Really - So Apple had no part in it? Apple was only savior to the industry?
p.s. the money for musicians - the BIG money - for a long time has been in concerts, not album sales. Albums make labels money. Concerts make artists money.
Got a tip for us?
Let us know
Become a MacRumors Supporter for $50/year with no ads, ability to filter front page stories, and private forums.
Apple Claims 20% of U.S. E-Book Market, Double Previous Estimates
- Thread starter MacRumors
- Start date
- Sort by reaction score
Really - So Apple had no part in it? Apple was only savior to the industry?
p.s. the money for musicians - the BIG money - for a long time has been in concerts, not album sales. Albums make labels money. Concerts make artists money.
Remember that labels were already losing a lot of money due to the prior model as set by Napster. So, the music industry was paralyzed by the fear of digitally distributed music and resisted it until Apple provided a profitable model. Since the price went from free to $1.29/song, are you going to hit Apple with colluding there as well?
Whether or not Amazon loses money in this is irrelevant. The fact is that the model set by Amazon for eBooks doesn't make it as profitable for publishers as traditional distribution. As a result, the eBook market is slow to grow. (Text books is a prime example of this. There is no technical reason that all of my text books can't be available on my iPad.) I like the convenience of eBooks, but the precedent set by Amazon's model in many individual's minds is that eBooks should be cheaper, when eBooks really just provide a different set of advantages. I don't mind higher eBook prices on par with the price of a normal books for the convenience of not having to load my backpack up whenever I go to school. Right now, my choices in that regard are limited.
In the same respect, publishers' choices were limited in distribution partners for eBooks, so they were beholden to Amazon. Apple offered an alternative that was advantageous to publishers and gave them some leverage to make the eBook market more profitable, would thus allow consumers to have more choices, and allows market supply and demand to work naturally for eBooks.
I never said anything about Apple colluding on music.
And publishers have always been free to price their eBooks however they want TO Amazon and make whatever profit they want. Amazon can, in turn, charge what they want. Are you saying that Amazon demanded publishers sell them eBooks at a price point that publishers couldn't make money?
With Apple's model - you realize that Publishers are NOT making more money. In fact - some, on some books are making less. That's noted in the DOJ evidence (emails from some of the publishers). Because of the 30% take using the agency model.
Look - I am not in favor or against the agency model. But if Apple and the publishers did collude, then they colluded and that's illegal. If they didn't - then they didn't. That's what this hearing is about. I support the hearing 100%.
I'm simply pointing out that the circumstances here are very similar to those implemented when iTunes was introduced, yet no one made the same types of claims then as they are now. Content providers were fearful of the long term effects of the status quo. It's less about money, and more about power; publishers were fearful of being powerless against a would be monopoly for eBook distribution, which could lead to less long term solvency. Without an alternative channel for eBook distribution, there's a natural motivation for publishers to push back from the growth of the eBook wholesale model. And since it was the only option available at the time, growth in the eBook market wasn't as much as it could have been. Again, text books being the most extreme of these examples. The issue I take with the DoJ is that it seems to be looking only to the price when determining the effects on consumers, without considering the advantages that come with it: more choices in the eBook industry, which in the long term should result in lower prices without stifling innovation.
I appreciate your repsonse,
The problem may be, speaking philosophically the distance the pricing is away from the producer. The nice thing about the agency model(or my idealized version of the agency model, if I don't understand it) is that it ties the pricing structure to the producer's, thus increasing the overall competition. Reseller's are in the business of comoditizing products. Amazon is arguing, that book's are a comodity, but if Amazon got out of the way and let the publisher's price their products, consumer's would have more choice at driving the market towards low-cost low-quality books or high-cost high-quality books.
True - but conversely - Publishers can sell their books for whatever they want and let resellers sell the books for whatever they want, no? As long as the publisher is getting what they want for their books - that should matter most.
Should Honda care what I resell my car for as long as I paid them what they were asking?
Note I am not advocating - I am asking.
It is a good thing that I did not claim any of it illegal then. I was responding to the posters who say actions by Apple is anti-competitive, which in their mind implies illegal. I just pointed out Amazon's business practices are, in some respects, even more anti-competitive.
