Apparently I may not have had an understanding of their setup. And I still don't.
However, I was not on my high horse. I was not being an ass. I was on a common sense horse. Sorry if my rudimentary understanding of the situation offended your Holmesian sensibilities.
What is there to not understand?
1) A personal computer with Handbrake installed got affected.
2) This computer had login credentials for a Git repository on a server on which the source code was stored.
3) The attacker used those credentials to download the source code directly from the Git server.
4) The names of the individual repositories was not obtained from the infected computer but by guessing, strongly implying that they had not been checked out to the infected computer at the time of the infection.
That is how it is described in plain English in the blog post.
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Not a single anti-malware program spotted this malware on time.
Define 'on time'. Technically, 'on time' would mean before a single computer is infected. Or rather before a single computer outside of the pool of test computers got attacked. But how could an anti-malware author ensure that his or her computers get attacked before anybody elses? You can run honeytraps, but in this case that wouldn't have helped.
I think the real yardstick is whether anti-malware apps detect something before the general media (like Macrumors) report about it. Or before X computers get infected.
Properly using a “firewall” for outgoing traffic is hard and cumbersome. I know, because I am using Little Snitch myself. The chance that I will notice if a trusted program starts connecting to malicious servers is far too low. I’d wager for most people this would not provide reasonable protection.
What should one do if, eg, Handbrake, asks to connect to something called edge-analytics.com? You could clamp down on anything that is not the domain of the software vendor. But who remembers all domains for all their applications. Adobe products still frequently phone home to macromedia.com, refusing all such other domain requests could easily block things like software update checks.
The only consolation is that lots of malware selects to stay inactive when it detects an installation of LittleSnitch. Probably to reduce the risk that somebody would see a LittleSnitch request and report it to the relevant authorities.
The problem could have been avoided differently: it seems that the developer put all eggs in one basket, i.e. used a single Mac and a single user account (admin account). They made themselves vulnerable to pretty much any kind of attack. They ought to have used separate user accounts as a minimum, even a separate administrator account to restrict root access.
The attacker tricked the developer into entering their admin password. Once that is done, it doesn't really matter what account is launching the infected app.