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I use yubikeys with my Apple ID. This essentially completely nullifies this security doesn't it? If all it takes is 6 digit passcode to get into the phone and change the AppleID password. If Apple doesn't acknowledge that as a major security flaw then they don't understand what security is. The whole point of USB security key is to prevent this very thing.
 
If you have a desktop iMac which ain't going anywhere, then one would be well advised to turn off Find My on that iMac to guard against it's data being wiped, would you agree.
And to allow your survivors to re-use it if you die. An elderly relative of mine died a couple years ago and left behind lots of fairy new Apple gear that was Activation Locked.
 
I use yubikeys with my Apple ID. This essentially completely nullifies this security doesn't it? If all it takes is 6 digit passcode to get into the phone and change the AppleID password. If Apple doesn't acknowledge that as a major security flaw then they don't understand what security is. The whole point of USB security key is to prevent this very thing.

Correct. Your device passcode has the power to completely nullify your security keys. So flawed!
 
And to allow your survivors to re-use it if you die. An elderly relative of mine died a couple years ago and left behind lots of fairy new Apple gear that was Activation Locked.
I believe Apple has a process whereby you can set up an inheritor for your stuff. They just have to provide a death certificate to Apple and personal ID.
 
No, it's not flawed. That power is good and saves the user experience. We all have the ability to make our devices as secure or insecure as we want. That is called flexibility.
I was expecting your circle argument. LOL! It is flawed! There are better approaches to balance security and user experience. Or at least give the customer the option to adjust the balance, just like they give the customer options for other security features.
 
Yes, I was expecting your circle argument. LOL! It is flawed! There are better approaches to balance security and user experience. Or at least give the customer the option to adjust the balance.
Yes. I was expecting your circular argument as well. It's designed to do exactly what it is designed to do. I understand we are all top experts in our fields on an anonymous internet forum, and there are valid things about the iphone and the apple ecosystem to criticize, but this is not one of them.

And as I said earlier we don't know if Apple will address the use case of assault in it's quest to lock down the iphone. We will have to wait and see.
 
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It's designed to do exactly what it is designed to do.

Nobody said it wasn't doing what Apple designed it to do. But the design is very flawed. Let's see your flawed circle argument again.....for the 83rd time. LOL!
 
Nobody said it wasn't doing what Apple designed it to do. But the design is very flawed. Let's see your flawed circle argument again.....for the 83rd time. LOL!
The design isn't flawed and I acknowledge that is your opinion. You may not like the design, but that doesn't mean it's flawed. I hate memes but this is beating the dead horse even more dead.
 
The design isn't flawed and I acknowledge that is your opinion. You may not like the design, but that doesn't mean it's flawed. I hate memes but this is beating the dead horse even more dead.

Their customers have the right to discuss and complain about their flawed design. Their design isn't gospal. Their customers want this security design improved, or at least give them the option. Times have changed and this security design needs to be improved.
 
Their customers have the right to discuss and complain about their flawed design. Their design isn't gospal. The customers want this security design modified, or at least give them the option. Times have changed and this security design needs to be improved.
No one is abridging your right to discuss this on MacRumors. You say the design is flawed, I say it isn't. That doesn't mean either of us are right or wrong for that matter. If you want Apple to offer more choice send a feedback request. It's all well and good that "times have changed" but that doesn't mean Apple agrees with you about the design. It also doesn't mean Apple isn't brainstorming or has some update to lessen the attack.
 
No one is abridging your right to discuss this on MacRumors. You say the design is flawed, I say it isn't. That doesn't mean either of us are right or wrong for that matter. If you want Apple to offer more choice send a feedback request. It's all well and good that "times have changed" but that doesn't mean Apple agrees with you about the design. It also doesn't mean Apple isn't brainstorming or has some update to lessen the attack.

Feedback has already been given to Apple. The more this is discussed, the more feedback they hear from their customers, and the more media exposure, all might help get this changed by Apple.
 
Feedback has already been given to Apple. The more this is discussed, the more feedback they hear from their customers, and the more media exposure, all might help get this changed by Apple.
Also, the more that solutions to discuss and mitigate this type of assault are discussed, the more likely it may be that Apple issues a support document to help people be more security conscious if they frequent places that are known for this type of social engineering. Media exposure may also push Apple to do that.
 