(By the way, selling some items below cost is illegal in some jurisdictions, such as France, but it is fine in the US.)
----------
I think that is a decision best left to Honda. If it cares, for one reason or another, it should be able to dictate the retail price. It designs and manufactures the product, the government should let it be.
The anti trust lawsuit is about COLLUSION.
And the collusion would only work if at least 4 Major Book Publishers agree to it. Penguin indicated that it won't go along unless 3 other Major Publishers also sign up.
Imagine only 1 major publisher goes agency ($12.99/$14.99) and 5 major publishers do not ($9.99), that 1 major publisher would lose a lot of market share.....Before long, it would switch back to wholesale under a free market system.
That's why it is crucial that at least 4 of the 6 major publishers are on board.
From DOJ opening statement/slides
http://www.scribd.com/doc/145486131/U-S-v-Apple-Et-Al-Opening-Slides
"You are absolutely correct: we've always known that unless other publishers follow us, there's no chance of success in getting Amazon to change its pricing practices."
--------------
Penguin CEO David Shanks: "My orders from London. You must have the fourth major or we can't be in the announcement."
Apple Eddy Cue: "Hopefully this is not an issue but if it is I will call you at 4pm. It would be a huge mistake to miss this if we have 3."
No change here, he is waiting for the others to sign. We have executables ready to sign but he wants an assurance that he is 1 of 4 before signing.
Once previous two are signed, I will head to their offices to get this one signed
Penguin CEO David Shanks: "We would never meet with Barnes and all our competitors. The Government would be all over that. We would meet separately with Indigo being the facilitator and go between. That is how we worked with Apple and the government is still looking into that."
And the collusion would only work if at least 4 Major Book Publishers agree to it. Penguin indicated that it won't go along unless 3 other Major Publishers also sign up.
Imagine only 1 major publisher goes agency ($12.99/$14.99) and 5 major publishers do not ($9.99), that 1 major publisher would lose a lot of market share.....Before long, it would switch back to wholesale under a free market system.
That's why it is crucial that at least 4 of the 6 major publishers are on board.
From DOJ opening statement/slides
http://www.scribd.com/doc/145486131/U-S-v-Apple-Et-Al-Opening-Slides
"You are absolutely correct: we've always known that unless other publishers follow us, there's no chance of success in getting Amazon to change its pricing practices."
--------------
Penguin CEO David Shanks: "My orders from London. You must have the fourth major or we can't be in the announcement."
Apple Eddy Cue: "Hopefully this is not an issue but if it is I will call you at 4pm. It would be a huge mistake to miss this if we have 3."
No change here, he is waiting for the others to sign. We have executables ready to sign but he wants an assurance that he is 1 of 4 before signing.
Once previous two are signed, I will head to their offices to get this one signed
Penguin CEO David Shanks: "We would never meet with Barnes and all our competitors. The Government would be all over that. We would meet separately with Indigo being the facilitator and go between. That is how we worked with Apple and the government is still looking into that."
This is worth a repost.
This is the top comment on this topic @ r/technology.
http://fr.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/1fisj9/us_takes_apple_to_trial_over_ebooks_pricefixing/
[]competitionroolz 2581 points 1 day ago*x2
Hi, all. Long time lurker, first time poster. I am an antitrust lawyer (among other things) and have followed this case closely, because it is interesting. Lots of the information in this thread is not accurate, probably because the coverage of this case fails in large part to capture its nuances. I am accordingly going to try to explain what is up.
Allow me to set the stage. Back in 2009, eBooks were sold using the traditional retail model, i.e. publishers sold them to resellers (like Amazon) and the resellers sold them at whatever price they chose. Amazon chose to sell them cheaply (at $9.99), even sometimes below cost, because they wanted everyone to buy Kindles and they thought cheap eBooks were the best way to make that happen. Even though the price at which Amazon sold eBooks to consumers did not directly affect the price the publishers received for those eBooks, the publishers still hated the cheap price, primarily because it threatened the paper book industry, i.e. if eBooks were cheap, people would more readily switch to that format instead of buying paper books (I believe publishers made more money off paper books).
