battle in Falluja forced the militants there to fight a more conventional fight. Was it entirely conventional? No, of course not (I never said that it was). There were sustained fire fights, there was ground to be gained and lost (both elements of a more conventional fight). There were also the hit-and-runs and hidden bombs etc. (one might say the figthing in Falluga was a "mixed bag" of conventional and guerilla fighting). Now that it's "over" the militants are going to resorte back to completely guerilla tactics. It's what they can afford and it is effective. I do think it is winnable in Iraq, but it's gonna take a long time and not gonna be easy (assuming it ever happens). But I'm biased. I always hope for the best and prepare for the worst.


Lethal

Wait, you started by tearing apart my post not directed towards you and now you want to get pissy with me about MY baggage? Puhleeze. Take your steamer trunk and lay it down buddy.

Whatever, if you want to argue the semantics of what is and isn't guerilla warfare, knock yourself out. That was never my point, you knew it and took the common tactic of trying to obscure the issue. Finally a page later you admit that, yes this is a guerilla war. Not to mention, that you took a response post of mine to quote that was NOT DIRECTED TO YOU AT ALL and then you manufactured out of whole cloth you assumption that I do not know the difference between guerilla and conventional war. My comment was directed to 'Rat as a response to a series of posts back and forth. If you are going to go about taking what I say to other people out of context, do me the favor of reading the rest of what has transpired before you latch on to one small facet of what I say and lay into me, huh?

I don't see this war as winnable, but then I'm biased. I'm a realist.

[Desertrat]

mac, sure there's guerilla warfare going on in Iraq. Long-term, can we win? I don't know.

But the hostiles made a big mistake in Fallujah; they lost way too many people for the amount of accomplishment. Same for the re-gathering, post-exodus. That's just not a proper guerilla-warfare tactic.

Or, if one says that the political strategy is more important insofar as gaining addition popular support, it follows that those doing the fighting are merely expendables in the grand scheme of things.

Is the idea to get more people to take up arms against the US and the Iraqi administration, to "Go to Iraq and kill the bani salb."? Will this continue to work if it's obvious that the bani salb are doing most of the killing? And will the "to whom it may concern" bombings wind up with political power to those doing the bombings?

A lot more questions than answers, regardless of one's opinion about the end results...

'Rat

[mactastic]

But the hostiles made a big mistake in Fallujah; they lost way too many people for the amount of accomplishment. Same for the re-gathering, post-exodus. That's just not a proper guerilla-warfare tactic.

You are assuming the military is correct when it says all the dead are insurgents. I doubt that is true myself and I don't think you have any way to make an accurate count of actual enemy fighters killed. My guess is most of the militants fled, and at least half of the dead are civilians.

And what of Zarquai?

[blackfox]

An excellent NYT Editorial which speaks to the point of this thread imo (continued in next post because of length):
A Victory, But Little Is Gained


By DARYL G. PRESS and BENJAMIN VALENTINO

Published: November 17, 2004
Hanover, N.H. — The textbook urban assault on Falluja reflected well on the dedication, training and equipment of the American military. Unfortunately, it has not brought the United States appreciably closer to achieving its political objectives in Iraq. In fact, history suggests that America has slim hopes of defeating the insurgency, and that our best chance for "success" depends on redefining what we would consider a victory.

American troops killed as many as 1,000 insurgents in Falluja and seized stocks of weapons and ammunition. But neither guns nor dedicated fighters are scarce in Iraq. The Pentagon estimates the number of hard-core enemy fighters to be roughly 10,000 (20,000 if active sympathizers and covert accomplices are included). And Iraq is awash in assault rifles, ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades and explosives - the lifeblood of insurgency. Most troubling, the guerrillas enjoy support from a sizable fraction of the population in the Sunni heartland.

While major operations like the attack on Falluja create the appearance of progress, over the last 60 years major powers have learned repeatedly that there is virtually no connection between seizing territory and defeating an insurgency. Insurgents do not seek victory on the battlefield.

The first rule of insurgency is to avoid large-scale battles with the government; guerrillas attack on their own timetable against civilians and isolated military units. Shrewd insurgents concede territory, melt away when enemy units approach in force, and then snipe, kidnap and bomb from the shadows. It was no surprise that the insurgents started isolated actions in Mosul, Samarra and other cities as soon as the attack on Falluja began.

If seizing cities was the key to success in a counterinsurgency, one might have expected a French victory after the battle of Algiers in 1957, an American victory after the defeat of North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in Hue in 1968, and a Russian victory over the Chechens after the retaking of Grozny in 1995. Instead, the French and Americans lost, and the war in Chechnya drags on.