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I've been mentally thinking through what would happen if a desktop was wiped and locked remotely by a bad actor. Would a Time Machine backup (encrypted) be of any use? I rotate mine and keep at least one off-site at all times, but now I'm thinking that just with a stolen iPhone, Find My on, and a known Device (iPhone) Passcode even the Time Machine backup would be useless on remotely locked hardware; I'd have to just buy an entire new Mac and restore it from the previous computer's back up. Wow.

The Device Passcode really wields a massive amount of power and control once you start thinking about it and testing.

Your problem is your AppleID would be locked. So how do you get back into your Mac to utilize TM?
 
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I have an iMac (the "mother ship") with two TM backups running 24/7, an iPad, an iPhone, an Apple Watch, and an old 2015 MB Pro.

Thinking it most unlikely that anyone breaking into our home (in the suburbs on the well-lit corner of an intersection with a stoplight) is going to muscle my 27" iMac out the door, I decided to protect myself by turning off [Find My] for that iMac.

Works for me.

For those with laptops who would not want to do so, then an iCloud backup system like BackBlaze would appear to be a solution. They are not that expensive, for one computer, and have a sterling reputation.
 
Your problem is your AppleID would be locked. So how do you get back into your Mac to utilize TM?
What am I missing here? Locking you out of your iCloud account doesn't lock you out of your Mac, does it?

Set up a brand new Apple ID with a different email address, boot up in Recovery Mode, erase the Macintosh HD, restore the macOS, then run migration assistant.
 
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The design isn't flawed and I acknowledge that is your opinion. You may not like the design, but that doesn't mean it's flawed. I hate memes but this is beating the dead horse even more dead.
No the design is flawed. If I activate hardware security keys for my iCloud account I clearly prioritize security over convenience. I should not be able to change my account password without one of those hardware keys. Its a massive fail on Apple's part.
 
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No, it's not flawed. That power is good and saves the user experience. We all have the ability to make our devices as secure or insecure as we want. That is called flexibility.
But we don't have the ability to make our devices as secure or insecure as we want.
 
Here's my updated list of suggested solutions from this thread and casually talking to friends. I jot this stuff down fairly quickly while talking so expect it to be imperfect :)

Solution Suggestions:

01) In order to change your iCloud password you should have to enter in the old/current password AND the device unlock passcode. Ideally, an iCloud passcode change would require: Face ID or Touch ID, current iCloud passcode, and device passcode.


02) All account critical settings on iOS and macOS should (optionally) be able to be locked behind an at least 6 digit passcode with the option to be alphanumeric and CANNOT also be the same as any currently used passcode like iCloud or device unlock. Adding Face ID and Touch ID authentication should be an option here as well.


03) There should be an option to toggle on a 24hr waiting period for an iCloud password reset to take effect.


04) Important apps like banking apps, stock market apps, email or whatever app (or folder) the user chooses, should have the option to be locked behind a passcode which must be entered before they launch. These apps and folder self-lock when the phone locks.


05) Once Advanced Data Protection is on, changing the Recovery Key or turning the Recovery Key off should require the device unlock passcode AND the iCloud passcode and probably Face ID or Touch ID as well. It should also have a waiting period as an user-settable option for 6, 12, or 24 hours.


06) Screen time passcode should not be able to be added, removed, or changed without iCloud passcode AND device passcode and probably Face ID or Touch ID as well.


07) If FaceID fails for Passwords (in Settings), require iCloud passcode AND Device passcode to unlock. Maybe have it always require some passcode.


08) Removing devices from your account through Safety Check should require iCloud passcode and device passcode and probably Face ID or Touch ID as well.


09) Apple could make a “duress” passcode an option, (or button presses) where when it’s used it locks down the phone or erases it (options set by the phone’s owner) or turns on Lockdown Mode.


10) FaceID and Touch ID should not be able to be altered without iCloud Passcode and Device Passcode.


11) Maybe a quick way to enable Lockdown Mode.


12) Apple should have an option to disable character preview on keyboard when typing passcodes. Also, an option to toggle off the last character shown in text entry box when typing passcodes.


13) There is a trusted emergency contact option available to regain access to iCloud if password is forgotten or changed. However, to change, remove, or add a trusted emergency contact, the iCloud password, device unlock passcode, and biometric ID should be required.