Around this time, Apple was looking to introduce this neat new product called an iPad which, among other things, could serve as an eBook reader. The then-living Steve Jobs also hated what Amazon was doing, because it led to a perception that $9.99 was the proper price for an eBook and this limited the price at which Apple could sell eBooks through the iBookstore, meaning Apple made less money. As such, both Apple and the publishers had tremendous incentive to prevent Amazon from selling discounted eBooks.
So, what were the poor beleaguered publishers to do? Well, there was this other way of selling eBooks, called the Agency Model. As opposed to the traditional method of reselling eBooks described above (publisher sells to reseller, reseller sells to consumer at price it chooses), when a reseller sells an eBook pursuant to the Agency Model, the publisher from which the eBook originated controls the price at which the eBook is sold to the consumer. In other words, the contracts between the publishers and Amazon (for example) would require Amazon to sell that eBook at a price dictated by the publisher, thereby preventing Amazon (or anyone) from discounting eBooks.
There is a problem, though: if only one publisher begins selling books pursuant to the Agency Model, all that happens is that that publishers eBooks get more expensive and price-sensitive consumers switch to cheaper eBooks from other publishers. So the agency strategy only works if all publishers implement the strategy at the same time. It is the classic collective action problem: the benefits exist only if all parties move together, while the burdens fall on any party moving independently.
SPOILER ALERT: THIS IS WHERE THINGS GET ILLEGAL. Two things then (allegedly!) happen, one involving Apple and one not. The latter first: the publishers begin discussing among themselves agreeing to implement the Agency Model simultaneously, thereby making sure prices rise across the board. But they could not really make it happen until the second thing happened.
The second thing: Enter Jobs and the iPad. Jobs and Apple wished to switch the entire publishing industry to the Agency Model and, accordingly (also allegedly!) served as a go-between through which the publishers agreed to simultaneously switch to the Agency Model. In other words, Jobs went to publisher #1 and said will you implement the Agency Model if publishers ##2,3,4, and 5 do? Publisher #1 says yes! Jobs then goes to publisher 2 and says Publisher #1 has agreed to switch to the Agency Model if you do. That cool? Publisher #2 says yes! And so on. Pretty soon, Jobs has orchestrated an industry-wide agreement to impose the Agency Model.
The implementation of the Agency Model occurs essentially simultaneously with the introduction of the iPad. Amazon kicks and screams and fights, but succumbs to the model after some publishers just stop doing business with it until it agrees to do so. Now, the publishers have the ability to dictate the price at which Amazon and other resellers sell eBooks to consumers. They exercise that right to impose an across-the-board price increase on eBooks sold through all outlets. As a practical matter, this means the price for eBooks published by major publishers immediately jumps from $9.99 to $12.99 (in most instances).
Brief digression into antitrust law: What is critical to the wrongdoing here is the fact that there were agreements between the publishers pertaining to price. Because the publishers are competitors, the agreement was horizontal, meaning they occupy the same place in the distribution chain and sell to the same people. Horizontal agreements pertaining to price are the supreme evil condemned by the antitrust laws, and are the very most illegal thing competitors can do. This is because there is no possible competitive justification for a price-fixing agreement. What this means is that if Justice and the private plaintiffs can demonstrate the publishers agreed to put this agreement in place, the case is over and the publishers lose. So, the publishers, when caught, are up **** creek, and they all settle.
So, what about Apple? Because Apple does not compete with the publishers, its liability is premised on the fact that it orchestrated the agreements between the publishers. In other words, it is not really liable for any agreements it, itself, made. Rather, its liability (if proven) stems from the fact that it worked behind the scenes to make the horizontal agreements happen. It is a so-called hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Think of a wagon wheel. Apple is the hub. The publishers are the spokes. And the rim of the wheel is the illegal agreement. While Apple is not directly in competition with any of the publishers, by inserting itself as the hub through which the illegal conduct was facilitated, it incurred liability. I have not seen their pretrial statement, but I would guess their defense is that there may very well have been an illegal agreement between the publishers, but they did not make it happen.
That is the long and short of it. Couple of folks on here made reference to most favored nations clauses. This case really is not about those they existed in the agreements, sure, and they were bad (and likely an enforcement mechanism), but the wrongdoing was the agreement on price.
