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Per the hearing, the FBI is asking Apple to create a custom firmware that does not currently exist that:

*Removes the delay between password attempts
*Allows the ability to plug in a device that would send software password guesses rather than utilizing the hardware of the touchscreen
*Removes the 10 wrong guesses and it destroys the encryption key function

All three of which would qualify as a defect (number two especially, they want to be able to use the lightning port to hook up a device that sends passcode attempts, thousands per second. Imagine if that vulnerability got exploited, you'd have companies and criminals everywhere just making these devices as they did pre iOS 8).

But does it meet the definition of a "back door" as posted above or as used by Craig Federighi?

a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data.

The FBI's request of Apple is neither surreptitious nor unauthorized. Their request have been out in the open through legally provided and court-approved warrants coupled with probably cause.
 
These guys should have been using burners anyhow. I hear Turkey, Russia, Saudi, Syria, North Korea, China would like some help from Apple too...
 
The FBI is perfectly entitled to take reasonable steps to ensure your safety and security and I demand the FBI has access to anybody's phone who might compromise those states. This is just plain old common sense it today's world.
Apple must stop this myopic, hysterical posturing and act in a normal adult fashion.
Federighi's comments are just those of a bought man doing what bought men do.

You sir, sicken me.

"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."

-Benjamin Franklin
 
But does it meet the definition of a "back door" as posted above or as used by Craig Federighi?
.

a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data
The FBI is asking for a feature(s) to be added and several features (defects) to be removed or made inactive. I would say that falls within this definition and within the definition as defined by Tim and Craig.
 
The FBI is perfectly entitled to take reasonable steps to ensure your safety and security and I demand the FBI has access to anybody's phone who might compromise those states. This is just plain old common sense it today's world.
Apple must stop this myopic, hysterical posturing and act in a normal adult fashion.
Federighi's comments are just those of a bought man doing what bought men do.

Yes, they are. Forcing a business to build special software to do so is NOT reasonable.
 
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I also feel that people need to stop using the term "back door". What the FBI is asking is just weakening the front door.

The FBI will still need to try passcode after passcode until they get the right one. This is not a back door. The security is still in place (requiring a passcode to be entered), just some of the secondary conditions would not work anymore.

Not a backdoor at all.

a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data

Um, it will be authorized access when they try passcode 1234 and it works. A backdoor would be allowing access without a passcode.
 
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But does it meet the definition of a "back door" as posted above or as used by Craig Federighi?
As described by the hearing expert witness (whom is not affiliated with Apple), and repeated many many times (again, 4 hour hearing, worth listening to), yes.
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I also feel that people need to stop using the term "back door". What the FBI is asking is just weakening the front door.

The FBI will still need to try passcode after passcode until they get the right one. This is not a back door. The security is still in place (requiring a passcode to be entered), just some of the secondary conditions would not work anymore.

Not a backdoor at all.

a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data

Um, it will be authorized access when they try passcode 1234 and it works. A backdoor would be allowing access without a passcode.
The metaphor used frequently in the hearing was "removing the vicious guard dogs to allow for time to pick the lock".
 
As described by the hearing expert witness (whom is not affiliated with Apple), and repeated many many times (again, 4 hour hearing, worth listening to), yes.
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The metaphor used frequently in the hearing was "removing the vicious guard dogs to allow for time to pick the lock".

Right, it is not a back door, just weakening the front door.
 
Right, it is not a back door, just weakening the front door.
Allowing an external machine to submit passcode attempts through the lightning port, which is not supported by any version of iOS ever (though that exact process was created prior to iOS7 by using a vulnerability that has been fixed in iOS8 and later), is an amazingly stupid security risk that they are asking to be built. Regardless of the semantics of what you call it, this is a monumentally stupid thing to do.

They're asking them to build a vulnerability BACK into the system after closing it two years ago.

This is nonsense.
 
Allowing an external machine to submit passcode attempts through the lightning port, which is not supported by any version of iOS ever (though that exact process was created prior to iOS7 by using a vulnerability that has been fixed in iOS8 and later), is an amazingly stupid security risk that they are asking to be built. Regardless of the semantics of what you call it, this is a monumentally stupid thing to do.

They're asking them to build a vulnerability BACK into the system after closing it two years ago.

This is nonsense.

I agree, that would be stupid. But I do not believe that's what the FBI is asking for. The FBI is not asking for a vulnerability be built into the OS on everyone's phone. The system the FBI is asking Apple to build is a custom system, kept proprietary by Apple in a secure facility maintained by Apple, that would be installed on a case-by-case or as-needed basis and only on phones where the government has gone through the legal hurdles of getting a warrant and having it approved by a judge. Your phone, my phone, everyone's phone would still enjoy the high level of encryption and security.
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a feature or defect of a computer system that allows surreptitious unauthorized access to data
The FBI is asking for a feature(s) to be added and several features (defects) to be removed or made inactive. I would say that falls within this definition and within the definition as defined by Tim and Craig.

