I can completely agree with the idea "that Qualcomm's practice of charging a percentage of an iPhone's entire value is excessive." It should be a flat rate royalty.
But is that not exactly the same as how Apple take a 30% cut on the App Store....
That's quite a different thing from what Qualcomm has been doing. Apple didn't seek to have use of the App Store included in an industry standard such that everyone wanting to develop software or distribute software had to use it, and in return for having it made part of such a standard (which would create greater demand - forced demand - for its use) agree to certain terms when it came to the pricing of its use, and then systemically violate those terms which it had agreed to so that it could make developers pay a higher rate to use the App Store than they would otherwise agree to pay.
Qualcomm wants to have it both ways. They want to: (1) Have their IP included in industry standards, which forces industry participants to use it; and (2) be able to charge those industry participants more than they'd otherwise be able to, and more than (and under worse terms than) they agreed to when they sought to (and agreed to) have their IP included in the industry standards.
What Qualcomm has been doing is egregious. I won't go through every aspect of what they've been accused of doing. I encourage those who are interested in understanding the situation to read the findings of the various regulatory agencies which have taken action against Qualcomm, as well as the court filings of Qualcomm and of those companies which have accused it of wrongdoing.
But here is some of what Qualcomm is accused of doing. First, as I indicated, it's sought to have its IP included in industry standards. This means that others wanting to make certain kinds of products have to use its IP whether they want to or not. They can't make, e.g. phones which work with existing systems, without using Qualcomm IP (and that of numerous other patent holders). In order to have that be the situation, Qualcomm has agreed to (F)RAND licensing terms. But Qualcomm has violated those terms, as well as the laws of some of the jurisdictions it operates in, in myriad ways.
It's refused to license its standards-essential IP to competitors such as Intel. That would be fine if it hadn't agreed not to refuse to as part of getting that IP included in industry standards. But it agreed to license that IP to any willing licensee, including competitors. In violating its own contractual commitments in that way, it's held back its competition in the chipset market, and for a long time effectively prevented any competition when it came to certain kinds of chipsets. Then, knowing that industry participants had to buy Qualcomm chipsets, it forced them to agree to improper licensing terms (relating to those chipsets and others) as a condition of getting those chipsets.
It went on to construct a royalty scheme which meant that, if industry participants bought other chipsets from Qualcomm's competitors rather than from Qualcomm, they'd end up paying a higher royalty on the Qualcomm standards-essential IP in those chipsets. Qualcomm, in effect, charged companies (which had little choice but to license its IP) more for its IP if those companies didn't buy chipsets from Qualcomm. That's also a violation of the contractual commitments it made and further stifled competition. Competitors where effectively priced out of markets (and not by normal market forces or performance, but by Qualcomm gaining an advantage through contractual commitments and then violating those contractual commitments). Not being able to sell certain kinds of chipsets, because they would effectively be too expensive (do to the licensing surcharge Qualcomm was effectively enforcing), meant that competitors couldn't justify devoting more resources to developing those chipsets. That meant that their own versions couldn't keep up with the performance of Qualcomm's.
Qualcomm has also, in effect, double charged customers for standards-essential IP. It sells them chipsets which substantially embody some of that IP, yet also requires them to pay licensing royalties for it. U.S. common law is clear in that selling components which substantially embody given patents exhausts the patent-holders rights in those patents with regard to those components which it sold (whether they are sold in the U.S. or not). So Qualcomm isn't entitled to royalties on the IP in those components in addition to whatever it gets when it sells them.
Qualcomm also, as you indicate, applies royalty rates which are based on the value of end products which incorporate components which use its IP. Under U.S. common law, it is not entitled to such royalties. U.S. courts have said that patent holders aren't entitled to royalties based on the value of end products , even if the royalty rate is correspondingly low, unless all of the value of those end products is created by their patents. This is another way in which Qualcomm is violating its contractual commitments to license on (F)RAND terms. Further, U.S. courts have been clear in that standards-essential patent holders are only entitled to royalties which compensate them for the intrinsic value of their IP - not for the value created by its inclusion in industry standards. So the question would be something like: What would the would-be licensee be willing to pay if it didn't need the IP in order to comply with an industry standard (and make its products work with existing systems)? How much would it be willing to pay for whatever increased performance (or other advantage) the IP adds?
Qualcomm has also violated its contractual commitments in a number of other ways. It has, e.g., required that licensees cross license their own IP without offsetting compensation. And it's required licensees to license (and effectively pay for) IP which they don't want or need in order to get that which they do need (again, because it's been included as parts of industry standards). Additionally, Qualcomm has - according to regulatory decisions which have either been upheld or which Qualcomm hasn't challenged - violated anti-trust laws of jurisdictions which it operates in.
Put together, Qualcomm's actions have been egregious. It made commitments to do (and not do) certain things so that it could gain leverage over the industry. Then it broke those commitments (as well as the laws of jurisdictions in which it operates) and used that leverage to extract greater compensation than it was entitled to for its IP - greater compensation than it would have been able to get if it didn't have that agreed-upon leverage. In the process it also artificially held back competition and, likely, the pace of advancement in the industry. There are reasons why certain Intel chipsets didn't perform as well as Qualcomm's chipsets, and some of them have to do with Qualcomm's contract-violative and illegal actions. Its ill-gotten stranglehold on the industry needed to be broken. And now, thanks to some regulatory bodies and market participants such as Apple, it effectively has been. Or, at least, it is in the process of being broken.
I want to be clear. I wouldn't have a problem with companies doing (many of) the kinds of things Qualcomm did, if they hadn't gained the power to do them through contractual agreements they made and then broke. I'm a regulatory minimalist. The issue here is how Qualcomm got the power it wielded to begin with, and then its systemic violation of the commitments it made in order to acquire that power.
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It's not common in Australian English, but that's about 0.00001% of English speakers; and some would argue, it's hardly English at all.
I understand. I was responding to your query about the use of the term in U.S. English.