Couple folks also made reference to monopolization. Also not an issue here. Apple is not, and never was, a monopolist in the eBooks market. The case is about horizontal agreement, i.e. good old cartelization & price-fixing.
It is interesting stuff, at least to me. I hope this explanation is helpful to some of you. Now I will go back to editing my brief.
TL/DR: This case is really just about a fancy new way of fixing prices, and everyone is guilty as hell.
Edit: To fix typos (typed Amazon where I meant to type Apple in last sentence of para 3; fixed there/there typo; similar etc.)
Edit: All of the above is based on allegations, not proof. Nothing will be proven until the trial is over, and if the government can't prove what they claim is true, they will lose. They might lose no matter what. Trials are scary, man.
This is the top comment on this topic @ r/technology.
http://fr.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/1fisj9/us_takes_apple_to_trial_over_ebooks_pricefixing/
[]competitionroolz 2581 points 1 day ago*x2
Hi, all. Long time lurker, first time poster. I am an antitrust lawyer (among other things) and have followed this case closely, because it is interesting. Lots of the information in this thread is not accurate, probably because the coverage of this case fails in large part to capture its nuances. I am accordingly going to try to explain what is up.
Allow me to set the stage. Back in 2009, eBooks were sold using the traditional retail model, i.e. publishers sold them to resellers (like Amazon) and the resellers sold them at whatever price they chose. Amazon chose to sell them cheaply (at $9.99), even sometimes below cost, because they wanted everyone to buy Kindles and they thought cheap eBooks were the best way to make that happen. Even though the price at which Amazon sold eBooks to consumers did not directly affect the price the publishers received for those eBooks, the publishers still hated the cheap price, primarily because it threatened the paper book industry, i.e. if eBooks were cheap, people would more readily switch to that format instead of buying paper books (I believe publishers made more money off paper books).
Around this time, Apple was looking to introduce this neat new product called an iPad which, among other things, could serve as an eBook reader. The then-living Steve Jobs also hated what Amazon was doing, because it led to a perception that $9.99 was the proper price for an eBook and this limited the price at which Apple could sell eBooks through the iBookstore, meaning Apple made less money. As such, both Apple and the publishers had tremendous incentive to prevent Amazon from selling discounted eBooks.
So, what were the poor beleaguered publishers to do? Well, there was this other way of selling eBooks, called the Agency Model. As opposed to the traditional method of reselling eBooks described above (publisher sells to reseller, reseller sells to consumer at price it chooses), when a reseller sells an eBook pursuant to the Agency Model, the publisher from which the eBook originated controls the price at which the eBook is sold to the consumer. In other words, the contracts between the publishers and Amazon (for example) would require Amazon to sell that eBook at a price dictated by the publisher, thereby preventing Amazon (or anyone) from discounting eBooks.
There is a problem, though: if only one publisher begins selling books pursuant to the Agency Model, all that happens is that that publishers eBooks get more expensive and price-sensitive consumers switch to cheaper eBooks from other publishers. So the agency strategy only works if all publishers implement the strategy at the same time. It is the classic collective action problem: the benefits exist only if all parties move together, while the burdens fall on any party moving independently.
SPOILER ALERT: THIS IS WHERE THINGS GET ILLEGAL. Two things then (allegedly!) happen, one involving Apple and one not. The latter first: the publishers begin discussing among themselves agreeing to implement the Agency Model simultaneously, thereby making sure prices rise across the board. But they could not really make it happen until the second thing happened.
The second thing: Enter Jobs and the iPad. Jobs and Apple wished to switch the entire publishing industry to the Agency Model and, accordingly (also allegedly!) served as a go-between through which the publishers agreed to simultaneously switch to the Agency Model. In other words, Jobs went to publisher #1 and said will you implement the Agency Model if publishers ##2,3,4, and 5 do? Publisher #1 says yes! Jobs then goes to publisher 2 and says Publisher #1 has agreed to switch to the Agency Model if you do. That cool? Publisher #2 says yes! And so on. Pretty soon, Jobs has orchestrated an industry-wide agreement to impose the Agency Model.
