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This design fails from that perspective. It prevents but negatively impacts the critical use case.
You can't design something to be secure some of the time. iPhone is used my millions around the world and needs to provide safety features like this one for every single user all of the time.
 
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Screen time can be easily bypassed due to a bug in passcode reset. Plus, you can do even more damage because it points you straight to main iCloud password reset (wtf xD). There’s also 2nd bug in reset all settings which also allows to change iCloud password just by providing the lockscreen code.
Hopefully both bugs (imo, these are bugs) will get fixed with 17.3 or at least Face ID will be required to move forward.
 
…. There’s also 2nd bug in reset all settings which also allows to change iCloud password just by providing the lockscreen code.
Like I said you cannot do Reset All Settings since iOS17.3 beta 2 that was released yesterday without Face ID or Touch ID, unless you found another way in?
 
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Screen time can be easily bypassed due to a bug in passcode reset. Plus, you can do even more damage because it points you straight to main iCloud password reset (wtf xD).
Could you maybe walk through that - I’d like to test it. I rely on screen time to provide additional account and passcode protection in 17.2
Thanks
 
Screen Time protection may be bypassable. How exactly has already been described in this discussion: https://forums.macrumors.com/thread...l-and-apple-cannot-help.2388366/post-32694116

If I understood @P_Watt correctly, then Stolen Device Protection can also be bypassed?
That post by Mike Boreham was from November before iOS17.3

Yes I could bypass it in 17.3 beta 1 with Reset all Settings, but cannot bypass it now in beta 2 as that reset now requires biometrics.
 
Could you maybe walk through that - I’d like to test it. I rely on screen time to provide additional account and passcode protection in 17.2
Thanks
Unfortunately I’m not able to check it because I do not install beta software :)
But steps are exactly as Mime described in the other linked topic by you:

1. Screen Time settings > Change Screen Time passcode.

2. Click Forgot Passcode

3. Enter Apple ID email but not password…click forgot Apple ID password

4. Wait 3 seconds

5. This produces a screen asking for iPhone Passcode which thief has. Enter Passcode leads to screen to enter new Apple ID password.
 
Unfortunately I’m not able to check it because I do not install beta software :)
But steps are exactly as Mime described in the other linked topic by you:

1. Screen Time settings > Change Screen Time passcode.

2. Click Forgot Passcode

3. Enter Apple ID email but not password…click forgot Apple ID password

4. Wait 3 seconds

5. This produces a screen asking for iPhone Passcode which thief has. Enter Passcode leads to screen to enter new Apple ID password.
OK it can be prevented (I hope) by
1. disallow account changes in Screen Time, that way the Apple ID is harder to see. The My Name panel is grayed out, I also disallow passcode changes
2. use somebody else’s apple ID (or no ID) when you save screen time password. I use my Wife’s.

As Holmes would say, I have written a small monograph on the subject https://discussions.apple.com/docs/DOC-250007287
 
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Hopefully whatever Apple decides on in the end, they don’t forget those folks.
In my opinion they turned their back on them in iOS15 when they made Lock Screen passcode the key to the Crown Jewels and sacked the staff who used to deal with forgotten passwords.
 
Yes, I get it. But then you're reliant solely upon a certain piece of hardware to never fail... and nothing better happen to your finger(s) or your face. I don't have the answers, nor am I arguing against this security implementation... I just wonder how you get around such things now.

I have my passwords on a piece of paper in my safe deposit box at the bank. If anything ever happens to me, my family will subsequently have access to my stuff, which is the plan. If I implemented this additional security, it sounds like they'd be locked out of certain things permanently without my face.

What about somebody who is injured on the job and loses the only finger registered to Touch ID. What if somebody has an auto accident where their face went through the windshield? They're bandaged or permanently disfigured. What if these extra security measures were already put in place?

There really is no plan B here? Some kind of AppleID 2FA using the iCloud website and multiple devices?

Yes as the idea is that with this on, even with the device password and the phone, the Apple ID and certain other items are protected.

The feature depends on location. The original article was somewhat lacking in that regard.

According to Apple, it's only when your phone is located away from home. Therefore, I have enabled it.

"When Stolen Device Protection is enabled, some features and actions have additional security requirements when your iPhone is away from familiar locations such as home or work."

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212510
 
The feature depends on location. The original article was somewhat lacking in that regard.

