4. Development of mobile payment systems
4.1 Technical developments and possible antitrust issues
25. The recent proliferation of smart phones and the development of technologies such as near field communications (NFC) provide opportunities for consumers to use their smart phones rather than their
credit or debit cards. The plans of those developing this technology appear to allow the incumbent credit card networks to continue to play a role in the payment ecosystem, except that mobile devices rather than plastic cards would be used for payment. However, because some new technologies like NFC permit two way communication between a consumers smart phone and a retailers terminal, mobile payment systems may offer greater functionality to consumers and merchants.
26. Successful implementation of mobile payment systems is challenging because (1) it requires coordination across several complement providers (smart phones, enabled terminals, merchants, consumer accounts), and (2) network externalities heighten the importance of scale. In the United States, two sets of competitors have formed mobile payment joint ventures: (1) Isis, a joint venture including most of the major American mobile phone network providers: Verizon Wireless, AT&T, and T-Mobile,22 and (2)
Merchant Customer Exchange (MCX), a joint venture of many merchants that collectively represent approximately $1 trillion in annual sales. Members of MCX include Wal-Mart, Target, CVS, Sears, Lowes, and Shell Oil. These joint ventures are not yet in operation.
27. Joint ventures that are collaborations between competitors may warrant antitrust scrutiny. The Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors issued by the U.S. antitrust agencies in April 2000 describe the principles for evaluating agreements among competitors and the analytical framework for doing so.23 Two broad categories of anticompetitive harm theories are (1) exclusion and (2) overly inclusive joint venture. For exclusion, harm may arise if a joint venture denies some key element to rival systems and thereby reduces competition.24 Whether this is a viable theory would depend on factors such as the freedom that the joint ventures members have to participate in multiple mobile payment systems (multi-home), the extent to which the members, individually or collectively, have market power with respect to the denied element, and the availability of adequate substitutes for that element. For the overly inclusive joint venture theory, harm may arise if a joint ventures membership is so expansive, or its rules sufficiently restrictive, as to prevent the emergence or viability of a rival mobile payment system that might otherwise threaten the joint ventures market power. Factors relevant to this analysis include the joint ventures exclusivity, membership scope, whether current members would help form competing systems but for the overly inclusive nature of the joint venture, and if so, the impact of such participation on the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of such entry.