The implementation of the Agency Model occurs essentially simultaneously with the introduction of the iPad. Amazon kicks and screams and fights, but succumbs to the model after some publishers just stop doing business with it until it agrees to do so. Now, the publishers have the ability to dictate the price at which Amazon and other resellers sell eBooks to consumers. They exercise that right to impose an across-the-board price increase on eBooks sold through all outlets. As a practical matter, this means the price for eBooks published by major publishers immediately jumps from $9.99 to $12.99 (in most instances).
Brief digression into antitrust law: What is critical to the wrongdoing here is the fact that there were agreements between the publishers pertaining to price. Because the publishers are competitors, the agreement was horizontal, meaning they occupy the same place in the distribution chain and sell to the same people. Horizontal agreements pertaining to price are the supreme evil condemned by the antitrust laws, and are the very most illegal thing competitors can do. This is because there is no possible competitive justification for a price-fixing agreement. What this means is that if Justice and the private plaintiffs can demonstrate the publishers agreed to put this agreement in place, the case is over and the publishers lose. So, the publishers, when caught, are up **** creek, and they all settle.
So, what about Apple? Because Apple does not compete with the publishers, its liability is premised on the fact that it orchestrated the agreements between the publishers. In other words, it is not really liable for any agreements it, itself, made. Rather, its liability (if proven) stems from the fact that it worked behind the scenes to make the horizontal agreements happen. It is a so-called hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Think of a wagon wheel. Apple is the hub. The publishers are the spokes. And the rim of the wheel is the illegal agreement. While Apple is not directly in competition with any of the publishers, by inserting itself as the hub through which the illegal conduct was facilitated, it incurred liability. I have not seen their pretrial statement, but I would guess their defense is that there may very well have been an illegal agreement between the publishers, but they did not make it happen.
That is the long and short of it. Couple of folks on here made reference to most favored nations clauses. This case really is not about those they existed in the agreements, sure, and they were bad (and likely an enforcement mechanism), but the wrongdoing was the agreement on price.
Couple folks also made reference to monopolization. Also not an issue here. Apple is not, and never was, a monopolist in the eBooks market. The case is about horizontal agreement, i.e. good old cartelization & price-fixing.
It is interesting stuff, at least to me. I hope this explanation is helpful to some of you. Now I will go back to editing my brief.
TL/DR: This case is really just about a fancy new way of fixing prices, and everyone is guilty as hell.
Edit: To fix typos (typed Amazon where I meant to type Apple in last sentence of para 3; fixed there/there typo; similar etc.)
Edit: All of the above is based on allegations, not proof. Nothing will be proven until the trial is over, and if the government can't prove what they claim is true, they will lose. They might lose no matter what. Trials are scary, man.
Check those settlements. You'll likely find that each of the so-called co-conspirators expressly have *NOT* admitted guilt.
At least one of them is on record as saying they settled because contesting the charges would have bankrupted them, regardless of the outcome.
----------
And that's where you're wrong. The vast majority of the inherent cost of producing an ebook is the *same* vast majority of the inherent cost of producing a physical book.
The printing, warehousing, shipping, etc. constitutes about 10% of the publisher's costs. The rest of the costs are the advances to the author, editing, layout, etc.
Advances and editing are shared across the physical and electronic formats. (Neither one gets it 'free' just because the other exists.)
Layout has to be done separately for hardback, paperback, and each e-book format. This means that most e-books have *higher* layout costs than most books (which are only released in a single dead-tree format).
At *most*, the pricing difference should be that 10% minus the extra layout and other electronic-only costs.
----------
No, the government is explicitly claiming that Apple has *failed* in the e-book market. Strangely, as a result, it seems to be arguing that Apple has failed in the e-book market *in spite* of supposedly illegal price-fixing arrangements.
If you can't succeed in a market against a single major competitor *in spite* of price-fixing in your favor, that's pretty good evidence that your single major competitor is a monopoly. And since a monopoly that has to play by the same rules as everyone else (the alleged price-fixing) can't rationally maintain that monopoly without some sort of dirty pool, it's also pretty good evidence that said monopoly is abusing their monopoly position in some way to prevent other entrants to the market.
In other words, the government's own testimony supports the idea that Amazon, not Apple, ought to be the one in the defendant's chair.
----------
I'm amazed by the number of people who can intentionally misstate the effect of a 'most favored nation' clause.
