iCloud Backups Not as Secure as iOS Devices to Make Restoring Data Easier

[MacRumors]

Apple's ongoing fight with the FBI over whether the company can be compelled to help the government unlock the iPhone 5c used by San Bernardino shooter Syed Farook has brought the full range of Apple's privacy policies into the spotlight.

The details surrounding the case have made it clear that while Apple is unable to access information on iOS devices, the same is not true of iCloud backups. Apple can decrypt an iCloud backup and provide the information to authorities when ordered to do so via a warrant, as it did in the San Bernardino case.

In a piece posted on The Verge entitled "The iCloud Loophole," Walt Mossberg takes a look at Apple's iCloud backups and explains the reason why iCloud data can't be made as secure as data stored solely on an iPhone or iPad.

Apple is able to decrypt "most" of the data included in an iCloud backup, and an Apple official told Mossberg that's because the company views privacy and security issues differently between physical devices that can be lost and iCloud. With iCloud, it needs to be accessible by Apple so it can be used for restoring data.

However, in the case of iCloud, while security must also be strong, Apple says it must leave itself the ability to help the user restore their data, since that's a key purpose of the service. This difference also helps dictate Apple's response to law enforcement requests. The company's position is that it will provide whatever relevant information it has to government agencies with proper, legal requests. However, it says, it doesn't have the information needed to open a passcode-protected iPhone, so it has nothing to give. In the case of iCloud backups, however, it can access the information, so it can comply.

iCloud backups contain iMessages and texts, content purchase history, photos and videos, device settings, app data, voicemail password, and health data. Backups don't include information that's easily downloadable, such as emails from servers or apps, and while iCloud backup does encompass iCloud keychain, Wi-Fi passwords, and passwords for third-party services, that information is encrypted in a way that makes it inaccessible to Apple.

Mossberg suggests customers who don't want to upload data to Apple via an iCloud backup make local encrypted backups through iTunes using a Mac or PC, and he points out that other cloud storage services, like Dropbox, are no more secure.

Mossberg's full exploration of iCloud is available over at The Verge and is well worth reading for anyone interested in the security of data stored in the cloud.

Article Link: iCloud Backups Not as Secure as iOS Devices to Make Restoring Data Easier

 

[Mac 128]

That's what I do! Thanks Walt!

 

[Mums]

This is called security theater.

 

[RiddlaBronc]

I dont back up to icloud. At least i hope not.

 

[Rigby]

Technically Apple could absolutely offer a cloud backup solution where even they couldn't access the data. For example, they could let the user pick a backup password (same as they already do for encrypted iTunes backup) and use it to encrypt the data before uploading to iCloud. Of course this means that users who forget the password couldn't restore their backup, which is why they should probably make this optional and give the user a proper warning. And, BTW, there are cloud services that use similar approaches to encrypt their users' data, e.g. Spideroak and the backup service Crashplan.

 

[appleguy123]

Technically Apple could absolutely offer a cloud backup solution where even they couldn't access the data. For example, they could let the user pick a backup password (same as they already do for encrypted iTunes backup) and use it to encrypt the data before uploading to iCloud. Of course this means that users who forget the password couldn't restore their backup, which is why they should probably make this optional and give the user a proper warning. And, BTW, there are cloud services that use similar approaches to encrypt their users' data, e.g. Spideroak and the backup service Crashplan.

Wouldn't Apple would have to store enencryption keys in the cloud though to make it work on a different device than the original phone?

 

[Rocco83]

So I guess it is a good thing my iCloud storage is filled with phantom backups and I can't save backups there anymore without purchasing more space. I always figured it was a ploy for Apple to force me to buy more space. Now I know it is just their way of protecting all the sensitive pictures on my phone.

 

[Rigby]

Wouldn't Apple would have to store enencryption keys in the cloud though to make it work on a different device than the original phone?

No. The encryption key would be derived from the user-supplied password using a secure hash function. So decryption would only require knowledge of the password. Again, this is how encrypted iTunes backups already work today. I see no reason why they couldn't use the same system for the cloud too.

 

[RedOrchestra]

Now everyone will want a 1TB iPhone, since they won't want to be backing up all that secure stuff they own to the iCloud.

 

[tentales]

I always backup locally only. No cloud will ever be secure unless the data placed there is already encrypted with a strong algorithm, although Apple might now develop or claim to develop a secure cloud solution on the back of this case.

 

[iapplelove]

I have been backing up to both my Mac through iTunes and iCloud. I wonder if I cancel my iCloud subscription my iCloud backups will just disappear ??

 

[ParanoidDroid]

I guessed that already, but now it's a fact on public record. The only 'safe' solution is to delete all our iCloud backups data, and not use any iCloud services.

But here is the problem! Apple is increasingly integrating iCloud services deep into its iOS and Mac OS X. It's almost impossible to use Apple products without iCloud. This is scary...

We're all already trapped deep in total surveillance by the NSA and god knows by whom else. The orwellian society is real!

