Apple Says UK App Store Steering Rules Would Be 'Highly Intrusive'

[Nuno Lopes]

I already did, in a reply to you upthread.

Again, please tell us who claimed that the DMA’s criteria were changed specifically to target American companies. The report contains no evidence supporting your argument, so presumably you are relying on testimony from the witness you previously mentioned.

The article you cited does not provide new evidence for that claim; it largely presents some opinions that align with your position.

Yet, the author argues that the DMA was designed to address legitimate competition concerns, while acknowledging that its thresholds and political context placed the burden on dominant American technology companies. It also suggests that the DMA may have protectionist features, but that it became globally influential primarily because the United States failed to regulate its own dominant technology platforms.

I particularly agree with the author’s conclusion: the United States and Europe should work toward harmonizing their digital-market rules.

Maybe the threshold should be lower so that more American companies services and products are designated? Is that the problem you have?

Yes, because if they included music streaming as a service covered by the law, then Spotify would get hit. My point is they didn’t want EU companies to get hit. If a few American tech services get through because of that, it is what it is.

That is mere malicious speculation: Apple Music, Google, Tidal, ... weren't designated. If that was the case, in volume more American companies would be affected than EU companies and you would also upset.

The fact is that these corporations, don't want to be regulated. But want others, such as ISPs, so on and so forth. In other words, they want on top of the work of these and many other companies and regulations, create their own unregulated abstraction to control the flow of information/misinformation and money anywhere possible. They do that in the US already leading to the political unrest, both internal and external, want to do that in the EU. Look these are just companies being companies looking to increase their bottom line, they can be American, European, or whatever.

In the west, American companies dominate the digital landscape. So regulating such a landscape becomes impossible to miss these companies. Also the US failed to regulate this space down to the most basic things, leaving it open for others to take the lead.

That is why an effort to harmonize the regulation in our transatlantic relationships would be helpful. The US gov has failed over and over again to pass the most basic regulations to protect consumers and businesses from praying practices. Even areas such as health: Purdue Pharma scandal (also GSK, Pfizer). At the height of the epidemic's fallout, federal data showed that roughly 8.9 million Americans misused opioids in a single year and over 1000 million deaths counted already. This is an example of total US regulation incompetence. Than there was the Housing crisis, with all the toxic CDOs ... that lead to a ripple economic effect across Europe also. Again an US regulation failure.

Meanwhile China and partially Russia influence is growing.

 

[Nuno Lopes]

None of the others are regulated like Apple and Google.😉

Well macOS is not designated but Windows is. I think Apple has iOS designated 😉

 

[I7guy]

Well macOS is not designated but Windows is. I think Apple has iOS designated 😉

HomePod isn’t designated either….what’s your point? 😉

 

[surferfb]

Again, please tell us who claimed that the DMA’s criteria were changed specifically to target American companies. The report contains no evidence supporting your argument, so presumably you are relying on testimony from the witness you previously mentioned.

The article you cited does not provide new evidence for that claim; it largely presents some opinions that align with your position.

Yet, the author argues that the DMA was designed to address legitimate competition concerns, while acknowledging that its thresholds and political context placed the burden on dominant American technology companies. It also suggests that the DMA may have protectionist features, but that it became globally influential primarily because the United States failed to regulate its own dominant technology platforms.

I particularly agree with the author’s conclusion: the United States and Europe should work toward harmonizing their digital-market rules.

Maybe the threshold should be lower so that more American companies services and products are designated? Is that the problem you have?



That is mere malicious speculation: Apple Music, Google, Tidal, ... weren't designated. If that was the case, in volume more American companies would be affected than EU companies and you would also upset.

The fact is that these corporations, don't want to be regulated. But want others, such as ISPs, so on and so forth. In other words, they want on top of the work of these and many other companies and regulations, create their own unregulated abstraction to control the flow of information/misinformation and money anywhere possible. They do that in the US already leading to the political unrest, both internal and external, want to do that in the EU. Look these are just companies being companies looking to increase their bottom line, they can be American, European, or whatever.