It most certainly does *not* mean that "no one could have better pricing than Apple". It means that publishers had to offer Apple the same terms if they offer a better deal to another customer.
If I offer to sell through Apple at $10, here's the difference between the two:
If I can't offer anyone better pricing than Apple, then nobody else can sell for less than $10.
If I have to offer Apple the better deal as well, then I can offer Amazon $8, and Apple *also* gets to sell for $8.
Here's the thing. Amazon, with their monopoly e-book market share, and near-monopoly physical book market share, already had *and still has* a most favored nation clause in their contracts. Apple insisting on those terms simply put them on the same footing as their monopoly competitor.
There's an even more massive problem with your theory.
It is *more* than 'feasible' to create a monopoly in any type of market. In fact, it has been done dozens of times in the history of our nation. Most of them during or after the 19th century.
Second, Amazon already *had* a monopoly in the e-book market before Apple's iBook Store came along. Yes, there were other e-book stores, but they were minor players, and either had been, or were in the process of being, driven out of business by Amazon's practice of selling e-books below cost. (An anti-competitive practice known as 'dumping'.) Amazon could afford to do so because of their massive non-e-book business.
If a competitor has to sell at a loss to get *any* business, then no competitors can enter the market without already having some other huge source of income to prop up their position. Few such businesses have any desire to *decrease* their profits to enter a market where they will have to compete against an established monopoly.
Once the competition is driven out of business, the monopoly can raise prices to whatever level they want. With no competition, the only options are to buy from the monopoly, or go without. If a would-be competitor attempts to enter the market, prices can drop again, with profits supported by other branches of the business, and the would-be competitor is driven out of the market.
----------
Because people don't have to *assume* that Amazon would do that. They already had. Amazon's pricing practices (selling below cost) *was* driving competitors out of business. Amazon already *had* used their massive market power to dictate terms to publishers. In one instance, when a publisher didn't agree to those terms (McMillian, IIRC), Amazon pulled *all* of their products from their store until they fell in line.
People don't get enraged over Apple dominating the music industry because they *haven't* done bad things with that domination. In fact, there's more competition in the music industry *because* the industry had to drop DRM (something Apple had been arguing *for* for years) in order to get another successful market for music downloads.
So, no 'assumption' of abuse on the part of Amazon is needed. They have demonstrated their willingness to abuse their monopoly position in a market.
And people aren't enraged at Apple over bad business practices in the music market, because Apple hasn't *engaged* in bad business practices in the music market, *despite* arguably having a monopoly.
Because Apple and it's competitors are already making a profit at those prices. Why would they need to raise their prices. Let's look at what would happen if they did raise their prices.
1) Apple might *briefly* make more profit before people noticed that they could still buy the same track elsewhere for the $0.99-1.29 rate.
2) Apple's competitors would get a flood of new business as people realized they could save money by going there instead of iTunes.
3) Since Apple and it's competitors were already operating at a profit in the music business, Apple would lose money and it's competitors would gain money.
Where is the motivation for Apple to raise it's prices?
Without that motivation, where is the cause for concern?
Even *assuming* that motivation, given the facts outlined above, where is the cause for concern?
I could not stop laughing. I knew this would happen. Why do people constantly put it on a tee and hand you a bat?
It's not quite so clean a 'hit' as he'd have you believe. The price gets down to $119 (as opposed to $169) because of a $50 instant rebate from Verizon when you're adding a new line.
Similarly, there's deal from Verizon where you can get an iPhone 5 for just $99 when you're moving from a 'dumb phone' to a smart phone.
Compare like with like, and you have:
$169 vs. $199 (not a new line, not moving from a dumb phone)
$119 vs. $199 (new line, not moving from a dumb phone) or
$169 vs. $99 (not a new line, moving from a dumb phone)
Note: The unsubsidized prices seem to be identical.
You have a link? I doubt Apple's current courtroom battle is costing more than the going rate of any other trial. Do these publishers not pay lawyers?
The settlements are not just slaps-on-the-wrist, pay your fine and continue on. These are highly structured settlements where publishers are going to be highly monitored in any price negotiations they enter. Every move they make financially is going to be regulated and put under a microscope. That is, every financial move they made in the past will now be forcibly changed. Admitting guilt is a mere formality when the DOJ is forcing to change their whole business model. If they weren't guilty, no changes would have to be implemented, but in reality many will be.
