Well I doubt that contradicts my argument. The word “encryption” can mean anything; even WeChat, that Chinese super-app where your every move is directly made available to the government and the police, is also technically “encrypted”. The catch is that it’s not end-to-end encryption.
Simply adopting some kind of “encryption” doesn’t necessarily mean adhering to a higher security standard. That’s just baseline security standard.
You are speculating about "baseline" security, but the EU's proposed measures actually address this directly. The document explicitly states that Apple is allowed to take "strictly necessary,
proportionate and duly justified measures to ensure that interoperability does not compromise the integrity of the operating system, hardware and software features".
Apple is responsible for setting the standard of encryption necessary to ensure interoperability and it must be equivalent to the same standard they set for themselves, not more, not less. Proportional.
“Likely”. So what happens if Apple is denied this right?
Also, who gets to decide whether it’s an “anticompetitive pretext”? Government officials who don’t know the difference between classic Bluetooth, competing companies who are eager to do negative PR on Apple’s security designs, or the general public who sometimes confuse RAM with hard disk? And if a decision is made, how to prove it is made fairly and have been given adequate security considerations?
It's not decided by random public opinion of someone on a forum that's for sure. The Commission has established a strict reporting mechanism for this.
Apple is required to communicate "all the measures that it intends to take" to comply. Specifically regarding security, Apple must "describe in detail every measure it has adopted or plans to adopt to ensure that the integrity of iOS is not compromised, explaining why such measure is strictly necessary and proportionate".
Apple even has to provide a non-confidential version of this report for publication. So, if Apple restricts a feature for security reasons, they have to prove on paper that it's technically necessary and not just an excuse.
Feel free to go download the documents and read. The information for the DMA commissioners is public information, feel free to message them and ask if they know the difference between classic bluetooth.
Better prove that before declaring Apple’s move “malicious compliance”.
Removing a feature instead of providing a proportional interoperable solution is malicious compliance otherwise you are stating Apple engineers are too stupid to figure out how to offer effective solutions for 3rd-party devices. This is simply just common sense.
History is filled with examples where the effect of regulations is exactly the opposite of their stated “core purpose”. If you banned all knives on the market for the “core purpose” of preventing murder, you cannot blame restaurants of “malicious compliance” when they close down.
Good thing we're not talking about banning knives but preventing a corporation from using their position of power to control what consumers can and cannot do with their device. Anymore ridiculous analogies you wanna add?
Back to the main topic. How is allowing third-party accessories to arbitrarily read all my WiFi SSIDs, MAC addresses, and passwords not a security risk, given this is a must if DMA was to be satisfied?
1. NOBODY IS ASKING YOU
@Skyuser to do anything. Simply do not use third-party devices with your iPhone, stay within Apple's ecosystem.
2. I'll let Apple explain it to you then since their engineers are not too stupid to figure it out.
Wi-Fi Infrastructure
Share Wi-Fi network credentials securely between devices and connected accessories.
iOS 26.2+iPadOS 26.2+
Companion apps that have paired an accessory with
AccessorySetupKit can use the Wi-Fi™️ Infrastructure framework to share networks with their paired accessory over a local Bluetooth 4.2 Secure connection.
The Wi-Fi™ Infrastructure framework enables your app to share Wi-Fi network credentials from an iOS device to paired accessories automatically and securely. Use this framework to avoid manually entering network passwords on accessories with limited input capabilities, such as smartwatches, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, or other connected hardware that travels with people across different networks.
The framework provides a secure, encrypted sharing mechanism that respects privacy and choice. People can authorize different levels of sharing, from automatic network sharing to manual approval for each network. All network sharing occurs only when accessories are connected via Bluetooth, ensuring that the credentials a person shares are only shared when devices are physically together.
With the Wi-Fi Infrastructure framework, you can:
- Request authorization to share Wi-Fi networks with paired accessories.
- Automatically share networks when the iOS device joins them.
- Prompt people through your app to share specific networks with their accessories.
- Receive shared network credentials in your app extension.
- Present system-provided network picker interfaces.
- Handle network-sharing failures and retry with alternative networks.
(For people who need some background, with these data and some publicly available databases, one can reconstruct a map of your physical location history for as long as you’ve used your phone.)
And if you do admit it’s a security loophole, how do you suggest Apple resolve it, without pulling the feature, while also satisfying DMA?
This isn't some "security loophole", Apple already does this for their own devices. Apple devices currently "obtain the Wi-Fi networks saved on the iPhone" to connect without friction. The DMA simply mandates that Apple provide third parties access to this same data "
subject to the same user controls and permissions that Apple applies with respect to its own connected physical devices".
If you believe syncing Wi-Fi credentials to a watch is a massive security risk that exposes your location history, then you should be arguing that the Apple Watch is a security risk, because it already uses this exact feature. The DMA doesn't create a new risk; it just demands that the existing functionality be vendor-neutral. If Apple can secure this transfer to an Apple Watch, they can secure it to a Garmin or Pixel Watch using the same encryption and integrity standards that they demand.