The point is its unfair to accuse Samsung of copying Apple when bias exists. The fact that Apple won in the end because of the president says it all
This isn't about bias (as relates to particular parties). This is about having different legal standards and different ways of doing things in the United States.
Samsung has won against Apple in the U.S. on numerous issues. Apple has also won on certain issues. Samsung just recently won on a fairly significant issue in our highest court, the Supreme Court.
When it comes to the case we've been talking about here, the issue is that in the U.S. we have a constitutional right to trial by jury in most cases. Our Seventh Amendment reads:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
We have set a high bar when it comes to judges being allowed to disregard the factual determinations of juries. Judges don't just get to override what juries decide just because they think it's wrong (or because of their own outcome preferences). That is one way in which our Constitution protects us; we've decided that in some situations we'd rather trust groups of our fellow citizens than individual judges. It is a right that I have in American courts. It is also a right that both Apple and Samsung have in American courts. Are there problems created by our having that right? Of course, there are problems created by most all rights that we have. But we've decided that having those rights is worth the problems they create.
Whether a claim was obvious based on prior art is a finding of fact that we have a constititional right to have a jury - not judges - determine. There are legal standards for determining obviousness which a jury is instructed on. But it is then left to them, based on evidence that they hear, to make the factual determination. Whether a claim is infringed is also a finding of fact left to the jury (if a jury was desired by one of the parties). Claim construction - what terms used in patent claims mean, if they have particular or specialized meanings beyond the ordinary meaning of the words - is a legal issue left to judges. But once a jury is given claim constructions and hears testimony on whether a claim was infringed based on those claim constructions, it is for the jury to determine whether infringement occurred. And in doing is, it is for the jury to determine (if necessary) more specific meaning based on the claim constructions it is given. For instance, if a claim construction given by the judge was - Term X means 'having numerous subordinate parts' - it would be left to the jury to determine what numerous meant in that context, based on its own understanding of that term and perhaps on evidence that it heard.
In this case a jury was presented with the prior art (relating to the slide-to-unlock patent) and heard conflicting testimony regarding the patent's obviousness based on that prior art. The jury decided which testimony it found more credible (or decided, at least, that it wasn't proven by clear and convincing evidence that the patent was obvious). That is the jury's decision to make and it is the right of the parties to have that decision by a jury respected.
The jury was also given a claim construction for 'analyzer server' and heard conflicting evidence regarding whether that limitation was present in Samsung's allegedly infringing method. There should be no dispute that the definition for 'analyzer server' that the jury was given was correct. It had just been determined to be proper by the Federal Circuit and it was agreed to by both parties in this case (i.e. Apple and Samsung). Based on that definition, the jury determined that that limitation (i.e. an analyzer server) was present and that (based on all the other limitations also being present) infringement occurred.
So a jury made the relevant factual determinations. A panel of three circuit judges then, in essence, substituted its own judgement for that of the jury's (on factual matters). Those judges determined, in effect, that no reasonable jury could have found the way this jury did.
There were some issues with how those judges arrived at that conclusion. For instance, they seemed to rely on a different - more specific - meaning of the term 'analyzer server' than the one which the jury had been given and which the Federal Circuit (to include two of those same judges) had determined to be proper less than two years earlier. Based on that more specific understanding of the term, those judges determined in effect that no reasonable jury could have found as it did when it came to the presence of the analyzer server limitation. But again, because we have a constitutional right to have factual determinations made by juries, those judges shouldn't have disregarded the findings of the jury based on their own more specific understanding of the term. A more specific understanding of the term was, if it was needed, left to the jury (so long as that more specific understanding was, itself, plausible based on the evidence the jury heard). If those judges felt a more specific definition of the term was required, they should have provided it two years earlier when they settled on the legal definition of the term instead of coming up with it later (perhaps) in order to have a basis on which to overturn a result in this case. In effect the judges determined the legal rules the jury should abide by in making factual determinations and then, after the jury had made those determinations, added additional rules which they thought the jury should have abided by.
But the findings of those three judges - which had thrown out the jury's factual findings - were overturned by eight other judges. Those eight other judges decided that the high bar set for judges substituting their own judgment for that of juries had not been reached in this case (i.e. with regard to certain aspects of this case).
So we have a jury making decisions. Then we have 3 judges saying (some of) those decisions aren't supported by substantial evidence and could not have been reached by a reasonable jury while we have 9 other judges (the district judge and 8 circuit judges) saying, yes, those decisions were supported by substantial evidence and could have been reached by a reasonable jury. So, as our Constitution requires, the jury's decision has force (at least for now). (And, btw, the technical and legal background of the en banc judges was every bit as substantial as that of the original panel judges.)
The TL;DR: The issue here isn't bias in the United States. The issue is that we enjoy robust protection of our right to trial by juries, which includes the right to have the factual determinations made by juries respected by judges and appeals court. That right of course creates inefficiencies and problems sometimes as most rights do, but we've decided that the benefits of those rights outweigh the costs.
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