
There's always one!
I gave the CORRECT answer. Allowing IMAP access is an increased security risk.
You seem to be implying that IMAP is more secure than OWA? I'd love to see the sources that led you to that conclusion.
Do you have any sources saying otherwise? Honestly, I see no documentation of IMAP as a security risk. Anywhere. Granted, I might just not have access to the super-secret IT administrator club where all the IMAP exploits have been hidden for the past decade or so.
On the other hand, I see lots of articles out there about security risks in IIS and Exchange. I'm not an OWA expert, and so assumed it runs on IIS and inherits those security flaws; perhaps that is a bad assumption.
In any case, there are three considerations to be had here:
1. Security of the email system's data. Can someone get someone else's emails.
2. Authentication of the email system. Can someone send mail pretending to be someone else (obviously not an IMAP issue because IMAP doesn't send mail, but your SMTP server bears this concern).
3. Intranet exposure. Can someone use a bug in the implementation to gain access to other resources of the intranet.
I don't see how OWA would be any better than IMAP on the first or SMTP on the second, and unless OWA isn't really running atop IIS, I can't imagine IMAP having a worse track record here than IIS! In any case, a sensible installation where (3) is a concern would place the IMAP server outside the firewall, just like a sensible OWA implementation places the frontend server outside the firewall.
What a ridiculous statement. IT is all about productivity. We can only hope you don't work in IT.
Ah, seems I poked you where it hurts. No, I don't work in IT. I work in a company (and have worked in various companies) with IT. Re-reading, I missed an "also"; I meant that those things that we corporate peons (the software engineers and managers) see as crucial are secondary in the IT mission statement, not the full picture we'd like them to be.
Obviously your IT mission statement has all sorts of happy talk about making the company run smoothly and people productive and happy. But when push comes to shove, if making things run smoothly and productive means exposing the company's "crown jewels" (which the email archives tend to include) then IT will always (and RIGHTLY) choose to protect assets and make the rest of us just work harder.
Case in point: who has worked in a corporate environment for more than a few years and not seen all .zip attachments filtered out for at least a period of time. That certainly hits productivity for a huge portion of the company, in the name of security.
In addition to the security issues and perhaps more importantly, there would be additional cost and resources involved that most companies would see as unnecessary. Especially as there is probably already support for BlackBerrys and other secure devices. For everyone else, there's OWA which also allows calendar and other PIM access.
Yes, let them eat cake.
OWA is worse than a second-class interface for email, much less calendaring. Even on a Windows box running the "premium" version of it, it's akin to walking around with toothpicks inserted under your toenails. IMAP is still a second-class interface, but given no one in their right mind will expose Exchange outside their firewall it's as close as one can get to a "real" mail server interface.
If I may, your two arguments seem to boil down to:
1. It's all about security when exposed outside the firewall. While I don't see any documentation that IMAP is any less secure than OWA, this is still the #1 claim stopping IMAP exposure. For good reason, when IT says "Security" about the corporate email system, all else goes quiet. I'd really like to see why people keep screaming security risk here, though.
2. It's more work for the IT staff. Well, boo hoo! This is a surmountable "issue". This is something that will disappear as a reason when one or two people in the executive office find out they can't get their email on their shiny new iPhones.
So, Paj, three questions:
1. Where are these IMAP security risks. Do you have any documentation of them? There are many Exchange security risks (obviously), and IIS is a cesspool of security problems depending on how well you stay patched. Is the MS IMAP implementation likewise so buggy? I don't see any articles on it.
2. Does OWA front-end server not run on IIS and thus inherit its many security issues?
3. How much more work is it to expose IMAP versus OWA? Seems like about the same amount of work from my perspective, but I don't work in IT. It is really a big deal?