I follow what your saying, I'm not sure I agree. First of all encryption is only as strong as its implementation, writing software that removes the pin lock security safeguards creates a backdoor, as it makes a brute force attack possible, where previously it was not.
I also understand what you're saying, but I think it's just not the right term for simply turning off retry limits. Back when you could brute force an Apple iCloud account because there were no retry limits, no one called it a back door.
The problem is that calling something a "back door" inherently biases the reader, because it usually means a secret, guaranteed, quick way in. That's of course scary. In this case, even if the software retry limits were disabled, it could take over a half decade to crack a good password on an older iOS device, and up to over three centuries on a newer one with the five second hardware delay. That's not a very scary "back door", especially since the brute force attack must run on the device itself. It's not like someone could take your device for years and you won't notice
Of course, with a poor password, it could take just hours. For that matter, it's possible to guess a few of the most-oft used ones even with the retry limit. Guessing is not a backdoor, although its just a variation of brute force.
Secondly, Cook is being pragmatic, no computer system is totally secure, even Apples. Even if there's only a small chance someone could break in and steal the software, given enough time it would be almost inevitable that they would. It's not a matter of trust, it's simply a matter of time.
Exactly my point. If Cook is right that Apple cannot be trusted to keep such a version or the keys safe, then even without the FBI request, we're already at risk of something happening. Nothing is perfect. Risks are part of everything.
And whilst it would be difficult to install without the digital key, if they could find an exploit it may be possible. Isn't that how jail breaking works?
Jailbreaking is about being able to load non-Apple files without a key, mostly to try to elevate privileges so you can then load other apps. However, jailbreaking cannot make the bootloader load an Apple OS version without an Apple key. Apple's done a good job locking that down. That's also why there is no way to downgrade to an unsigned version.
Thirdly, don't underestimate the legal aspects. Creating a precedent that requires Apple employees to work for the US government is chilling. Apple is not a law enforcement agency, it is not their job to investigate criminal activity.
Again, yep, that's exactly what I've been saying. This is not about whether or not it's legal or moral for the government to try to get into the phone. They have a warrant, therefore it is legal and moral. Warrants are a bedrock of our legal system.
It's about whether Apple can be forced into helping. It's also, according to Cook's Time magazine interview, about him being personally miffed that the FBI took their request public, which left him no choice but to publicly fight back.
Remember we all work voluntarily, co-opting those same employees and forcing them to work for the government, is somewhat Orwellian. Also since computer code is protected free speech, such an order would require those same employees to speak on behalf of the government, surely unconstitutional. And if Apple employees can be forced to work for the government, why not anyone else!
Apple has for years helped (and continues to help) the government to break into many iPhones, by providing a custom version of iOS that bypassed the lock screen, given law enforcement access to iCloud backup info and to any other info that's not encrypted.
The FBI was just dumb going public in this case. Not the least because there were other options, and because of public backlash, but also because well encrypted devices are ridiculously hard to brute force on the device itself, even with Apple's help. They really need to find a better, faster method if possible.
Reader opinions may vary and that's fine. Regards.