iOS 15 Includes Built-In Password Authenticator With Autofill, Replacing Google Authenticator and Authy

[Wildkraut]

Yes, but it's end-to-end encryption. The poster could have meant that the plaintext passwords never hit the iCloud. Or I could just be giving them a free way to wiggle out of an argument.

The meat of end-to-end encryption is that, "the messages are encrypted by the sender but the third party does not have a means to decrypt them, and stores them encrypted. The recipients retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it themselves."

But this topic landed me on this page (Apple Support: iCloud security overview) which was very clarifying for me. 128-bit AES encryption is indeed "industry standard", but it can be decrypted. Unless end-to-end encrypted, the private keys would need to be stored on Apple's servers because the same key used to encrypt is the key used to decrypt.

What I'm not really sure about is why law enforcement seems to have readily available access to iCloud Backups but not Messages. That article seems to imply that they would have access to stored messages, but it may be that end-to-end encryption also plays a role in Messages too. If not, hopefully that is introduced here at WWDC. Still reviewing updates! Lots of posts today!

Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages.

Well, If you enable Messages over the iCloud and iCloud backups, Apple and Authorities can access your msgs through your iCloud backups. Simply because the encryption of your backups is done with Apples own private key. Once they download your backup and decrypt it with *their* key, they can access your private keys and decrypt your messages by using your private key.

Just Apple Marketing Mumbo Jumbo, to make people feel more secure...
And I bet they have plenty of *cough, cough* undiscovered backdoors build-in...

 

[FindingAvalon]

Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages.

Well, If you enable Messages over the iCloud and iCloud backups, Apple and Authorities can access your msgs through your iCloud backups. Simply because the encryption of your backups is done with Apples own private key. Once they download your backup and decrypt it with *their* key, they can access your private keys and decrypt your messages by using your private key.

Just Apple Marketing Mumbo Jumbo, to make people feel more secure...
And I bet they have plenty of *cough, cough* undiscovered backdoors build-in...

So, are you worried about someone getting a warrant for them to do that? They can get warrants for your own backups at your home too.

 

[TechGuy327]

what if i want to use my preferred authy app?

You still can use it. I use 1Password for security codes and it works great.

 

[Wildkraut]

So, are you worried about someone getting a warrant for them to do that? They can get warrants for your own backups at your home too.

I'm not worried, my stuff is fully encrypted on my own server, far from the internet, with few hardware firewalls in-between, and honeypots. Just a gun right on my head might make me decrypt it... but this is very unlikely gonna happen, compared to the higher risk of an attack on Apples infrastructure and iCloud dumps.

I see "The Fappening Reloaded" coming!

 

[Apple_Robert]

Will there be an option to have 2FA codes appearing on Apple Watch as well?

I don't why not so long as the watch is on the wrist and unlocked.

 

[Apple_Robert]

Wait, can someone confirm that the codes are synced with Mac, iPad and other iOS devices (when updated to iOS 15 obviously)?

If the feature works anything like OTP Auth it will do. Great feature. OTP Auth also offers the option of 2FA to be totally local on the device not in the cloud.

 

[humole]

Since i'm mostly on windows PC's now, think i'm going to move away from iPhone & iPad.

this news solidifies it as how the hell are you suppose to get apple 2FA on windows if Sarfari isn't on windows.

Hmm I think you are misunderstanding how this is supposed to work, it would be like the stand alon authenticator apps from google or microsoft. Where you have a collection of code generators for 2FA so even with the other apps it wouldn't matter if you are on windows or macos or the browser.

 

[FindingAvalon]

I'm not worried, my stuff is fully encrypted on my own server, far from the internet, with few hardware firewalls in-between, and honeypots. Just a gun right on my head might make me decrypt it... but this is very unlikely gonna happen, compared to the higher risk of an attack on Apples infrastructure and iCloud dumps.

I see "The Fappening Reloaded" coming!

The fappening occurred via social engineering and had nothing to do with Apple’s security. Additionally, Apple encrypts user keys and I’m sure they keep their own keys offline.

 

[Wildkraut]

The fappening occurred via social engineering and had nothing to do with Apple’s security. Additionally, Apple encrypts user keys and I’m sure they keep their own keys offline.

Beeeeep - wrong, Apple didn't secure iCloud decently against brute-force attacks.

It was possible to use the over social engineering gathered infos and shoot uncountable passwords against the iCloud authentication interface, which didn't limit nor delay the tryouts.

I still can see "The Fappening Reloaded" coming!

 

[hot-gril]

Yes, but it's end-to-end encryption. The poster could have meant that the plaintext passwords never hit the iCloud. Or I could just be giving them a free way to wiggle out of an argument.

The meat of end-to-end encryption is that, "the messages are encrypted by the sender but the third party does not have a means to decrypt them, and stores them encrypted. The recipients retrieve the encrypted data and decrypt it themselves."

But this topic landed me on this page (Apple Support: iCloud security overview) which was very clarifying for me. 128-bit AES encryption is indeed "industry standard", but it can be decrypted. Unless end-to-end encrypted, the private keys would need to be stored on Apple's servers because the same key used to encrypt is the key used to decrypt.