As T. E. Lawrence famously described it, fighting rebels is "like eating soup with a knife." Guerrillas do not depend on vulnerable lines of supply and communication, so counterinsurgents must target them directly, and even a few thousand armed guerrillas can create chaos in a country of tens of millions. Guerrillas camouflage themselves among the population; frequently the only way to distinguish an insurgent from a civilian is when he (or she) opens fire.

This is why the history of counterinsurgency warfare is a tale of failure. Since World War II, powerful armies have fought seven major counterinsurgency wars: France in Indochina from 1945 to 1954, the British in Malaya from 1948 to 1960, the French in Algeria in the 1950's, the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Israel in the occupied territories and Russia in Chechnya. Of these seven, four were outright failures, two grind on with little hope of success, and only one - the British effort in Malaya - was a clear success.

Many counterinsurgency theorists have tried to model operations on the British effort in Malaya, particularly the emphasis on winning hearts and minds of the local population through public improvements. They have not succeeded. Victory in Malaysia, it appears in retrospect, had less to do with British tactical innovations than with the weaknesses and isolation of the insurgents. The guerrillas were not ethnic Malays; they were recruited almost exclusively from an isolated group of Chinese refugees. The guerrillas never gained the support of a sizable share of the Malaysians. Nevertheless, it took the British 12 years to defeat them, and London ended up granting independence to the colony in the midst of the rebellion.

Paradoxically, it is only some weaker countries that have succeeded in suppressing rebellions, albeit by unleashing tremendous brutality against the civilian population. This is the approach that Guatemala adopted in the late 1970's and early 1980's to crush a growing communist insurgency in the countryside. Villages were wiped out in a campaign that killed about 200,000 people and made an equal number refugees. Hafez al-Assad of Syria succeeded with a similarly murderous approach when he crushed the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in 1982, as did Saddam Hussein when he defeated the Shiite uprising in southern Iraq after the Persian Gulf war in 1991....CONT...

[blackfox]

Continued...

...A Victory, But Little Is Gained



Published: November 17, 2004



(Page 2 of 2)



America, of course, is not willing to contemplate this level of violence in Iraq. Furthermore, even unrestrained brutality does not guarantee success. The Soviet Union killed more than a million people in Afghanistan, but never broke the will of the insurgents.

Some will insist that the American commanders have a more refined strategy for defeating the insurgency in Iraq. They plan to rely increasingly on Iraqi forces, trained by our military, who will have greater legitimacy with the population and whose knowledge of the language, culture and terrain will allow them to do a better job policing the country.


There is logic to this approach, but it is not new. Hundreds of thousands of local troops fought alongside the French in Algeria and Indochina. The Soviets set up a puppet government in Afghanistan. And, of course, the American policy of "Vietnamization" did not prevent the collapse of the South Vietnamese government after United States forces withdrew from the country. In all of these cases, the local forces were corrupt and inefficient and had dubious loyalty to the occupier. Do we really expect more from the weak government in Baghdad?

As long as the insurgency rages, it is unlikely that America will achieve the political goals it set for itself - a unified, democratic Iraq as the first building block in the broader democratization of the Middle East. In fact, we must now worry about the emergence of an Iraqi government dominated by anti-Western jihadist groups, or a perpetual civil war among the Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities that will kill millions and create fertile ground for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to recruit, train and plan.

Given these horrific possibilities, perhaps we should set our goals more realistically, and focus on the achievable. Some have suggested that we let Iraq divide itself into independent Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish countries. This might avert a prolonged, violent struggle for control of the central government after the United States withdraws. Still, history - most recently that of Yugoslavia - suggests that partition is a risky, bloody business. Millions of people would be forced from their homes, and many would not leave without a fight. Furthermore, the mini-countries carved out of Iraq may be swallowed by their larger neighbors; the Shiite area would be very attractive to Iran.

A second distasteful alternative is to support the consolidation of power in the hands of a new secular strongman. This may bring peace of a sort, but it would be a bitter result for the Iraqi people after their brief taste of freedom. Saddam Hussein was able to keep his politically, ethnically and religiously divided state together only through nearly constant repression; it seems unlikely that any successor could rule with a velvet glove.

These are depressing prospects. The fact that we must consider them underscores the caution that should be employed before deciding to go to war. Still, given where we stand today, if the United States can find a way to withdraw most of its troops over the next several years and leave behind an Iraq that is not in a civil war, that is not a haven for Al Qaeda and is not an immediate threat to its neighbors, history may well record it as an odds-defying success.

Pretty much sums things up imo.

[IJ Reilly]

You are assuming the military is correct when it says all the dead are insurgents. I doubt that is true myself and I don't think you have any way to make an accurate count of actual enemy fighters killed. My guess is most of the militants fled, and at least half of the dead are civilians.

And what of Zarquai?

I can't believe anyone who lived through the Vietnam War actually believing the military's reports of how many of the enemy they killed.