Yes, but it would be a custom system that is not made available to the public. This system would be used only after the government secures a warrant and has jumped through other legal hurdles regarding 4th amendment protections. Based on how that would be used, I cannot see how the system would meet the definition of being surreptitious or unauthorized.
 
I agree, that would be stupid. But I do not believe that's what the FBI is asking for.
I spent the day watching the hearing yesterday, those three listed items are EXACTLY what they are asking for. The committee asked repeatedly if those three items were what they were asking for, to which under oath they said yes.

That is exactly what they are asking, there is not further interpretation.

There is no asking for apple to keep the system, and the very introduction of the system means anyone that can figure out the procedure used to load that custom version onto an iPhone means they can load whatever they want onto it.

What you're saying is basically the technology equivalent of the rubber stamp FISA court, once in place the mechanism will be used routinely.

Hell, even if there were legal requirements to use it, it doesn't matter. The NYPD and the Baltimore PD have used Stingrays (able to collect tens of thousands of calls, texts, etc. at once) over 1,000 times without a warrant since 2008.

If you put the technology out there, it will be used with or without the legal go-ahead.
 
I spent the day watching the hearing yesterday, those three listed items are EXACTLY what they are asking for. The committee asked repeatedly if those three items were what they were asking for, to which under oath they said yes.

That is exactly what they are asking, there is not further interpretation.

There is no asking for apple to keep the system, and the very introduction of the system means anyone that can figure out the procedure used to load that custom version onto an iPhone means they can load whatever they want onto it.

Are you referring to the hearing with Bruce Sewell and Cyrus Vance?

I don't think you're right. Here's the testimony from Vance:

We do not want a backdoor for the government to access users’ information, and we do not want a key held by the government. We want Apple, Google, and other technology companies to maintain their ability to access data at rest on phones pursuant to a neutral judge’s court order.

Maybe you fell asleep during that bit? :D
 
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I'm so sick of this story. Can we just let it play out in the courts/congress. What more is there to say?
To the contrary, without vigorous public debate and widespread discussion by all of us (since all of us will be affected), deliberate and intentional weakening of the security protocols protecting our most private data will be swiftly enacted by the FED, and give authorities the world over the additional desperately wanted 'teeth' they need in their existing search and seize powers, while such weakening of encryption will naturally in short order also be abused by the criminal element in society for all sorts of misuse and massive defrauding of financial institutions and ordinary citizens while creating potential financial and security havoc for people the world over.

Even worse, once weakening of data security through 'backdoors' becomes a reality, there's no guarantee unfriendly or worse, unstable regimes won't be using any newly-found intel to infiltrate and/or destabilize civilized societies.

In addition, working back from the premise these measures are needed to combat terrorism or crime in general, it would seem obvious that once criminals know their private conversations such as texts and messages are subject to surreptitious interception, they will instantly cease using those methods of communication and find alternative ways of planning their evil deeds, all the while leaving ordinary people having (in futility) ceded more of their privacy and ultimately freedom, under the guise of increased security.

I believe this issue deserves and needs vigorous public discourse; imho, as a society we have given up enough privacy since the onset of the 'digital revolution'.
 
Are you referring to the hearing with Bruce Sewell and Cyrus Vance?

I don't think you're right. Here's the testimony from Vance:



Maybe you fell asleep during that bit? :D
You're going to cherry pick one sentence, out of 4 hours of testimony?

I assume you only read headlines as well?

:rolleyes:
 
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You're going to cherry pick one sentence, out of 4 hours of testimony?

I assume you only read headlines as well?

:rolleyes:

Those sentences in his testimony summarize his position accurately. Which, incidentally, is completely contrary to your earlier assertion when you said

I spent the day watching the hearing yesterday, those three listed items are EXACTLY what they are asking for. The committee asked repeatedly if those three items were what they were asking for, to which under oath they said yes.

That is exactly what they are asking, there is not further interpretation.

Well, apparently according to DA Vance, not so much. I think you're hearing only things you want to hear and disregarding other viewpoints and concerns.

Despite what you think you heard, nobody in the government is advocating for government back door access to every iPhone on the planet. That was discussed and rightly shot down in 1998 (were you even born then??) when the government actually DID propose backdoor access. I was against it in 1998 and I'm still against such access today. But this current request is much more limited and, on balance, reasonable. What they are asking for is for Apple to maintain a specialized OS that Apple can use to access a particular iPhone when requested by a lawful warrant consistent with 4th Amendment protections in order to assist a government investigation. Nothing more. Apple did something similar pre-iOS8 in order to comply with warrants, and they should do so now.
 

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