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Everything is end to end encrypted, meaning only you have access to data.


Someone might have already corrected you. Only certain sensitive information is encrypted end to end. It doesn’t include iMessage, photos and notes. In fact in includes very specific data. Rest is accessible to Apple and they will provide to law enforcement if requested with a warrant.
 
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Someone might have already corrected you. Only certain sensitive information is encrypted end to end. It doesn’t include iMessage, photos and notes. In fact in includes very specific data. Rest is accessible to Apple and they will provide to law enforcement if requested with a warrant.
iMessage is end to end encrypted
 
Researching how TouchID works in the most cheapest chinese phones and how to implement it in the Iphones in 2024.
 
They could make iOS open source and then the community can improve upon it and also install it on non-Apple devices. :p
I make my living developing iOS applications. The idea that I would download the iOS source code, and study it in my spare time to the point where I understand it well enough to find hidden bugs and fix them, without any pay, instead of spending my time with my wife and other people I love, that is just ludicrous.

And what makes you think Apple has the slightest interest in allowing you to install iOS on a non-Apple device?
 
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That said, iMessage logs available unencrypted to the NSA would still include sender, receiver, timestamp, and the size of the message. Likewise with FaceTime – notably if you've done group FaceTime to a number of individuals under surveillance.
iMessage is end to end encrypted and I doubt Apple keeps logs of any of the communication, Apple’s only provides an introduction between the devices, the message data is then sent directly from the senders device to the receivers device.
Also iMessage, health data and a number of other items in the cloud is also encrypted with the device passcode as well so Apple cannot decrypt them
 
Everything is end to end encrypted, meaning only you have access to data.


Governments require data to be stored locally because states are not obligated to conform to other states’ data protection laws.
I’m afraid that not everything is end to end encrypted, although I wish it was the case.

Stuff that’s end to end encrypted-
Home data
Apple Card transaction and finance data
Health data
Keychain
Safari history and iCloud tabs
Siri info and volcab learned from spellcheck
Screen time
Wifi and Bluetooth keys and passwords.

It gets a bit weird with Messages. It is also end to end encrypted, but if you have iCloud backup on, then they’re saved there, and so the encryption is broken in this case and they’re viewable.
However if you have messages in cloud on, the that is e2e so you can have your messages backed up that way, and keep iCloud back up off. (Technically though this isn’t ‘backing up’ your messages, just enabling them on every device. But can achieve a similar effect as long as you’re careful).

The best practices are to turn off iCloud back up and to back up on your computer using encryption.
 
How does Apple ensure that they are not making the research to find exploits easier but that the researcher doesn’t sell a found exploit to a 3rd party for more than Apple offers?

Is Apple monitoring and recording the nature and content of the researcher’s work, so they know who to go after should a bad faith researcher go rogue?
You can be sure of that. It will only go to researchers whose identity Apple knows, living in places where Apple can sue the hell out of them if they go rogue.
 
Apple has the obligation under the law to provide any data the NSA request, that includes all of the customer's data.
No. NSA isn’t the police. And the police (FBI, for example) can only get data that is relevant to a crime, and in the possession of Apple, and with a search warrant.
 
Someone might have already corrected you. Only certain sensitive information is encrypted end to end. It doesn’t include iMessage, photos and notes. In fact in includes very specific data. Rest is accessible to Apple and they will provide to law enforcement if requested with a warrant.
in fact, you need correcting. synced data such as messages, photos and notes are all encrypted with keys that Apple does not have and so cannot hand over the keys of unencrypted data to anyone. Apple does not store the receiver or sender of messages with iMessage.
The only items not encrypyed in iCloud are the iOS backups which do NOT contain any synced data. So if it's synced it's secure. CloudKit handles all this.
In fact the file isn't encrypted as a whole, it's broken up into "chunks" and each part encrypted with a seperate key. This is all in Apple's Platform Security documents.

look at https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
It adds more color to the section people cite to say that iCloud only encrypts a small set of items.
 
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No. NSA isn’t the police. And the police (FBI, for example) can only get data that is relevant to a crime, and in the possession of Apple, and with a search warrant.
After you have lived a few more years you will come to understand that this statement about "only relevant to crime" is patently false. The FBI want you to believe that, but it is just an illusion. Wait, better to call it marketing. The FBI is one of the most corrupt organizations in the government and has been since it was run by Hoover. Go read some history.
 
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Seems to be timed very closely with this post from 20 Dec:

The Great iPwnJournalists Hacked with Suspected NSO Group iMessage ‘Zero-Click’ Exploit​

https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-g...pected-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit/
All three processes were running as root. We were unable to retrieve these binaries from flash memory, as we did not have access to a jailbreak for iPhone 11 running iOS 13.5.1.

h/t to Patrick Wardle's tweets:
 
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They probably have a little more than what they are advertising. For example on Big Sur the amount of data on what you are doing on your Mac that goes back to Apple is a lot.