I feel like a chimp sitting in a zoo while constantly being watched. Welcome to the 21st century's privacy striptease.

The only way out of our modern tech zoo is going low-tech and to move to an isolated island, dig a cave there (beware spy satellites), and hide there forever.

 

[mantan]

I always backup locally only. No cloud will ever be secure unless the data placed there is already encrypted with a strong algorithm, although Apple might now develop or claim to develop a secure cloud solution on the back of this case.

Totally agree. Local encrypted backup is the only way to go.

 

[goobot]

Technically Apple could absolutely offer a cloud backup solution where even they couldn't access the data. For example, they could let the user pick a backup password (same as they already do for encrypted iTunes backup) and use it to encrypt the data before uploading to iCloud. Of course this means that users who forget the password couldn't restore their backup, which is why they should probably make this optional and give the user a proper warning. And, BTW, there are cloud services that use similar approaches to encrypt their users' data, e.g. Spideroak and the backup service Crashplan.

They could just use the Apple ID's password that is associated with the back up.

 

[tentales]

Now everyone will want a 1TB iPhone, since they won't want to be backing up all that secure stuff they own to the iCloud.

1TB hard drives are very inexpensive nowadays. Unless you don't have access to a computer, backing your iPhone up to an encrypted drive or two or three, storing one in a bank vault, you're more secure than backing up to any cloud.

 

[Rigby]

They could just use the Apple ID's password that is associated with the back up.

True, but theoretically the FBI could force them to intercept that password e.g. when you use it to log on to the icloud.com web site.
[doublepost=1456972017][/doublepost]

I guessed that already, but now it's a fact on public record.

To Apple's credit, this has been known all along since it's well documented in their iOS security guide. They are more open and transparent about their security practices than most other companies.

 

[a120]

No mention of iCloud email security here -- are we to assume Apple, like Google, will turn over iCloud email with a warrant?

 

[Rigby]

No mention of iCloud email security here -- are we to assume Apple, like Google, will turn over iCloud email with a warrant?

Yes they will. Everything that you can access on icloud.com is technically accessible to Apple too (since they have to be able to decrypt it on their end in order to display it on the web site) and thus potentially subject to a warrant.

 

[modemthug]

So this really proves that the FBI is 100% full of **** on the San Bernadino case. They know full well they can just subpoena the iCloud backup and be done with it, they just want an easy way into phones so they can subvert due process.

 

[tentales]

I have been backing up to both my Mac through iTunes and iCloud. I wonder if I cancel my iCloud subscription my iCloud backups will just disappear ??

No they won't. Your access to them will, but Apple keeps multiple realtime backup locations and authorities would be able to subpoena those records. Going forward, new data won't be backed up.

Although, given the spotlight on this issue, there's now the distinct possibility of silent backups for law enforcement, until the next Snowden-type revelations.

 

[JPSaltzman]

The only thing I use iCloud for is "Find my iPhone." Everything else is an encrypted backup on my computer via iTunes. I have never trusted Apple's cloud services through all its various incarnations, beginning with me.com, mobile me, mini me, no more mini me, and what are they calling it now, by the way? /s

 

[ParanoidDroid]

I have been backing up to both my Mac through iTunes and iCloud. I wonder if I cancel my iCloud subscription my iCloud backups will just disappear ??

THE INTERNET NEVER FORGETS!

As Edward Snowden revealed, the current surveillance programs do "full take" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora) of all your traffic. Once your data ran through any web server, it was captured and stored forever! Even if we assume that Apple deletes your iCloud backups, a copy was already saved on some NSA/GSHQ server farm, indefinitely.

 

[iapplelove]

As Edward Snowden revealed, the current surveillance programs do "full take" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora) of all your traffic. Once your data ran through any web server, it was captured and stored forever! Even if we assume that Apple deletes your iCloud backups, a copy was already saved on some NSA/GSHQ server farm, indefinitely.

lol that's what I figured. Oh well

 

[goobot]

So this really proves that the FBI is 100% full of **** on the San Bernadino case. They know full well they can just subpoena the iCloud backup and be done with it, they just want an easy way into phones so they can subvert due process.

They already got the iCloud back ups. But there were no backups a month from the event. They want to get into the phone to get more recent data.

 

[tentales]

No mention of iCloud email security here -- are we to assume Apple, like Google, will turn over iCloud email with a warrant?

Email & security are mutually exclusive. Unless you encrypt your email with strong encryption prior to sending and your opposite party knows the key, email data in motion is clear text and can be intercepted at any ISP or man-in-the-middle PoA, eg. when you're connected to public WiFi.
[doublepost=1456973086][/doublepost]

They already got the iCloud back ups. But there were no backups a month from the event. They want to get into the phone to get more recent data.

and the FBI shot themselves in the foot by changing the iCloud password and thereby preventing the iPhone from backing up. As we all know, this isn't about this one phone.