I believe I need to respond to your perspective with care and caution, for three reasons:
- Friendly discussions like this can easily veer into sensitive political territory, even when we're careful with tone and wording.
- I cannot speak for Taiwan or the Republic of China. (Anyone familiar with cross-strait politics knows how even these terms carry the weight of historical conflict.)
- While I understand why you say what you say, I have to respectfully point out that your view of the Taiwan-China situation lacks depth and context.
Still, I appreciate the thoughtful effort you put into your post, so I want to offer a personal reply—purely from my own perspective, not as a representative of any party, government, or nationality.
Let me start with a quick clarification. Just in case some readers are unfamiliar with the distinction between China and Taiwan (ROC): After WWII, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government was defeated by the Chinese Communists and retreated to Taiwan. The ROC (Republic of China) remained a legal government with full international recognition for decades, even holding a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Over time, global dynamics shifted, and eventually the ROC lost its UN seat after the U.S. severed formal diplomatic ties—a move some call Chiang’s greatest mistake, though even without that decision, Taiwan would’ve faced growing international pressure.
That said, the U.S. did provide significant help to the ROC in various ways, particularly in maneuvering through the complexities of the UN system to buy time. But here's the missing half of the story: the U.S. offered that help because it needed to. That's the nature of international politics—there are no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.
We often hear phrases like “this aligns with U.S. interests.” Yes—if you can't serve U.S. interests, you're unlikely to receive U.S. support, let alone protection. This also refutes the notion that NATO has been “taking advantage” of the U.S. for decades. The truth is: the U.S. voluntarily invested in NATO for influence, deterrence, and leadership in the post-WWII world. No one forced them.
So when someone says, “The U.S. shouldn’t protect others without getting something in return,” it sounds more like a politician’s talking point than a full picture. What they’re not saying is: “If there’s nothing to gain, the U.S. won’t get involved.” I already used NATO as an example, so let’s apply this to Taiwan.
Taiwan serves a key strategic role for the U.S.—a non-bloody frontline to contain Chinese expansion. And considering Taiwan’s ambiguous status in global diplomacy, the U.S. gets to “support” Taiwan while extracting substantial tech, economic, and geopolitical leverage. It’s a profitable arrangement.
Of course, this leaves the U.S. in a tight spot: How does it satisfy China (for business) while also defending Taiwan (for strategy)? The answer: it can't. That’s where the contradictions begin—and they've only grown sharper in recent years.
Over time, Taiwan has paid a price for this awkward reality. I see it firsthand. Our international identity is constantly challenged. We deal with confusion over passport names, exclusion from trade blocs, endless political compromises. Even the smallest nations can use the “One China” policy as a bargaining chip. But again—this is realpolitik. It’s not fair, but it is the game.
That brings me to a topic that’s starting to re-emerge in Taiwanese society: the “China constant.” Some people have begun to ask—quietly but increasingly—whether it's time to pursue more pragmatic dialogue with China. Not because we want to be absorbed, but because our current situation is increasingly unsustainable.
Now, to be clear, I personally stand firmly for democracy, human rights, and free speech. I care deeply about U.S. elections because they directly affect Taiwan’s future. I’ve never been on the pro-China side of the political spectrum. But I also recognize this truth: the more the U.S. government aligns itself with self-interest alone—and the more Taiwan gets treated like a pawn—the more people will start to question our current direction.
Recently, our government expelled a few naturalized citizens with extreme pro-PRC affiliations. That would’ve been unthinkable years ago. So while this is technically an internal matter, it reflects rising internal tension fueled by global shifts—many of which are tied to U.S. decisions.
Here’s what stings: Even after Trump announced a 32% tariff on Taiwan—on top of previous “reciprocal” policies—our government only responded with a 880 billion NTD domestic relief plan. Sound familiar? That kind of response is exactly what U.S. citizens often criticize when their own leaders do it—band-aid stimulus that does little to solve root problems.
So yes, once again, people here are talking about the “China constant.” And perhaps for the first time in years, some are genuinely wondering: should we at least talk to Beijing? It’s not easy. There are obvious political and ideological barriers. But as I said—if we judged today’s situation based on what was unthinkable in Chiang Kai-shek’s era, we’d call it science fiction.
Let me be absolutely clear again: I’m not advocating for surrender, absorption, or compromise of our values. But if even Japan, Korea, and China are now reportedly exploring regional economic discussions, would it really be that surprising if Taiwan did too?
You said something about America maintaining world order. I respect the sentiment, but when people say that, I can’t help but recall the era of Dick Cheney. Shall we talk about what that “order” actually meant—for Iraq, for the UN, for civil liberties?
My point is: things are not black and white. Talking about U.S. protection, weapons sales, or global leadership without acknowledging the self-serving half of those equations is misleading.
And frankly, if Trump continues down this path, it won’t just be China, Japan, and Korea sitting down together. It might very well be China and Taiwan too. That’s the possibility I’m trying to highlight—calmly and sincerely, based only on my own observations.