According to Apple, it's only when your phone is located away from home. Therefore, I have enabled it.

There was a further update in March or April 2024, which enabled you to chose to have this turned on all the time (regardless of location). I've turned it on so it always needs the one hour delay.
 
There was a further update in March or April 2024, which enabled you to chose to have this turned on all the time (regardless of location). I've turned it on so it always needs the one hour delay.

@ADrunkenMarcus, when using Stolen Device Protection (SDP) set to "Always," is there a workaround to access protected system settings at a "familiar location" in the event that Face ID fails to operate properly?

For example, if the Face ID sensor develops a hardware problem, how does the owner of the iPhone regain access to the protected system settings in order to perform actions such as changing the device passcode or the Apple ID password? If these settings are protected by SDP "always," and SDP is protected by biometrics, and biometrics are no longer operational - then, what happens?
 
@ADrunkenMarcus, when using Stolen Device Protection (SDP) set to "Always," is there a workaround to access protected system settings at a "familiar location" in the event that Face ID fails to operate properly?

For example, if the Face ID sensor develops a hardware problem, how does the owner of the iPhone regain access to the protected system settings in order to perform actions such as changing the device passcode or the Apple ID password? If these settings are protected by SDP "always," and SDP is protected by biometrics, and biometrics are no longer operational - then, what happens?

The user would have to wipe the phone and restore from a backup.
 
The user would have to wipe the phone and restore from a backup.

@Morac, unfortunately, an unauthenticated user is blocked from performing a "wipe the phone" operation by Stolen Device Protection (SDP) - i.e., "Erase all content and settings" and "Reset All Settings" actions are unavailable (see here).

Thus, if SDP is set to "Always" and Face ID is not functional, is the owner of the iPhone permanently prevented from changing any of the security settings protected by SDP - including accessing passwords in Keychain, or changing the iPhone passcode?
 
@Morac, unfortunately, an unauthenticated user is blocked from performing a "wipe the phone" operation by Stolen Device Protection (SDP) - i.e., "Erase all content and settings" and "Reset All Settings" actions are unavailable (see here).

Thus, if SDP is set to "Always" and Face ID is not functional, is the owner of the iPhone permanently prevented from changing any of the security settings protected by SDP - including accessing passwords in Keychain, or changing the iPhone passcode?
I have SDP set to always on my 15 Pro. Should Face ID fail, I would enter my phone passcode and have to wait an hour to make any changes.
 
@Morac, unfortunately, an unauthenticated user is blocked from performing a "wipe the phone" operation by Stolen Device Protection (SDP) - i.e., "Erase all content and settings" and "Reset All Settings" actions are unavailable (see here).

Thus, if SDP is set to "Always" and Face ID is not functional, is the owner of the iPhone permanently prevented from changing any of the security settings protected by SDP - including accessing passwords in Keychain, or changing the iPhone passcode?

It would require using a computer (either Mac with Finder or Windows with iTunes) to do a restore. Worse come to worse you could do a recovery mode restore - https://support.apple.com/en-asia/118430

There’s nothing blocking you from making a backup so you can back the phone up, wipe using a computer and then restore the backup (presumably to a new working iphone).
 
I have SDP set to always on my 15 Pro. Should Face ID fail, I would enter my phone passcode and have to wait an hour to make any changes.

@Apple_Robert, have you tested this solution?

For example, would you kindly be willing to (1) force Face ID to fail (e.g., by wearing sunglasses or a disguise) while attempting to access a password saved in Keychain at a "familiar location," (2) wait an hour, and (3) see if a prompt appears to enter a passcode in order to circumvent the Face ID failure? My understanding is that "no passcode alternative or fallback" mechanism exists (see here).

Thank you.
 
It would require using a computer (either Mac with Finder or Windows with iTunes) to do a restore. Worse come to worse you could do a recovery mode restore - https://support.apple.com/en-asia/118430

There’s nothing blocking you from making a backup so you can back the phone up, wipe using a computer and then restore the backup (presumably to a new working iphone).

@Morac, this (very insightful) solution assumes that Stolen Device Protection (SDP) is automatically reset to a disabled state as a consequence of the restore operation. That may be (and hopefully would be) the case, especially since Face ID itself is disabled and needs to setup anew after restoring a phone from a backup.

Nonetheless, have you had an occasion to test the approach, to verify that it works as expected in practice?
 
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