I keep iMessage turned off. So all my texts are sent through the carrier.
Hopefully straight to the carrier, without Apple involvement.
Yeah, I'm sure your tactic is secure.
I keep iMessage turned off. So all my texts are sent through the carrier.
Hopefully straight to the carrier, without Apple involvement.
Call me naive, but if the government told Apple to do something like that, I don't think it would go down quietly.
I don't have faith in an updated Mac Pro any time soon. I don't have faith in all-Flash storage. But by gum I have faith that Apple will fight tooth and nail against anything like that.
If I haven't done anything wrong, why would I mind that as well. SHEESH!
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WHAT I DO CARE ABOUT IS CATCHING BAD GUYS AND TERRORISTS AND MURDERS.
I'D GLADLY GIVE UP MY RIGHTS FOR THAT! PERIOD!
If you don't want records kept, use Signal.
In this scenario, the carriers actually record your actual text message and can hand that over to authorities. Apple doesn't log actual iMessage content. However, if you use iCloud Backup, then Apple will have whatever iMessages are on your phone, and they can/will hand those over if summoned.I keep iMessage turned off. So all my texts are sent through the carrier.
Hopefully straight to the carrier, without Apple involvement.
I would pay to use a service that would go out of its way to piss of law enforcement.
Blimey, you do put a lot of faith in Apple, don't you!I am pretty sure that my comment specifically stated that the 30-day issue was something that could be argued, so not missing the point. Most operations tend to save logs for 30 days, it's fairly standard stuff. Most policies I have written is that we maintain daily incremental backups of logs and data on-site, with off-site backups for 30 days. For mission critical we replicate logs off-site even within the day so that we can recover to almost the last transaction. My guess is no one thought about this and just let it be part of their normal process of backups and purging within the operations procedures. Maybe they review this and decide to reduce the time, but I don't see it as a major issue in the first place. To change is more a policy/process change and very little software change (may be as simple as a parameter in their backup/purge software).
This seems like a non-story, wouldn't basically any service of this type have to keep this sort of data for a brief period of time?
But then if you need that, you anonymise the data, right?I get what you're asking but I hate the way that question is phrased... because in the absence of a direct answer and focus on an abstract, I feel anything I could answer with supports the "well then it must be for law enforcement if you can't put your finger directly on some function."
As an engineer, I can think of countless reasons why I would retain a set of logs about anything that occurs on my servers - of which, at the very minimum would be a set of metrics outlining the raison d'etre so I could make future decisions down the line.
Metrics to see how the system should respond, capacities, location-focuses, etc. There are countless reasons why that information is stored, and there probably is not a single purpose, but data is useful. The more data you have the more accurate picture you can draw... maybe 30-days was the limit they could get?
Its not any different. Google and Facebook have WAAAAAY more info about everyone, so yeah. This is just more SPOOKY LANGUAGE from Glenn Greenwald.I'm having a hard time seeing how this is more than what is already available to law enforcement though the telcos.
Politics aside....nothing anyone has done since the dawn of the internet is untraceable without going to extreme precautions. Talk about banging the drum "just because".That Coolaid just trickles down the throat.... Does it taste good....?
Thanks for the lesson in log file management though. Takes me back to my programming days! I never did get to do the tech support thoughI am pretty sure that my comment specifically stated that the 30-day issue was something that could be argued, so not missing the point. Most operations tend to save logs for 30 days, it's fairly standard stuff. Most policies I have written is that we maintain daily incremental backups of logs and data on-site, with off-site backups for 30 days. For mission critical we replicate logs off-site even within the day so that we can recover to almost the last transaction. My guess is no one thought about this and just let it be part of their normal process of backups and purging within the operations procedures. Maybe they review this and decide to reduce the time, but I don't see it as a major issue in the first place. To change is more a policy/process change and very little software change (may be as simple as a parameter in their backup/purge software).
Politics aside....nothing anyone has done since the dawn of the internet is untraceable without going to extreme precautions. Talk about banging the drum "just because".
this was my concern-
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston
"All of that stuff" - meaning every telephone conversation Americans have with one another on US soil, with or without a search warrant - "is being captured as we speak".
I keep iMessage turned off. So all my texts are sent through the carrier.
Hopefully straight to the carrier, without Apple involvement.
I had just responded to someone else and I was looking at it from an operations process perspective, specifically around policies for backup and purge of data. But you add another compelling thought here. And if I may camp on, it will also depend on where they keep this log. If these pings are against a database then this could be the DB log and it would be hard to separate these queries from anything else going on in the database, which supports your perspective. Pretty much the same if these are Unix logs. The only way that I could even argue with you is if it were an isolated log just for these pings. Then maybe one could say that 30-days is not needed for metrics. My thought is that what we are dealing with is not so simple and to reduce the time they keep this information would also reduce a lot of other server or database information. And that is why your argument is sound and strong.I get what you're asking but I hate the way that question is phrased... because in the absence of a direct answer and focus on an abstract, I feel anything I could answer with supports the "well then it must be for law enforcement if you can't put your finger directly on some function."
As an engineer, I can think of countless reasons why I would retain a set of logs about anything that occurs on my servers - of which, at the very minimum would be a set of metrics outlining the raison d'etre so I could make future decisions down the line.
Metrics to see how the system should respond, capacities, location-focuses, etc. There are countless reasons why that information is stored, and there probably is not a single purpose, but data is useful. The more data you have the more accurate picture you can draw... maybe 30-days was the limit they could get?
No, it doesn't. Apple are completely upfront with their privacy policy.
We're talking about a messaging app, synced across Mac/iOS devices, capable of sending SMS and iMessage, with the entire conversation history available until you delete it. Pinging a device and Apple's servers, to figure out what a device is and how to talk to it, just comes with the territory of this technology.
And again, Apple can't see any of the content from the messages, nor do they store it or even have the facility to decrypt it. Complete non-issue.
Uh, yeah, because that's definitely more secure.I keep iMessage turned off. So all my texts are sent through the carrier.
Hopefully straight to the carrier, without Apple involvement.