More bad news: cockpit delayed evacuation by 90 seconds.
"Pilots initially said passengers should stay put."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23265238
For this kind of an accident, there would really be no reason to hold off evacuating, however for some general perspective, when I first started flying in the airlines (1986) a standard maneuver would be to have some malfunction after landing and the Captain was expected to evacuate. Over time this morphed into a situation where more analysis was expected.
For example, evacuations typically cause injuries. So, if you land and the aircraft is in one piece, and are informed of a brake fire or even an engine fire and emergency trucks are there to put it out, a Captain might not order an evacuation immediately or maybe not at all. One of the keys is what's happening in the cabin- Everything normal back there? No smoke? Are reports from the emergency vehicles positive or negative?
I think the ILS being inoperative is a non-issue, but have a question.
If the ILS was unavailable, does that mean the whole approach was visual? Isn't there a cockpit warning, audible or visual, that would alert the pilots he was off the glide slope? At least I'm assuming it was since its widely reported he was too low and slow.
Wouldn't there have been a stall alarm sounding since he was about 40 mph or knots below normal approach speed?
No ILS means no electronic glideslope, however there is a VASI (Visual Approach Slope Indicator) or PAPI, visual aids representing a glideslope provided by an instrument located next to the landing threshold that the pilots see, if the runway has one and it's working. As I recall, those runways do have one or the other.
And most (all) pilots have a mental picture of a proper visual glideslope based on how the angle of the runway appears to them. But if new to an aircraft, new environment, this element is reduced somewhat.
Modern airplanes are established with stick shakers which warn of impending stall, and a stall warning that annunciates STALL, STALL. The time to act is when the stick shaker goes off, and my understanding is that they did have stick shaker (but I'm not 100% on this).
Note: The Airbus technology includes fight laws (computer controlled) that if working properly will not allow it to stall, although this kind of an accident could still happen because it won't prevent the aircraft from being low and slow and in the landing mode, it's expecting to land. Consequently there is no stall warning in Airbus aircraft. I'm not familiar with the 777, if it has flight laws or a stall warning.
All this brings me to my real question, I'd like to understand how you think the decision making process went as to why it was decided to "continue" the approach and landing? I assume at the "continue" point they were already low and slow. It was not until 1.5 seconds before impact [at least from what I read and heard on KGO] was the decision made to go around.
Many factors- did they recognize they were low and slow? They should have, they may not have, or they tried to fix it without doing a go around. If you recognize it in a timely fashion it is something that can be corrected to a safe landing, but based on what I've read the trend developed and got worse until only moments before touching down when they tried to Go Around.
And where was their power set? Normally when you are flying a stabilized approach, the engines are at a mid range power setting and are usually very responsive if a go around is necessary. However if the engines are at a reduced power setting, there will be more lag before they spool back up. This is why there is such emphasis in aviation on flying a stabilized approach. Stabilized means configured for landing, basically on glideslope, at a normal speed (not excessively fast or slow), and with the engines at the normal power setting, especially not at idle.
My guess is that their rate of decent was higher than it should have been (low), and that their power was pulled back for what ever reason, and when they tried to go around, they pulled the nose up in an attempt to avoid landing short, and the engines did not spoll up fast enough, resulting in a tail strike. Which btw could indicate that they over rotated the airplane trying to climb and avoid hitting the ground.
It's possible it was not until they were at 1.5 seconds prior to touch down that it dawned on them what was going to happen, but this shows a real lack of situational awareness. Although not all of the info is in, my impression is that the instructor really failed in his duties.