14) iCloud passwords should have an optional hint available in case the passcode is forgotten.


15) Apple should add the ability to require an app to be unlocked with a pin or biometric ID in that app’s settings via a toggle. For example in an app’s settings “Require Face ID or Touch ID to open.”


16) Any account change should have the option to lock it behind a physical MFA device like a yubikey.


17) Another suggestion is to make changing your iCloud password require 2 device authentication. But this will not work for those that only own one device, obviously.


18) In the case of someone with only an iPhone and no other apple devices or home computer or laptop changing iCloud password should not send any manner of confirmation code or email to that single specific device. This is like an ATM telling you your PIN code. In this case something like security questions (that are NOT stored in Passwords) should be used. And in this case these answers would simply have to be remembered by the user as they would not be contained on the phone. Maybe they could be in a locked Note, but then that password would be on the phone also, potentially, in Passwords. The point is any verification for a person who only has an iPhone and no other computer or device should be something not retained on the phone and only kept in that person’s brain.


19) Screen Time, if set to not allow account or password changes, should prevent iCloud passcode from being changed until the Screen Time passcode is entered.


20) If a Screen Time passcode is set, it should not be allowed to be altered if the device passcode is used to reset the AppleID.


21) If one forgets their Screen Time passcode, there should not be any “Forgot AppleID passcode?” presented to recover or change it.


Concerns once passcode is known by bad actor:


01) With Find My enabled when a bad actor has control of your phone (via just the device unlock passcode, alone) and it is a trusted device, the bad actor can permanently lock you out of ALL your other “Find My” enabled devices.


02) They can not only see where all your other Find My devices are, but if you are carrying one with you they can track and follow you to steal it and because they may already have control of ALL your devices, and the bad actor would be the only one able to use them. They can PRE-STEAL your devices even before they physically have them and lock them so that only they can use them.


03) A bad actor could possibly see where you are due to your airtags and also know that you have a laptop or desktop at home and steal it since they can see you are not at home.
i just have one - don't go to a hookup bar and get drunk.
Sorted.
 
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What am I missing here? Locking you out of your iCloud account doesn't lock you out of your Mac, does it?

Set up a brand new Apple ID with a different email address, boot up in Recovery Mode, erase the Macintosh HD, restore the macOS, then run migration assistant.
The way I read this support article, just like with an iOS device, Activation Lock (turned on with Find My) will prevent others from being able to use a [edit: T2 or Apple Silicon-equipped] Mac if it’s lost, so if it was set up with your Apple ID and you get locked out of that…


 
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No the design is flawed. If I activate hardware security keys for my iCloud account I clearly prioritize security over convenience. I should not be able to change my account password without one of those hardware keys. Its a massive fail on Apple's part.

But we don't have the ability to make our devices as secure or insecure as we want.
You may not like the design, but it isn't flawed. Keep your device and passcode secure, set a screen time password with appropriate permissions and there is little chance damage can be done even if your phone is snatched from your hand. That is not to say Apple will or will not provide some updates to lessen the chance of this happening with a future ios release.

There is security vs usability for two billion devices and it is not a fail in any way shape or form on Apples' part.
 
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What am I missing here? Locking you out of your iCloud account doesn't lock you out of your Mac, does it?

Set up a brand new Apple ID with a different email address, boot up in Recovery Mode, erase the Macintosh HD, restore the macOS, then run migration assistant.

Okay …
The “thief” locks your AppleID.

Can you still log into you Mac?
 
You may not like the design, but it isn't flawed. Keep your device and passcode secure, set a screen time password with appropriate permissions and there is little chance damage can be done even if your phone is snatched from your hand. That is not to say Apple will or will not provide some updates to lessen the chance of this happening with a future ios release.

There is security vs usability for two billion devices and it is not a fail in any way shape or form on Apples' part.
I can do all that, turn on end to end encryption on my iCloud account and switch to hardware keys for 2FA. But if anyone obtains my passcode for any of my Apple Devices they can lock me out of all of them with just that passcode.

That is a huge flaw in Apple's security model. Unlike some people here I do expect Apple to fix it. I don't expect them to admit it is a huge flaw though because they will be expecting to be sued. If the woman in the WSJ video didn't have a lawyer before the video was published she does now.
 
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