MS is a software company. They will develop code to flush your toilet if there is money in it.
MSFT is a company. They will (try to) make decisions that have (the most) positive impact on their bottom-line.
I'm guessing Bill missed that class when he dropped out of Harvard. Silly Bill.
Bill missed nothing; as noted, the decision to support Apple was correct for more reason than one. You on the other hand seems to have missed it all.
"Back in the day" being the key phrase. The infusion of cash into Apple by MS also required them to develop Office for mac. That deal died a long time ago. MS doesn't have to provide Office for the mac. It does so today because it's profitable. (Marketing 201)
It is certainly profitable, and more than that, it helps maintain MSFT's dominant position in enterprise (office) software. I never argued against Office for Mac. My point was that Office for Mac and Office for iOS - from a business point of view - are two completely different animals. The value of doing always have to be balanced with the value of not doing (Economy 101).
Once more: Office for Mac and Office for iOS are two completely different situations, necessitating completely different strategic approaches. Are there tangents? Certainly, but we have to remember that what is at stake here is not only the dominant position of Office, but also the dominant position of Windows. It goes without saying that MSFT is better off if they succeed to maintain both. Consequently, the choice cannot be reduced to number of licenses of Office sold.
Put short: Office is a strategic asset. The route they take with regards to Office for iOS has significant impact on MSFT's ability to leverage that asset in other markets (e.g. Windows). Just looking at one column (i.e. Office revenue) thus completely misses the larger picture (i.e. MSFT revenue).
How hard could it possibly be to get?
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So what should they do? Without having the numbers, i really only see two scenarios as likely - all depending on how much they are willing to wage on being successful with Windows 8 (and more specifically, Windows on ARM).
One option is to ditch iPad all together, trying to use the gravity around Office to make people opt for W8-based tablets. This is the riskier of the two, as failure essentially opens up room for outside competition, in turn threatening Office dominant position on all platforms and form-factors.
The other option is to use Office as a pawn in price competition between platforms (W8 v. iOS). For example, MSFT could charge steeply on iOS, while subsidizing on W8 to make the latter look like the better choice. If MSFT is content securing their dominant position in enterprise this is somewhat of a Win-win. Enterprises can on the one hand cope with high license costs (even at 199 its not that high, really), and at the same time the added 200 bucks that not standardizing on W8 would incur will draw enterprises toward W8-offerings.
Just selling, and doing so cheaply, only thinking of the bottom-line for Office is a non-option, or at least a very stupid one. Doubt we will see that kind of stupidity from Redmond in the near future. (The exception being arrogance and overall cockiness; an attitude of "we can't lose, regardless". In that scenario they would certainly maximize profits from Office and Office alone. Then again, arrogance and cockiness goes hand in hand with stupidity).