In the west, American companies dominate the digital landscape. So regulating such a landscape becomes impossible to miss these companies. Also the US failed to regulate this space down to the most basic things, leaving it open for others to take the lead.

That is why an effort to harmonize the regulation in our transatlantic relationships would be helpful. The US gov has failed over and over again to pass the most basic regulations to protect consumers and businesses from praying practices. Even areas such as health: Purdue Pharma scandal (also GSK, Pfizer). At the height of the epidemic's fallout, federal data showed that roughly 8.9 million Americans misused opioids in a single year and over 1000 million deaths counted already. This is an example of total US regulation incompetence. Than there was the Housing crisis, with all the toxic CDOs ... that lead to a ripple economic effect across Europe also. Again an US regulation failure.

Meanwhile China and partially Russia influence is growing.

If the lead negotiator of the bill amending it to increase the numerical thresholds to have the law apply while saying "we shouldn't include a European gatekeeper" and that the law should "unquestionably" target US firms (which again, he doesn't deny saying, just that the quote was "cherry picked"), while the bill conveniently leaves out the market category of the one EU tech giant from even having the law apply at all (despite including a similar service type) isn't enough evidence for you that the law might have been targeted at US firms, then there's no need for further back and forth.

 

[Nuno Lopes]

HomePod isn’t designated either….what’s your point? 😉

My point was that Apple is designated mostly for iOS / iPad OS and the App Store. Microsoft is designated for Windows PC and Linked In.

You argued that the DMA impacted more Apple and Alphabet (Google) than any other company. I presented examples of another company products of the same class that are in the fold.

Now the distinction might be in this case is that for Microsoft is just business as usual. They were in fact specifically regulated decades ago, that made it not possible to use Windows to steer businesses into them as Apple uses iOS.

Cheers.

 

[Nuno Lopes]

If the lead negotiator of the bill amending it to increase the numerical thresholds to have the law apply while saying "we shouldn't include a European gatekeeper" and that the law should "unquestionably" target US firms (which again, he doesn't deny saying, just that the quote was "cherry picked"), while the bill conveniently leaves out the market category of the one EU tech giant from even having the law apply at all (despite including a similar service type) isn't enough evidence for you that the law might have been targeted at US firms, then there's no need for further back and forth.

I have already acknowledged that the DMA addresses legitimate competition concerns while falling disproportionately on dominant American technology companies. My argument is that this largely reflects the structure of the industry: the biggest corporations in this sector are overwhelmingly American, making this disproportion inevitable. It also reflects the United States’ repeated failure to regulate its own technology industry effectively. So this is merely incidental.

Hence, your evidence does not establish the stronger claim that the DMA was created principally—or exclusively—to target American companies.

Schwab’s remark is relevant and troubling, but the expressed preference of one rapporteur does not, by itself, establish the purpose of an entire legislative process involving the Commission, Parliament, Council and final trilogue negotiations. Moreover, the phrase “unquestionably target only the five biggest US firms” was the US National Security Council’s characterization of Schwab’s position, not a direct quotation from him. His actual comment about not including a European gatekeeper is sufficiently concerning without presenting someone else’s paraphrase as his own words.

If the intention was to make the DMA legally exclusive to American companies, it failed. The resulting legislation is nationality-neutral and has designated ByteDance, a Chinese company, as well as Booking.com, a Dutch-founded business acquired by the American company Booking Holdings. This does not disprove the existence of protectionist motivations among some participants, but neither does it prove that the legislation was principally designed as an anti-American instrument.

The omission of Spotify and music-streaming services may support legitimate criticism of the DMA’s scope. However, it still requires an argument demonstrating that music streaming performs the same gatekeeping function as one of the defined core platform services. The apparent similarity between Spotify and YouTube is not, by itself, sufficient.

