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I never used one. What happens when the dongle gets lost or damaged? You lose access to the account or files forever?
You have 2 of those security keys. You keep one on yourself like house keys and one in a safe location (like in your safe or inside your favorite pair of Air Jordan). You also need to keep a set of (10) backup keys in case you lost both keys.

The system is not perfect, but it is intended to slow hackers down. These security measures have been in use for cryto mining and other applications that require high security access verification.
 
You have 2 of those security keys. You keep one on yourself like house keys and one in a safe location (like in your safe or inside your favorite pair of Air Jordan). You also need to keep a set of (10) backup keys in case you lost both keys.
The downside to keeping your backup key in a less than convenient location is that people may become lax in registering the backup key when signing up with their primary key at some new service/website/etc.

Presently I have two Yubikeys, one that stays at my desk and one that is attached to my car keys. Whenever I signup for a new service/website/etc I signup with my key at my desk then grab my car keys and register that key at the same time. Admittedly this does not always work, say when I'm out and about and signup for something new. Since I use a password manager I also make notations on which Yubikeys are registered to which sites/services and can then periodically go back and register any missing keys as needed.

Either way I try not to treat my keys as primary/backup but as equals. Yes this is less convenient, however I am ok with the tradeoff.
 
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How does this work with a mix of older and newer devices on an Apple ID? What method would the older device use to login if it isn’t running 16.3+ iOS?
 
No. The hardware token isn’t the limitation. The device would need to be running iOS 16.

not really unless you are talking sim swapping. There are point and click phishing deploys. Try it on your friends
The scenario I am thinking is lising phone with like EDP activated but old iPhone SE (wifi only) can not access the iCloud services you’ve chosen to encrypt.
 
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Is this working for anyone? I tried on my iPhone and Mac, but it always fails at the key verification. The part where you need to re-enter your key.
 
I'm confused. I've been following the news about Apple introducing Passkeys. Does this whole "physical security key" thing work in conjunction with Passkeys, or is this a totally separate thing?
They are based on the same technology. You can think of Passkeys as a software-based implementation of what FIDO hardware keys do, with additional features such as cloud-based syncing across multiple devices and recovery. Hardware keys have a higher security standard because they cannot be duplicated and the key material cannot be extracted by normal means.

This seems like it would be a step back in some ways. I don't like the idea of using a physical object to keep my accounts secure, especially since multiple people have commented about how their Yubikeys broke. Then other people are saying you should set up two just in case one breaks...why not set up three or four or five? Where would it end? That's like saying you should buy two computers in case one fails. If it's something important and these things are prone to failing, maybe people shouldn't be using them...
I've been using Yubikeys for several years and never had one fail. Of course they could be physically damaged or you could lose one, so backups are required. Personally I have one on my key chain, one is permanently plugged into my computer, and I keep one as an additional backup in a safe place. All but one of the services I use them for allow to register 3 or more keys (the exception is Bank of America which only allows 2).
 
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The downside to keeping your backup key in a less than convenient location is that people may become lax in registering the backup key when signing up with their primary key at some new service/website/etc.

Presently I have two Yubikeys, one that stays at my desk and one that is attached to my car keys. Whenever I signup for a new service/website/etc I signup with my key at my desk then grab my car keys and register that key at the same time. Admittedly this does not always work, say when I'm out and about and signup for something new. Since I use a password manager I also make notations on which Yubikeys are registered to which sites/services and can then periodically go back and register any missing keys as needed.

Either way I try not to treat my keys as primary/backup but as equals. Yes this is less convenient, however I am ok with the tradeoff.

Excellent points.

Using keys isn’t convenient. And you need to develop your own workflow.

On the other hand, I find the barrier to securing accounts means I carefully consider new account creation. I count that as a unexpected side benefit.
 
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They are based on the same technology. You can think of Passkeys as a software-based implementation of what FIDO hardware keys do, with additional features such as cloud-based syncing across multiple devices and recovery. Hardware keys have a higher security standard because they cannot be duplicated and the key material cannot be extracted by normal means.


I've been using Yubikeys for several years and never had one fail. Of course they could be physically damaged or you could lose one, so backups are required. Personally I have one on my key chain, one is permanently plugged into my computer, and I keep one as an additional backup in a safe place. All but one of the services I use them for allow to register 3 or more keys (the exception is Bank of America which only allows 2).

Which keys do you use? The 5ci has a clever design at first glance. Except that the hole in the middle doesn’t accommodate many key rings. When on a key ring it doesn’t balance well, and the contacts are prone to shorting with the side activation buttons. That and the case breaks extremely easily.

The 5c is nice and durable. The 5NFC is good but I find NFC fidgety compared to inserting a key.

Any experience with the biometric yubis?
 
Which keys do you use? The 5ci has a clever design at first glance. Except that the hole in the middle doesn’t accommodate many key rings. When on a key ring it doesn’t balance well, and the contacts are prone to shorting with the side activation buttons. That and the case breaks extremely easily.

The 5c is nice and durable. The 5NFC is good but I find NFC fidgety compared to inserting a key.
I have one 5C (the small one without NFC) which is permanently plugged into my keyboard, the rest are 5C NFCs (I also have a few old USB-A keys but don't use them anymore). I'm not a fan of the 5Ci's design either (not to mention the price) and wouldn't recommend it unless you need to use it on an iPad with Lightning port.

