"(Judge)Cote described how Apple struck agreements with each of the five publisher defendants—who settled the case before trial—in order to push e-book rates higher than Amazon's. The negotiations happened in the seven weeks leading up to the January 27, 2010 announcement of the iPad."
With a wholesale model, Apple would purchase e-books and resell them at a price of its choosing, whereas with an agency model "a publisher sets the retail price and the retailer sells the e-book as its agent." Apple would become the agent selling the books, taking a 30 percent commission on each sale, just as it does with its App Store.
But Apple did not want to open an e-book store at all unless it was profitable, Cote wrote, and in order to make it work, the company had to deal with Amazon. Apple had even considered proposing a partnership with Amazon, "with iTunes acting as 'an e-book reseller exclusive to Amazon and Amazon becom[ing] an audio/video iTunes reseller exclusive to Apple,'" Cote wrote.
"Apple realized, however, that in handing over pricing decisions to the Publishers, it needed to restrain their desire to raise e-book prices sky high," Cote wrote. "It decided to require retail prices to be restrained by pricing tiers with caps. While Apple was willing to raise e-book prices by as much as 50 percent over Amazon’s $9.99, it did not want to be embarrassed by what it considered unrealistically high prices."
The agency model (along with publisher-set but capped prices of $12.99 to $14.99) made it profitable enough for Apple to open its own e-book store—so long as Amazon's prices went up, too. Apple thus devised a Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause in its contracts with publishers which "guaranteed that the e-books in Apple’s e-bookstore would be sold for the lowest retail price available in the marketplace," Cote wrote."
"The MFN approach "eliminated any risk that Apple would ever have to compete on price when selling e-books, while as a practical matter forcing the Publishers to adopt the agency model across the board," the judge wrote.
"A chief stumbling block to raising e-book prices was the Publishers’ fear that Amazon would retaliate against any Publisher who pressured it to raise prices. Each of them could also expect to lose substantial sales if they unilaterally raised the prices of their own e-books and none of their competitors followed suit. This is where Apple’s participation in the conspiracy proved essential. It assured each Publisher Defendant that it would only move forward if a critical mass of the major publishing houses agreed to its agency terms. It promised each Publisher Defendant that it was getting identical terms in its Agreement in every material way. It kept each Publisher Defendant apprised of how many others had agreed to execute Apple’s Agreements. As Cue acknowledged at trial, “I just wanted to assure them that they weren’t going to be alone, so that I would take the fear awa[y] of the Amazon retribution that they were all afraid of.” As a result, the Publisher Defendants understood that each of them shared the same set of risks and rewards."
