That’s a mischaracterization. The DMA isn’t about one company, it’s about recurring patterns of behavior observed across many dominant platforms over many years, through formal competition law cases.
Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Facebook all were investigated under Article 101 and 102 TFEU for:
- self-preferencing,
- refusal to interoperate,
- tying and bundling,
- anti-steering,
- and leveraging market dominance into adjacent services.
These weren’t ideological opinions they were legal decisions, backed by enforcement processes, evidence, and often court rulings. And they revealed a pattern: once digital firms gain entrenched market power, certain types of abuse keep recurring.
So the EU didn’t “study Apple” it studied its own case law. The DMA is the result of that:
👉 It codifies proven abusive behaviors as clear-cut ex ante obligations.
👉 It applies those rules only to platforms that meet the threshold of systemic gatekeeping power.
👉 It creates a regulatory shortcut to avoid wasting years on repeat legal battles over the same conduct.
That’s not ideology. That’s what a civil law system does when precedent isn’t binding: it legislates based on the accumulated legal logic of past enforcement.
And in a civil law system, unlike in the U.S., precedent isn’t law. So if you want to build consistent, enforceable obligations, you need legislation, not just court rulings. That’s why the DMA was necessary because past rulings didn’t bind future conduct.