Any experience with the biometric yubis?
No. I don't think they make much sense.
 
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How does this work with a mix of older and newer devices on an Apple ID? What method would the older device use to login if it isn’t running 16.3+ iOS?
Simple. Maintain current standards and implementations, including sms verification.
When talking about general public, people tend to forget there are still folks out there who has no idea what a hardware security key is and how to use it (I bet many of them). SMS code 2FA is easy to implement, everyone has a phone today (mind you, not necessarily a smartphone), so the coverage is near perfect. Swapping to hardware key only? You can expect a massive influx of support calls, tickets and all sorts of crazy stuff.
Yes, people will yell “this is not secure!”, but that’s how it is when dealing with general public. Lowest denominator must be considered when designing a security system for them.
In the meantime, having an option to disable less secure method on a PER ACCOUNT BASIS is nice to have, but should never be the one way street.
 
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Simple. Maintain current standards and implementations, including sms verification.
When talking about general public, people tend to forget there are still folks out there who has no idea what a hardware security key is and how to use it (I bet many of them). SMS code 2FA is easy to implement, everyone has a phone today (mind you, not necessarily a smartphone), so the coverage is near perfect. Swapping to hardware key only? You can expect a massive influx of support calls, tickets and all sorts of crazy stuff.
Yes, people will yell “this is not secure!”, but that’s how it is when dealing with general public. Lowest denominator must be considered when designing a security system for them.
In the meantime, having an option to disable less secure method on a PER ACCOUNT BASIS is nice to have, but should never be the one way street.
I guess my question is, with this implementation, does enabling the hardware key for iCloud login disable other backup auth methods? Or is it user choice and we can select to continue to allow other devices or SMS auth?
 
I guess my question is, with this implementation, does enabling the hardware key for iCloud login disable other backup auth methods? Or is it user choice and we can select to continue to allow other devices or SMS auth?
Not enough detail at the moment. But I do wish they don’t just auto disable all other backup methods and leave hardware key as the only way, as that would be a direct contradiction of the principle of security system: regulate access.
 
Sorry if I'm a bit off-topic, but could anyone please educate me on how these hardware keys work? I couldn't for the life of me find anything apart from how to use them. Search "how yubikeys work", and you'll get dozens and dozens of pages explaining you how to plug them into a USB port and how to touch a button to generate a one-time code. I already know that.
What I'd like to know is how the entire security mechanism is designed to work at a conceptual level, what actually happens behind the scenes when you register such a key, as well as when you use it for logging in. How does this all work? How does a web site know exactly what code to expect from you when prompted? What makes this mechanism so secure?
 
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Not enough detail at the moment. But I do wish they don’t just auto disable all other backup methods and leave hardware key as the only way, as that would be a direct contradiction of the principle of security system: regulate access.
And it would encourage new hardware purchases. That old iPad laying around the house would become a paperweight.

I was hoping it would be clear with the beta out.
 
registered two Yubi5C NFC which are shared obviously on my devices ... but obviously not on appleid.apple.com.
It doesn't seem to see them and says it is sending a note to set them up which pops up nowhere ...

Any way to test it? I still get the 6 digit codes sent :(
 

Note that logging into Mac wouldn't use FIDO2/WebAuthn but the above describes the process that most sites including what the iCloud MFA Hardware Implementation process would use.
Thank you.
What's not very clear to me is that "challenge" thing. It says the site generates a challenge, which the authenticator encrypts with its private key. But what challenge? I've used Yubikeys in the past, and all they did when I touched the button was emulate a virtual keyboard and type a six-digit code. I could have done this in Notepad, then copied and pasted the code in the client app, and the login would have still worked. It didn't seem to me like the communication with the Yubikey was two-way.
I'm sure I'm missing something.
 
I welcome this but at the same time feel like its worth waiting on buying a couple yubi keys until the iPhone migrates to USB C. No need to deal with special iPhone specific keys with a connector that's being phased out when you could just buy some that work on all your devices.
youbikey works over NFC, no need to plug it in. Both lastpass and bitwarden work with youbikey NFC. Only reason you'd have to plug in a youbikey is on a ipad because for some reason apple just can't figure out NFC on ipad.
 
Thank you.
What's not very clear to me is that "challenge" thing. It says the site generates a challenge, which the authenticator encrypts with its private key. But what challenge? I've used Yubikeys in the past, and all they did when I touched the button was emulate a virtual keyboard and type a six-digit code. I could have done this in Notepad, then copied and pasted the code in the client app, and the login would have still worked. It didn't seem to me like the communication with the Yubikey was two-way.
I'm sure I'm missing something.
The confusion is caused by the fact that the black Yubikeys support multiple applications. FIDO and FIDO2 (which are used for Webauthn) are two of them. Additionally they support OTP (a Yubico-proprietary form of one-time codes), PIV (a US government authentication standard), OpenPGP, and OATH (standard TOTP one-time codes). The virtual keyboard thing is only relevant for the OTP application, which is not used for Webauthn (or Apple's new hardware key support). You can en-/disable individual applications on the key using a Yubico utility.

You can also buy Yubico's blue "Security Keys" which only have the FIDO/FIDO2 functionality. If you only want to use the key for Webauthn, you can choose these instead of the black keys. They are cheaper too.
 
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