Directly undoing defects in someone else's hardware is a litmus test for "good security device". It is more the case that whole scoping of the problem is way. off.
If also offers secure key and credential storage. Often that was the problem with the MDS/attacks is they are chasing sensitive information. One way of securing it is to not storage the master keys in RAM at all.
Even free of CPU defects, any code in the kernel and with root privs can see pragmatically everything anyway.
Implementing very good security consists of multiple layers. The T2 doesn't have to solve every security problem. The evaluation should be more so on does it add yet another secure layer to the system's defenses.
T2 does a bit more than Boot volume security. One of its primary purposes is to protects the boot firmware itself. That is data independent of the end user "storage disk" capacity it serves up. if the firmware isn't secure ( similar to trust corrupted kernel/root level) the whole system has security vulnerabilities.