What I'm not really sure about is why law enforcement seems to have readily available access to iCloud Backups but not Messages. That article seems to imply that they would have access to stored messages, but it may be that end-to-end encryption also plays a role in Messages too. If not, hopefully that is introduced here at WWDC. Still reviewing updates! Lots of posts today!

iMessage is E2EE, iCloud backups aren't. That's why.

Technically Apple could mitm attack iMessage even though it's E2EE, but it has to be more deliberate. Say they want to know what you're telling Bob. They'd make their own set of keys and tell your devices, this public key is Bob's. Then you message Bob, Apple receives the message and reads it, and they relay it to Bob's actual devices.

Anyway, whether or not your data is E2EE, it's considered to be "in the Cloud."

 

[Wildkraut]

Messages are E2EE, iCloud backups aren't.

And the iCloud backups includes the keys to decrypt messages.
In other words, an on purpose backdoor.

 

[hot-gril]

And the iCloud backups includes the keys to decrypt messages.
In other words, an on purpose backdoor.

I'm not sure about that. I think the messages are just stored in the backups like any other data and are therefore accessible. Where do you see that the iMessage keys are too?

The difference being that if you disable iCloud backups, they shouldn't know how to decrypt your future messages.

 

[Wildkraut]

I'm not sure about that. I think the messages are just stored in the backups like any other data and are therefore accessible. Where do you see that the iMessage keys are too?

The difference being that if you disable iCloud backups, they shouldn't know how to decrypt your future messages.

Right here Sir... https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages.

 

[aajeevlin]

Noice. 2-Factor was my only hold out with 1Password. Been holding my 1Password license since version 6.

Same here, Bought it back in version 6. I need to see how easy this is to use, the other good thing about 1password is that you can control your dataabse. I need to be sure there is now way I can screw myself over....haha

 

[Stromos]

Then just go on your iPhone and under the Password in Settings, just like pressing Authy or whatever else on your phone to log onto something else.

Not following at all. Right now I log into any machine not just my Mac and I can pull up a MFA code via Authy on my phone or watch. Easy. If you're saying moving to keychain means I need to go digging in settings on my iPhone when I need a code is not easy or convenient.

The other reason I hate keychain. Apple has gone out of their way to prevent exporting. So secure if I want to move passwords elsewhere I can manually copy them to Keepass over a couple hours.

Great features if you only use Keychain. As always doesn't play well with others because Apple.

 

[hot-gril]

Right here Sir... https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages.

Below it, it says
> When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device to protect future messages and isn't stored by Apple.

So if you have it off then turn it on, I'm not sure if they also change the keys so Apple doesn't instantly gain access to your old messages that you don't have stored but they might.

 

[travelsheep]

Need password protection for Authenticator app. When someone snatches your phone while unlocked all these 2-factor passwords are exposed.

 

[Wreckus]

Hmm I think you are misunderstanding how this is supposed to work, it would be like the stand alon authenticator apps from google or microsoft. Where you have a collection of code generators for 2FA so even with the other apps it wouldn't matter if you are on windows or macos or the browser.

Until Apple says that it will be available on Windows, then I’m expecting that you must use Safari or on a Mac, iPhone, or iPad.

Apple’s track record with windows apps suck and not expecting it to get better.

 

[arvinsim]

Unfortunately, I don't think this will be cross-platform.

 

[JippaLippa]

Don't know what I'll do...
On one hand I'm satisfied with authy, on the other I'd love to minimize the amount of accounts and apps in my digital life.

We'll see...

 

[JippaLippa]

Until Apple says that it will be available on Windows, then I’m expecting that you must use Safari or on a Mac, iPhone, or iPad.

Apple’s track record with windows apps suck and not expecting it to get better.

Ages ago, back in early high school, I had a first gen iPod shuffle (actually my first apple device) and I rember how awful itunes was on windows...
Dark days indeed...

 

[Apple_Robert]

Below it, it says
> When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device to protect future messages and isn't stored by Apple.

So if you have it off then turn it on, I'm not sure if they also change the keys so Apple doesn't instantly gain access to your old messages that you don't have stored but they might.

Apple has the access key to open messages that are stored in the cloud. That is why it is not a good idea to use iMessage in the cloud or back-up your devices to the cloud. When you do that, a access key (Apple backdoor) is also uploaded. That is how Apple can gain access to turn your stuff over the the authorities.

 

[Anthony Sullivan]

I would never ever use these authenticators. I lost my iPhone a couple of years ago and had no way to regain access to accounts that.

 

[aajeevlin]

Unfortunately, I don't think this will be cross-platform.

Oh, this is a really good point to remember. In that case I'll probably continue to use 1password.

 

[Wreckus]

Oh, this is a really good point to remember. In that case I'll probably continue to use 1password.

That’s what I’m doing, sticking with 1 password. What I’m curious what apple will do in terms future app approval of features with apps like enpass and 1Password when their 2FA comes out.