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Discussion in 'Community Discussion' started by PracticalMac, Jul 20, 2018.
US Congress hearing on MAX next week.
The Air Force has currently stopped accepting deliveries of their KC-46’s due to finding trash, and power tools left in the airframes upon post delivery inspections. Serious times for Boeing.
Chalk up another one why they should have bought the MRTT.
....and it would have been built in the US as well.
Together with Northrop Grumman.
To me the most serious issue with this other that the fact that it is a remarkably negligent decision as an option is what prompted AA and WN to order it? Did they have have information not widely available at the time of ordering? What made them more aware of the need to correct the standard single sensor error anomaly and it’s effect on MCAS? I also don’t buy the statements that most airlines did not want another warning display on the PFD. Show me a pilot who wants less information when running a list. So much political corruption at Boeing right now. I hope they recover.
It seems the warning light that will be made standard cost 80K until now.
I read WN ordered the AoA display option as an additional precaution after the Lion Air crash. I don't know how much it will still cost. It is just drawn on the PFD.
Just MO, but I don’t see the C919 going anywhere. By the time it’s anywhere near certified other than in the Congo the 797 will be close to EIS. 2025 at the earliest for any real C919 orders.
--- Post Merged, Mar 23, 2019 ---
It’s a no cost reflash to all existing Max as of the patch release in a few weeks. AA pilots start flying the new software in the sim next week.
--- Post Merged, Mar 23, 2019 ---
That's for the new behavior. It seems the AoA display is not included.
I don't know if the airlines will get a warning light kit to be installed at their own cost or how that is supposed to work.
I had read the AA pilots were going to test the software at the Boeing sims this weekend.
Interesting. I’ll have to double check. My understanding was the AOA disagreement notification was part of the new Patch for MCAS parameters? Thanks.
Yes, but I understand they have to add the light, or is it already installed but optionally functional on all planes?
My understanding was the AOA disagreement on the PFD and a new warning display on the panel were different. I was under the impression that the new software included the AOA disagreement on the PFD along with the new MCAS parameters. I’m fairly certain the warning display on the panel is not included. I need to look into it further.
Yes, it is possibly misreported on the press.
My understanding is the testing this weekend was for the new MCAS software. The AoA disagree message on the PFD is standard on all AA 737s, MAX and NG alike.
It is embarrassing how blatantly biased the selection processes was.
Sure it is better to buy American, but there are plenty of times when better equipment and aircraft was foreign made.
It is also a question that the MRTT was basically ready and the US did not need to waste time and money making their own.
I was wondering how long it would take for this to come out. The fact that Boeing kept a single AoA sensor input on the Max reinforces the rush to certification. So disappointed in Boeing.
Everything I'm seeing says there are two AoA sensors, including the post you responded to.
Where are you guys seeing one AoA sensor?
I posted a link which mentioned one AOA, if I’m not mistaken, which I could be. Triplicate seems to be the norm. Back in the day (1990-2000s), the 747s, we had used 3 inertials for over the pond navigation.
Thank you, now I see the cause for confusion. The 737 does have two AoA sensors.
However, it is not a redundant setup--the two AoA sensors are used for different systems. So if one of the two AoA sensor fails, whichever system uses that particular AoA sensor also fails.
One AOA used by the culprit system, even if there are more on the airplanes.
This is the case. The 737 has one AoA probe on each side of the nose, but MCAS can activate based on data provided from either one. In a miscompare situation you *know* one set of data is incorrect, so for Boeing to go ahead and let MCAS run anyway is the core of the problem, IMO. Either insist that both agree or put a third probe on the jet and require two of three to agree. How that wasn't obvious to the engineers or the people involved in the certification process is a mystery to me.
Training is the other side of this as well - we're all supposed to know how to handle a trim runaway. The first accident was an eye opener because nobody knew MCAS even existed or the manner in which it it'd run the trim, which is somewhat different than what we see in the sim. Nevertheless the solution is the same as it's always been, and indeed anytime we strapped into a MAX after the Lion Air crash the trim cutout switches were always at the forefront of our mind.
So the second crash? I dunno. It's hard to imagine these guys weren't just as primed to grab the trim cutout switches as we are over here. Maybe there's more to it - we'll find out soon enough I suppose.
One of the issues prior to the patch was that MCAS would move from AOA 1 to AOA 2 to AOA 1 etc.....after each flight. The patch configures MCAS to use data from both at all times. I’m looking for more information from the investigations as to wether an AOA failure started the chain of events in both accidents. There have been some QC issues with one of the AOA suppliers on the Max.
Regardless, the fact that Boeing choose for some unfathomable reason to not implement MCAS as is on the KC-46 just reinforces my concern at Boeing.
Boeing is due for a harsh reckoning that'll set them back years. All their tomfoolery is coming back to bite them in the ass.