What I said in post #21 about Apple e-mail addresses has been true for years. I've been using Apple computers for 13 years, and I don't recall a time when it wasn't true. There's nothing recent about it.
Then how do you explain that we have five Apple IDs, three of which were created within the last three years (one of them even less than a year ago, as I said), which are all linked to pre-existing GMail addresses?
Of course you need to obtain a recovery code before being locked out. In the last paragraph of post #21, I'm not talking about a recovery code. I'm talking about an additional process that involves a trusted friend or family member. This process has nothing to do with recovery codes.
I said "recovery
contact", not code. That trusted friend is called a recovery contact, and he (or she) must be set up in advance.
You need one security key. I explained in post #21, second paragraph, why I think that Apple requires its users to have a backup key.
Sure, that is clearly one reason, namely to save less tech-savy users from themselves. If the second security key were merely recommended rather than required, most people wouldn't bother. When dealing with lots of users it's safer to just force them to use best practices.
However, there may be other reasons as well, and what I said does seem to be quite a likely one (provided that the password reset procedure is the way I suspect - which I can't check myself, as I haven't installed the beta).
I've explained my views on a scenario where someone steals a security key in post #15. I have my primary security key on a key ring and the backup elsewhere in a drawer. There is no reason to have both of them on my key ring. In any event, from my perspective theft of security keys, especially both the primary and backup keys, is so far fetched that it isn't worth worrying about. As discussed in post #15, I don't think that a thief can access my accounts with one of my security keys anyway.
I'm not sure you got my point.
The scenario I'm thinking about goes like this. Someone who knows you personally, like a work colleague, perhaps a distant friend of a friend, or maybe even your spouse who wants to divorce you and is looking for compromising evidence against you, etc., is targeting you specifically. They know your Apple ID, because it's your e-mail address. By being long enough around you, they will have noticed at some point that you're using a Yubikey that resides on your keychain, and that you use to keep that keychain in a specific pocket of your jacket. Now all they need is an opportunity to get that Yubikey while you're out for a smoke, or in the bathroom, or whatever. They only need thirty seconds. And unless you happen to need something from that keychain immediately upon your return, you may not notice its absence for quite some time. Actually, a smarter thief might also put an identical Yubikey back on the keychain, to keep you from noticing the theft for an even longer time - this could buy them days, or even weeks.
Now, that person won't be able to log into your account directly, because they don't know your password. But Apple provides a procedure for resetting the password in case you've forgotten it. Currently that procedure requires you to enter a six-digit code that's sent to another device of yours. The question is, how will this procedure work from now on? Will it take a Yubikey instead of that code - in which case the thief can reset your password and log in? Or will it require both keys - which the thief can't provide, since the second one is stored safely away?
My money is on the latter, but I can't test it. Since you've installed the beta, maybe you can try this out and tell us how it actually is?
