Super-virus (ethical debate)...

[iBlue]

My opinion as a scientist-in-training... this kind of research has to be done.

And the controversy of releasing findings like this isn't new... several years ago, there was a firestorm over the publishing of the sequenced genome of the 1918 flu virus that was responsible for a pandemic that killed 50 million people. Much of the criticisms are the same now as they were then:
- terrorists could use it against us
- what happens if it gets out of containment?
- it's irresponsible to do and release science like this

But if we don't do this type of research, someone else will. And we all know what happens when research is done in secrecy (Tuskegee, anyone? Atmospheric atomic tests?). This type of research is necessary and needs to be open because we can learn much about how viruses mutate and spread, guard ourselves against future outbreaks or attacks... and most importantly, needs to be subjected to critical peer review to ensure accurate results. The only way this is done, is if the results are published for rigorous peer review (and yes, that means beyond the initial manuscript review).

Classic recent example of how the openness of research is integral for advancing scientific understanding is the recent conflicting reports of the XMRV virus' role in chronic fatigue syndrome (much of what was originally published has since been largely debunked as contamination).

For an example of how understanding how viruses mutate and spread can aid our implementation of revised health protocols... look at work done by people like Mark Newman on social networks and disease outbreak. Recent changes to influenza immunization protocols can be directly and indirectly traced to research like this (re: who to immunize first... children, expectant mothers, the elderly... and health workers).

I understand why people are afraid and apprehensive of publishing research like this... but it is hugely necessary on multiple fronts.

I agree on everything except specifics of THE "RECIPE". That sort of information should be given to people with some sort of credentials rather than any old arsehole.

Believe me, I am all about opening public eyes on most matters of science (particularly pharmacology) but not so much on a specific how-to guide for an extremely contagious virus with a very high mortality rate.

 

[chaosbunny]

Anyone remembers the scene from Terminator 2 where Sarah Connor talks to the Cyberdyne guy researching the Terminator technology? She says something like "Right, how could you have known? It were people like you who created the atomic bomb. You think you are so clever ...".

 

[Don't panic]

QFT.



The trick is, we still have a LOT to learn about virus's, and we can still learn things from more mundane virus's, or by creating less deadly virus's to examine. There's no reason to create an airborne death virus when we can examine avian flu and some other airborne (non-lethal) virus.

That's not to say we should never create/examine a virus like this, but I'd feel safer if we did it on a different planet, or only after every-other virus was completely known.

That's not exactly how science works though. And IF a virus exists, and there's a .0000001% chance it will escape, that's scary enough.

There was a woman, Henrietta Lacks, who had cancer. She died, but her cancerous cells were saved, and grown in a lab. They were used to test the polio vaccine, among others. The problem is that they grew so well, and were so abundant, that 50 years later a majority of cell-lines in America had been contaminated and then overrun with the HeLa (Henrietta Lacks) cells. Most of the cell lines that they thought beloned to individuals, actually had been overrun by cells from a single person.

Now, imagine that scenario, only instead of a cancerous cell line used for testing drugs, it was a virus that killed. Scary, isn't it? And the HeLa cells weren't even airborne!

this is quite an exaggeration. Cross-contamination with HeLa (and other cell lines) exists (or, more correctly, existed) but certainly not to that magnitude.

but to the point. As I mentioned, a lot of this discussion is a bit futile.
the information on how to reproduce this result is ALREADY out there, there is no real need for a specific protocol, or even to know the specific mutations needed.
this is not coming out of the blue, from secretive research done in a vacuum: the same kind of research is being done in many labs, though maybe not with the same results (yet). so lots of the pieces are already published and in the public domain.
the key piece of knowledge missing was that it CAN be done, which many virologists doubted (many still do).
obviously i don't know the fine details, but what we do know —that these are 5 mutations in two genes, all 5 already present as natural variations; that several of them are already currently used to 'humanize' other viruses in other combinations (which i imagine can be easily deduced from previous publications from the same group); that an in vivo selection strategy was used— is more than enough for an average virologist, or even a non-virologist like myself, to reproduce it given enough means and, especially, will.

the important message here is that viruses that are in the wild now, are already a few mutations away from a highly virulent, infective and lethal form, and that each of the mutations needed for at least one such form (there are likely many more combinations) is also already existing in the wild, today.
viruses mutate. a lot. in certain situations information can be transmitted/exchanged horizontally between viral strands.

so the possibility that one of the bugs out there will evolve into a highly deadly one is non-zero. given the severity of the possible outcome, that's the key part of the message: non-zero. we should definitively prepare for it, have treatments and solutions that would be both reactive and proactive.