Here's a press release for Macmillan's settlement, with some details:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-at-171.html
Are you really going to pretend that you can't get an S4 for less?
Whatever - doesn't even matter.
So, what is your definition of a monopoly?
Mine is an environment in which a single company owns all or nearly all of the market for a given type of product or service. As such, monopoly is characterized by an absence of competition, which may result in high prices and inferior products.
Based on that definition, Amazon fits the bill as a monopoly in the ebook space. I see ebooks as a distinct market from overall book sales, and maybe that's a source of our difference. Amazon used it's overall business to sell many ebooks at or below wholesale prices, creating significant price pressures that limited competition in the specific market. This is at the time of Apple's entry into the market.
Today, I find their product to be somewhat inferior to Apple's in the way in which I use ebooks (at night, indoors, in a somewhat darkened room), at least as far as responsiveness goes. Obviously, mileage may vary based on usage patterns and habits.
Dominant marketshare + inferior product = monopoly. Monopolies don't have to be harmful, and they don't have to be expensive, but they can still be anticompetitive.
Note: I still think it's distinctly possible Apple is found guilty. If true, the increased government oversight that will result concerns me greatly.
Steve's quote in the biography states, Given the situation that existed, what was best for us was to do this akido move and end up with the agency model. And we pulled it off.
Here's the thing - your definition is not the legal one. So you're entitled to your opinion.
Second - As noted above - Apple could have entered the market. They just would not have made as much profit. That frustrated Apple. So they were on a mission to change the game to benefit themselves. Do you really think they wanted the publishers to make more money? Please. Side benefit. They wanted to make money off of ebooks. And if they stuck to their 70/30 split (which was only an internal "rule") they could not be profitable by selling books at 9.99. Nothing stopped Apple from doing a different split and/or pricing their books slightly higher to make up the difference.
But they didn't. Did they?
I haven't seen anyone mention that before (I don't think). The 70/30 split. Apple could have done 80/20 or 90/10. Whatever. But that wasn't what they wanted. I'm not saying they were greedy. And obviously every company wants to make as much profit as possible. But let's not pretend there was NO way for Apple to make money...
I would even go as far as saying Apple enabled and popularized the entire music piracy movement. It was ubiquitous nature of the iPod which gave people a reason to steal. Before the advent of the MP3 player, music piracy was only in its infancy. The iPod made it grow longer legs and run at a sprint.
Are you really going to pretend that's even remotely what I said?
Whatever - doesn't even matter.
No, the settlements aren't just 'slaps on the wrist, pay your fine and continue on'. I didn't claim they were. I simply pointed out that companies *often* settle suits because it is less expensive for them to do so than it would be to contest the claims *regardless* of whether or not they are at fault.
You're right that admitting guilt or not is a mere formality when the DOJ can punish you either way because the expense of a trial to prevent it would force the company into bankruptcy. But if you take the time to read your link, you'll find no admission of guilt. Just an agreement to change practices in order to avoid the expense of a trial.
You might want to look into how expensive anti-trust trials actually are. Publishers (even the major ones) are as a whole, *not* incredibly wealthy companies like IBM, Microsoft, and Apple. Defending against an anti-trust accusation can run into the *high* hundreds of thousands of dollars a day, and that only increases during the trial itself which can be *years* down the line from when the accusations were leveled. And you don't get to recoup your costs, even if you win, unless you can show that the suit was flagrantly frivolous, and/or malicious, which is an incredibly high bar to cross.
Besides, you're the one who made the *blatantly* incorrect claim that:
Isn't it strange that, when you can't find a single example of *any* of them doing so, you claim admitting guild isn't important?
What's wrong with people on this site. They jump to defend Apple with no knowledge of the case. The fact is that Apple did help in bringing the biggest publishers together to raise eBook prices and are guilty as charged. If all the big publishers came together and said they won't do a deal unless it was under the terms they all agreed beforehand (because of Apple), that's collusion. The publishing groups together held a monopoly on books. Thanks to Apple they were able to work together to raise eBook prices when in a free market they should be competing with each other.