I think you’re right. The people defending Apple aren’t using legal principles, they say Apple is right simply because it’s Apple.
That’s ridiculous. Here’s some case law that shows Qualcomm cannot receive patent license fees from manufacturers who use Qualcomm chips (i suggest you pony up some legal support for your rabid anti-Apple spouting off if you want to stick with this line of nonsense):
“First up are the Return Program cartridges that Lexmark sold in the United States. We conclude that Lexmark exhausted its patent rights in these cartridges the moment it sold them. The single-use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark's contracts with customers may have been clear and enforceable under contract law, but they do not entitle Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item that it has elected to sell.” Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017)
“First, Univis held that ‘the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.’ Id., at 249, 62 S.Ct. 1088. The lens blanks in Univis met this standard because they were ‘without utility until [they were] ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.’ Ibid. Accordingly, ‘the only object of the sale [was] to enable the [finishing retailer] to grind and polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer.’ Ibid. Here, LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice the LGE Patents.[6] Nor can we discern one: A microprocessor or chipset cannot function until it is connected to buses and memory. And here, as in Univis, the only apparent object of Intel's sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the Intel Products into computers that would practice the patents.” Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2119 (2008)
“The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee's right to control what others can do with an article embodying or containing an invention.[2] Under the doctrine, ‘the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.’ Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, 128 S.Ct. 2109, 170 L.Ed.2d 996 (2008). And by ‘exhaust[ing] the [patentee's] monopoly’ in that item, the sale confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, ‘the right to use [or] sell’ the thing as he sees fit. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-250, 62 S.Ct. 1088, 86 L.Ed. 1408 (1942). ” Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013)
“Moreover, Keurig's argument that patent exhaustion must be adjudicated on a claim-by-claim basis is unavailing. The Court's patent exhaustion jurisprudence has focused on the exhaustion of the patents at issue in their entirety, rather than the exhaustion of the claims at issue on an individual basis. See id. at 634-35, 128 S.Ct. 2109; Univis, 316 U.S. at 249-50, 62 S.Ct. 1088. Keurig's decision to have sought protection for both apparatus and method claims thus means that those claims are judged together for purposes of patent exhaustion.” Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
“LifeScan also appears to argue that its meter does not embody its patented methods because its strips themselves are inventive and should have been found separately patentable. LifeScan bases this argument on expert testimony asserting that the patent examiners erred in repeatedly rejecting its attempts to patent its strips, and that the strips would indeed have been separately patentable. But the question here is not whether the strips would have been separately patentable or whether the United States Patent and Trademark Office erroneously denied a patent on the strips. The question is whether the strips embodied the inventive features of the claims that were actually allowed by the examiner. In allowing the method claims, the examiner did not attribute an inventive feature to the strips themselves. Having accepted the rejection of its claims drawn to the strips themselves by abandoning those claims in both its original and continuation applications, LifeScan cannot now argue that the strips themselves were the invention. The fact that the specification may have described the strips in considerable detail and as ‘inventive’ is of no consequence in view of the facts that the claims covering the strips were not allowed, and that the meter rather than the strips performs the inventive feature of the patent claims that were actually allowed.
To be sure, if a patent had actually issued on the strips, the patentability of the strips could be relevant to exhaustion. That principle was announced in Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 14 S.Ct. 627, 38 L.Ed. 500 (1894).” Lifescan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)