All things considered, I do not accept that this evidence proves the DMA’s competition objectives were merely a pretext or that the legislation was designed exclusively for American companies. I do accept that some influential participants may have been motivated, at least partly, by protectionist or security considerations.

If we want to discuss protectionism seriously, however, we should also put American protectionist and security-driven legislation on the other side of the scale.

Look at the broader competitive picture. Visit a major Chinese city and, in many respects, everyday digital life feels considerably more advanced and integrated. China is deploying robotaxis across several cities while much of the west remains stuck debating elementary questions of platform access and interoperability. Chinese consumers are already experiencing aspects of the technological future that Western companies have promised for years—and China achieved this without being offered anything comparable to the market openness available in the EU to the US and others.

Meanwhile, Apple and Google enjoy access to an enormous European market and generate substantial profits from it, yet we are still arguing about app-store restrictions, alternative distribution and whether features such as iPhone Mirroring can be offered in the EU. Then every regulatory disagreement becomes another argument about tariffs and retaliation. It is absurd.

These companies argue for business freedom. But only to the extent of their own ability to govern others through their tools.

Why? Because these companies simply refuse to be regulated. Use and abuse the democratic freedoms through convoluted legal measures to get their way with it. Yet when faced with say China, … they simply jump at their largely more stringent regulatory demands while directly or indirectly increasing their investment in its economy. The values are totally reversed. Capitalism by itself does not bring innovation. It needs Democracy values and its rules to actually innovate.

This is why choosing between competing walled gardens often amounts to only the illusion of choice. Whichever ecosystem consumers select eventually constrain them in very creative ways yet even damming to their assets, impose substantial switching costs and inhibit innovation.

Meaningful competition and innovation requires both technical and commercial interoperability. The objective should be to minimize the financial and practical costs of choice —not maximize them—for businesses and consumers alike. Corporation with a focus on profit, don’t like this once they get the leverage power to create silos of cost for consumers that becomes hard to get out of the paths these companies set out. Hence we need regulation over some of these products and services.

 

[mcnallym]

Always focus on the positive:
The EU didn’t and the UK won’t remove your choice to move to a country where Apple remains a closed ecosystem.
😊

Presume goimg for sarcasm there.

Unfortunately falls a bit flat as emigrating to another country is not within the control of the individual.

My niece not long back from Australia visiting a friend she was at Med School with. Her friend applied to emigrate to Australia and was accepted.

Back in the late 2000’s ago a friend of mine working in IT applied to emigrate to Australia and was turned down.

Both chose to emigrate to Australia, however only one of them was able too.

Emigrating to another country is not within the choice of the individual, but the country looking to emigrate too.

 

[I7guy]

I have already acknowledged that the DMA addresses legitimate competition concerns

Legitimate in whose opinion? Vertical ecosystems imo do not qualify for “competition concerns”. Apple has broke no law, forced any hand. They are under no obligation to turn their app stores into a public utility. That the DMA made them do so, is exactly the issue with it.

while falling disproportionately on dominant American technology companies. My argument is that this largely reflects the structure of the industry: the biggest corporations in this sector are overwhelmingly American, making this disproportion inevitable. It also reflects the United States’ repeated failure to regulate its own technology industry effectively. So this is merely incidental.

The DMA is an example of why the largest tech companies in the world may be outside of the the EU. And because you disagree with the way America regulates its tech does not mean in any way shape or form there is a “failure to regulate”.

Hence, your evidence does not establish the stronger claim that the DMA was created principally—or exclusively—to target American companies.

There’ an old expression, if it walks like a duck or quacks like a duck…etc.

Schwab’s remark is relevant and troubling, but the expressed preference of one rapporteur does not, by itself, establish the purpose of an entire legislative process involving the Commission, Parliament, Council and final trilogue negotiations. Moreover, the phrase “unquestionably target only the five biggest US firms” was the US National Security Council’s characterization of Schwab’s position, not a direct quotation from him. His actual comment about not including a European gatekeeper is sufficiently concerning without presenting someone else’s paraphrase as his own words.