Most people don't know but the PRISM surveillance program (you can find more info here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program)) force US companies to deliver any data they have to the NSA (with a warrant but they are easy to obtain and it has been proven the system as been easily abused) and the said company as the legal obligation not to divulge they had to give it.

So Apple will never admit they gave away your data because it would be a federal offense for them to do so (plus bad publicity) but they are, they have been identified as one of the the company that had the most requests from the NSA since 2008. Sorry, rude awakening but it's not Apple's fault.
You really don't have a clue.
 
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Any data they have which is why all the “please make a backdoor access or else” threats and pushes have been a thing. Since Apple DOES NOT have access to the data, the best they can do is give a handful of an encrypted soup... and then good luck with that.

See, Apple has protected the consumer and themselves, rippling into protecting privacy at large, by making sure that they don’t at all cost collect any sensitive or identifying information. I understand that one of the weakest links was iCloud but two factor authentication has increased security there... in other countries not having the information ready when asked could at best mean being displaced by a new puppet that would or even execution for treason at worst.

I come from Venezuela, in 2001 a petition was signed to let the president be let go, call it an impeachment of sorts... but that ended up in 20K+ workers getting axed from their positions, especially if linked to public sector or a private company with public sector contracts and ties, because the government basically used it as a trap to see who was on their side... I left a long time ago, but that happens often. From getting fired to kidnapped to never seen ever again.
Trust me when I say that no, the US is nowhere near close what happens in other countries, by far, I get the sentiment that it seems to steer in the wrong direction badly but it’s for sure on time for the proper corrections.
Isn't it great to have people who know exactly what data Apple collects and what they do with it, Why does the USA even need the nsa? amartinez1660 seems to have all the answers
 
Now wouldn't it be hilarious if the an .ipsw of the specific fork of iOS were to get into the wild..
 
Now wouldn't it be hilarious if the an .ipsw of the specific fork of iOS were to get into the wild..
Probably binded to hardware. Booting requires authentication from Apple for the hardware identifier etc.

Unrelated, but I found iPhone illustrations in the verbose mode text cropped by notch is hideous, lol.

Same here. Why in the earth must that area next to notch be actual app screen area by default? When I had iPhone 12 it was really disturbing. For example safari shows web page on landscape starting from top so part of page goes behind the notch. I don't get it why Apple has made this decision. Use the space for time + battery + signals only ..
 
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Apple in July announced the launch of a new Apple Security Research Device Program, which is designed to provide researchers with specially-configured iPhones that are equipped with unique code execution and containment policies to support security research.
next I’d like to see them encrypt all customer data on their servers with the option to allow Apple to store your key (default) or the user to manage their own key. That way the security services have to go to savvy users for their decryption key if they want to see our data.

edit: I see above someone mentions that it is in fact encrypted. When did this happen, because it used to be that backups weren’t.

edit2: appears I was right when digging deeper, iCloud backup stores the key. somewhat defeats the object of encryption on the server :/
 
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next I’d like to see them encrypt all customer data on their servers with the option to allow Apple to store your key (default) or the user to manage their own key. That way the security services have to go to savvy users for their decryption key if they want to see our data.

edit: I see above someone mentions that it is in fact encrypted. When did this happen, because it used to be that backups weren’t.

edit2: appears I was right when digging deeper, iCloud backup stores the key. somewhat defeats the object of encryption on the server :/
It’s not e2e encrypted, only part of it is, as I outlined which in a previous response.
iCloud back up is sadly not end to end encrypted.

However, this doesn’t defeat the concept of encryption at rest. Your stuff remains secure from casual eyes, hackers etc, it just means it can be readable should Apple be demanded the keys by law enforcement. If that’s something that you don’t want, then either don’t use iCloud back up, or use encrypted containers for your important stuff.

Obviously- I’m not condoning the fact Apple don’t e2e iCloud backup, I really would prefer end to end encryption of all my stuff. It is however in keeping with most other none specialist cloud providers.
Hoping for change though.
 
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Obviously- I’m not condoning the fact Apple don’t e2e iCloud backup, I really would prefer end to end encryption of all my stuff. It is however in keeping with most other none specialist cloud providers.

Hoping for change though.
I may be confused about either the technical nuance or corporate logic of this, but it seems reasonable to assume that the reason Apple makes a distinction with the iCloud backups is that they are exactly the sort of thing that a non-expert user (the vast majority) is going to desperately need, with no way to retrieve the key on their end, and not have access to. By maintaining the keys on Apple's end, it's possible for a user to retrieve their backed-up data after an account hack or poorly-prepared-for disaster. Were the key completely user-side, they'd be out of luck.

Contrast with e2e encryption on messaging and the other data Apple does encrypt e2e, which has no customer disadvantage--it only prevents man-in-middle spying. Basically it seems like Apple is trading off between situations in which there is genuine advantage to less-secure encryption for "everyday user" functionality, and doing the best available in situations where they can without impacting those same users.

