I'll respond to Sora as well below but they cited incorrectly. You're obviously not following my logic (not meant as a slight, perhaps I'm not communicating it clearly enough) but I do believe a case such as this will be filed and we'll see how it shakes out. You and I seem to be too far apart to debate it.
This was not government trying to restrict free speech or it never would have required SCOTUS review as that would have clearly violated the first amendment and been prima facie to throw it out. This was protected speech (religious materials) taking place on privately owned property (owned by the Gulf company).
No, I had to look it up, Food Employees v. Logan Valley. SCOTUS found that the protestors had a right to protest on the privately owned property of the mall. Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority:
(footnotes omitted)
The district court had found that "the Mall is the functional equivalent of a public business district" and the appeals court affirmed that. I hadn't reviewed Lloyd Corp before but just did and it's tailoring its ruling to whether the mall was an applicable location for the speech being exercised. Valid point but they aren't stating the first amendment can't apply on private property and Logan Valley and Marsh do.
Individual states have taken this further as well. For example, California (Apple, Google, Facebook, and Twitter being California companies) has an affirmative right to free speech in its own constitution. The Pruneyard case went to SCOTUS and upheld individuals' right to free speech on private property as well (another shopping mall).
There's enough precedent to see that the first amendment absolutely can be upheld on private property. Not all private property but I've never stated that. Whether the precedent would extend to digital environments is something for the next court to decide but I think there's ample ground to file when an individual is excluded from expressing thoughts on an nominally open platform with sufficient reach to be considered the electronic equivalent of a public square. One could easily make that claim for Youtube, Facebook et. al.
No, I stand by my analysis, you cited the wrong case. Given I've cited the correct cases now I'll assume we can move on to more philosophical rather than legal (which is documented). A private entity could definitely chill free speech. Free speech is useless if it happens in a vacuum (or say, in your own living room). It needs to have potential for an audience whether they will agree with the speech or not. This has traditionally been the public square but as the above has shown the definition of public square can change with time, from literally the square to a shopping mall and to something else entirely in an era where communication, particularly broadcast communication by individuals, is done electronically. If the primary mechanism for communication is electronic and a oligopoly of platforms all ban a particular political viewpoint then that right is under threat. Again, whether any specific court agrees with that only time will tell but that's a valid argument (and a plausible scenario) and one I think we'll see made in the near future.
In
Marsh v. Alabama,
the petitioner was arrested and charged criminally - and the labeling of the case - Marsh v. Alabama indicates that the state is the respondent and thus the individual attempting to chill speech. The Court noted that the residents of these non-Gulf neighborhoods were freely allowed to use the company-owned streets and sidewalks to access the town's businesses and facilities. And because the petition was standing on the street beside a post office in what is considered a public space, the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute as applied was constitutional because the title to the sidewalk was in the corporation's name.
It held that the public use of the sidewalk had not been such as to give rise to a presumption under Alabama law of its irrevocable dedication to the public.
In other words, the sidewalk was public space. Therefore, even though owned by a company - it was still classified as a public space.
In
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, the court found that individuals may peacefully exercise their right to free speech in parts of
private shopping centers regularly held open to the public, subject to reasonable regulations adopted by the shopping centers.
Recently, the Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins decision has been narrowed.
On December 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of California reaffirmed
Pruneyard but narrowed its applicability to the facts of the original case. The entire court concurred in Associate Justice Joyce Kennard's holding that
Pruneyard applies only to "common areas" of shopping centers that are designed and furnished to encourage shoppers to linger, congregate, relax, or converse at leisure, but
does not apply to any other open portions of shopping centers merely intended to facilitate the efficient movement of shoppers in and out of tenants, including concrete aprons and sidewalks which shoppers simply walk across as they move between parking lots and big-box stores.
In other words, 1A on private property is severely limited - and this applies to California. I'm sure there are other states that have similar protections. It is prudent to note that SCOTUS declined to hear further Pruneyard challenges.
Lastly, in
Food Employees v. Logan Valley, your analysis is correct. The court used many factors to reach this threshold, one which was the distance of the picketing from the entrance (300-500 feet) of the business (of which there were only 2 in the mall), and the risk of injury, interference with traffic and shoppers.
While private spaces doesn't indiscriminately give the owner complete dominion over the property, the more the space is opened to the public, the more 1A challenges can occur.
With that said however, the overall thrust of these cases have one thing in common - private spaces does not offer the same 1A protections as public spaces. And more dramatically, a truly private space offers no 1A protections at all (ie: one cannot walk into an Apple Store and claim 1A protections when they are kicked out of the establishment). Because ultimately, this would be
trespassing.
Applying these tests to an online sphere is a simple one. Who owns the servers own the space, and therefore it is private. Apple's servers are it's house. We are guests in their home. Because they can close their house (shut down the service) then what will you do? Google can shut down youtube tomorrow - then what? A court cannot order these private companies to keep providing a service.
The analysis of these cases are clear - a test of reasonable "public spaces" is required on privately held property to determine 1A protections. The less domain privately held spaces have, the greater 1A protections.
A truly private space, Apple Store, Google's campus, has no 1A protections at all. You would be trespassing.
BTW, these are all great cases. Very fascinating reads.