There was an excellent article in The New Yorker (dated March 25th, 2013) by James Surowiecki in which the author of the piece cites Warren Buffet's observation that, "When a manager with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that will remain intact."
The article also acknowledges mistakes made by Ron Johnson during his time at J.C. Penney (the article was published before Johnson moved on), and Surowiecki writes of Johnson's pedigree, and efforts at the company: "Skill is important, but so is context
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Like I said *excellent article.
Here's a
link to the article.
THE TURNAROUND TRAP
BY JAMES SUROWIECKI
MARCH 25, 2013
In January of 2012, Ron Johnson, the new C.E.O. of J. C. Penney, gave a speech unveiling his ambitious strategy for reinventing the hoary old retailer. It was a much anticipated event. Penney was directionless and barely profitable, and Johnson was a retail superstar. He had helped make Target hip, pioneering partnerships with big-name designers like Michael Graves, and had then moved to Apple, where he orchestrated the creation of the Apple Store. Johnsons presentation did not disappoint. He made it clear that he wasnt going to just stabilize Penney; he was going to revolutionize it. Coupons and sales, which had become ubiquitous, were going to be replaced by what he called fair and square pricing. The stores themselves would be radically redesigned, becoming curated showcases of mini shops, arranged by brand. J. C. Penney, Johnson said, would become Americas favorite store.
Fourteen months later, J. C. Penney is Americas favorite cautionary tale. Customers have abandoned the store en masse: over the past year, revenues have fallen by twenty-five per cent, and Penney lost almost a billion dollars, half a billion of it in the final quarter alone. The companys stock price, which jumped twenty-four per cent after Johnson announced his plans, has since fallen almost sixty per cent. Twenty-one thousand employees have lost their jobs. And Johnson has become the target of unrelenting criticism. There is nothing good to say about what hes done, Mark Cohen, a former C.E.O. of Sears Canada, who is now a professor at Columbia, told me. Penney had been run into a ditch when he took it over. But, rather than getting it back on the road, hes essentially set it on fire. Johnson is scrapping his pricing strategy but is sticking by the mini-shop concept: last week, Joe Fresh boutiques débuted in stores across the country. Meanwhile, rumors of Johnsons imminent departure are everywhere, and last years pronouncement is starting to look like the business equivalent of George Bushs Mission Accomplished speech.
The biggest problem with Johnsons strategy is simple: he misread what Penneys customers wanted. Doing away with constant markdowns was, on the face of it, sensible: instead of starting with a high price and quickly marking it down, start with a lower price. But Johnson failed to see how attached customers were to markdowns. In most of the retail universe, price is the most powerful motivator, Cohen said. This game of cat and mouse with regular, ever-changing discounts is illogical, but its one that lots of consumers like to play. Johnson just ignored all that.
The way Penney implemented its plan also hurt. For one thing, Johnson didnt test his pricing strategyperhaps because of his experience at Apple, where market research has always been anathema. In addition, he rolled it out before the stores had been remodelled or filled with new merchandise. This drove old customers away without giving new ones a reason to come in. Offering pain and no gain is no way to remake a company. Anytime youre trying to change the way you do things, small wins are important, Michael Roberto, a management professor at Bryant University, told me. Small wins help you build support both internally and externally, and they make it easier for people to buy in.
Given Johnsons track record, plenty of people are shocked by whats happened. Yet hiring him was always a huge gamble. As Cohen put it, He had never been a C.E.O., never mounted or managed a turnaround, had limited fashion-apparel experience, and had no experience in the middle-market space. Johnsons champions assumed that, because he had done great work elsewhere, he would do great work at Penney. But the circumstances at Johnsons previous companies were radically different from those at Penney. Target was a thriving company that had already positioned itself as a trend-aware, fashionable store, so Johnson had plenty of support in the effort to make it cooler. And, while the Apple Store is a brilliant retail concept, its success was surely helped by the fact that it has been home to three of the best-selling consumer products ever.
At Target and at Apple, Johnson was running with the wind, not against it. At Penney, hes trying to do something very different: remake a companys DNA. Penneys board no doubt believed that Johnsons record guaranteed that hed succeed. But this perception probably reflects what psychologists call the fundamental attribution errorour tendency to ignore context and attribute an individuals success or failure solely to inherent qualities. (People who watch one basketball player shoot free throws in a poorly lighted gym and another shoot in a well-lighted gym attribute the latters greater success to ability rather than to conditions.) Skill is important, but so is context: being great at selling cheap fashion or cool technology products doesnt mean youll be great at turning around a middle-market retailer.
Of course, this cuts both ways. Right now, Johnson looks like a complete fool. But turnarounds are hard to pull off, especially in retail. One study found that efforts at merely getting a money-losing retailer back to profitability succeed only thirty per cent of the time. Radically remaking a major company, as Johnson is trying to do, is even harder. So, if Johnson isnt as good as he looked at Apple, hes probably not as bad as he looks at Penney. Indeed, his biggest mistake may simply have been taking the job in the first place. Hes become a living example of one of Warren Buffetts keenest observations: When a manager with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. ♦