If the intention was to make the DMA legally exclusive to American companies, it failed.

I don’t know if the DMA failed. It was cut very, very close to ensure mostly American companies. But I’m sure at some point a non-American company will sneak in there.

The resulting legislation is nationality-neutral and has designated ByteDance, a Chinese company, as well as Booking.com, a Dutch-founded business acquired by the American company Booking Holdings. This does not disprove the existence of protectionist motivations among some participants, but neither does it prove that the legislation was principally designed as an anti-American instrument.

The omission of Spotify and music-streaming services may support legitimate criticism of the DMA’s scope. However, it still requires an argument demonstrating that music streaming performs the same gatekeeping function as one of the defined core platform services. The apparent similarity between Spotify and YouTube is not, by itself, sufficient.

All things considered, I do not accept that this evidence proves the DMA’s competition objectives were merely a pretext or that the legislation was designed exclusively for American companies. I do accept that some influential participants may have been motivated, at least partly, by protectionist or security considerations.

If we want to discuss protectionism seriously, however, we should also put American protectionist and security-driven legislation on the other side of the scale.

Look at the broader competitive picture. Visit a major Chinese city and, in many respects, everyday digital life feels considerably more advanced and integrated. China is deploying robotaxis across several cities while much of the west remains stuck debating elementary questions of platform access and interoperability. Chinese consumers are already experiencing aspects of the technological future that Western companies have promised for years—and China achieved this without being offered anything comparable to the market openness available in the EU to the US and others.

Meanwhile, Apple and Google enjoy access to an enormous European market and generate substantial profits from it, yet we are still arguing about app-store restrictions, alternative distribution and whether features such as iPhone Mirroring can be offered in the EU. Then every regulatory disagreement becomes another argument about tariffs and retaliation. It is absurd.

These companies argue for business freedom. But only to the extent of their own ability to govern others through their tools.

Why? Because these companies simply refuse to be regulated. Use and abuse the democratic freedoms through convoluted legal measures to get their way with it. Yet when faced with say China, … they simply jump at their largely more stringent regulatory demands while directly or indirectly increasing their investment in its economy. The values are totally reversed. Capitalism by itself does not bring innovation. It needs Democracy values and its rules to actually innovate.

This is why choosing between competing walled gardens often amounts to only the illusion of choice. Whichever ecosystem consumers select eventually constrain them in very creative ways yet even damming to their assets, impose substantial switching costs and inhibit innovation.

Meaningful competition and innovation requires both technical and commercial interoperability. The objective should be to minimize the financial and practical costs of choice —not maximize them—for businesses and consumers alike. Corporation with a focus on profit, don’t like this once they get the leverage power to create silos of cost for consumers that becomes hard to get out of the paths these companies set out. Hence we need regulation over some of these products and services.

Anyway, I remain convinced the DMA is a best efforts targeted attempt to regulate American tech in the EU.

 

[Nuno Lopes]

The DMA is an example of why the largest tech companies in the world may be outside of the the EU.

That is a political opinion rather than an established economic fact. The largest U.S. technology companies were founded decades before the DMA existed, so the DMA cannot explain why Europe did not produce companies like Microsoft, Apple, Google, or Amazon.

A more complete explanation starts after WWII. While the United States emerged with its industrial base intact and invested heavily in research, universities, and venture capital, much of Europe was rebuilding from the war. Before European integration, the continent was also economically fragmented, with separate national markets, regulations, and capital markets. That made it harder for companies to scale across Europe in the same way they could within the large, unified U.S. market.

The EU's economic integration has created one of the world's largest single markets. As a result, its regulations and trade policies increasingly affect global companies and have become points of disagreement not only with strategic competitors but also with allies such as the United States.

Whether the DMA will make it harder for Europe to create future technology giants is a legitimate debate. However, using it to explain the historical absence of Europe's largest technology companies overlooks the much more significant roles of post-war history, market fragmentation, access to capital, and the development of the European Single Market.