Notable in this is that technically proficient users who understand the potential risks of a non-user-key-encrypted cloud backup can do a local backup, which is encrypted with a local key.

Why make a big deal out of being a researcher then do something flagrantly illegal?

But even if you don't trust them, each one has to do the calculus: Other people have the same device I have. I find a bug that Apple is willing to pay $500,000 for and can get the payout for immediately, legally, no questions asked.

Or I can try to find some very wealthy criminal or state actor who is willing to pay $2,000,000 for it, launder the money, probably quit my job because people are probably going to ask questions if I flaunt it, and my buyer is going to have to be okay with the risk that one of the other researchers isn't going to find the same bug tomorrow.

All of which is to say that an illegal buyer is going to have to be either extremely rich or extremely confident that you're better than the other researchers working on the same problem to be willing to pay big for it, and you're going to be under a lot more scrutiny if you suddenly get rich.
After thinking about this more, I realized that it's even more inherently "good" than I made out with this reasoning. Logic:

If I'm a bad-faith security researcher, I really don't want to let the people I'm selling the hack I discovered know who I am. If they know who I am, they can both ruin my career and put me in prison by making public that I sold them a hack, without harming themselves. Not to mention that the Russian mob/government could also have me killed if they decide I know too much.

So I'm going to pretend to be an anonymous blackhat when I sell the hole I discovered on the dark web. At which point, why would I not immediately turn around, report the bug to Apple, and collect the payout from them too? If I covered my tracks well it'll just look like a coincidence, it insulates me from accusations that I found a bug and didn't disclose it, and I make even more money.

Basically, even a bad-faith public security researcher would presumably still report the bug to get paid twice for it, in which case the worst harm might be a short period between when I sold it illegally and cashed in publicly.
 
iMessage is end to end encrypted

Great. This is what happens when you don’t read the thread or apply the context. iMessage storage in iCloud is not end to end encrypted. On devices yes but that is not what we were talking about.
 
in fact, you need correcting. synced data such as messages, photos and notes are all encrypted with keys that Apple does not have and so cannot hand over the keys of unencrypted data to anyone. Apple does not store the receiver or sender of messages with iMessage.
The only items not encrypyed in iCloud are the iOS backups which do NOT contain any synced data. So if it's synced it's secure. CloudKit handles all this.
In fact the file isn't encrypted as a whole, it's broken up into "chunks" and each part encrypted with a seperate key. This is all in Apple's Platform Security documents.

look at https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
It adds more color to the section people cite to say that iCloud only encrypts a small set of items.

I really hate to be rude on any forums but seriously your lack of understanding an article is amazing. There are two sections in that article. Encrypted and end to end encrypted. iMessage is encrypted yes but on iCloud Apple has the key. Apple doesn’t have the key for end to end encrypted.
 
Great. This is what happens when you don’t read the thread or apply the context. iMessage storage in iCloud is not end to end encrypted. On devices yes but that is not what we were talking about.
No, iMessage on iCloud is end to end encrypted. iCloud backups store the key if you choose to use backups as (according to Apple) the entire point of the backups is that if you lose the key you can restore your phone including your messages. Whether or not that is a good justification may be up for debate, but iCloud backups and iMessage on iCloud are two different things. If you only meant the former, then you need to be more precise as iMessage is end to end encrypted on iCloud. Because from your post it seems that you don’t understand that iMessage on iCloud and iCloud backups are two different services, both on iCloud and are distinct from iMessage on the device.

This is in fact true for services in general. The iCloud services are end to end encrypted. An iCloud backup may store the keys to that encryption.
 
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I may be confused about either the technical nuance or corporate logic of this, but it seems reasonable to assume that the reason Apple makes a distinction with the iCloud backups is that they are exactly the sort of thing that a non-expert user (the vast majority) is going to desperately need, with no way to retrieve the key on their end, and not have access to. By maintaining the keys on Apple's end, it's possible for a user to retrieve their backed-up data after an account hack or poorly-prepared-for disaster. Were the key completely user-side, they'd be out of luck.

Contrast with e2e encryption on messaging and the other data Apple does encrypt e2e, which has no customer disadvantage--it only prevents man-in-middle spying. Basically it seems like Apple is trading off between situations in which there is genuine advantage to less-secure encryption for "everyday user" functionality, and doing the best available in situations where they can without impacting those same users.

Notable in this is that technically proficient users who understand the potential risks of a non-user-key-encrypted cloud backup can do a local backup, which is encrypted with a local key.
Yup. Exactly why. Wish there was an ‘opt in’ but I fully understand why there is not, from a customer service point of view, with an operation the size of apples. If one is interested, there are plenty of ways to retain your privacy to a huge extent. If you’re not- then the default is a massive benefit over Google or other operators for basic privacy. If you want to hide from law enforcement it’s very possible- you just have to research it a bit- which I assume you would. Otherwise it’s pretty damn secure.
 
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