The Ars article is good, but misses a few key points IMHO.
1. The legal definition of monopoly for software services and platforms was set by Intel v Intergraph in the Ninth Circuit some 15+ years ago, and was referenced in the antitrust filings against Microsoft soon thereafter. The Court there ruled that an x86 customer that bought Intel CPUs was therefore bound to software that was Intel-compatible. Other CPU instruction sets, and their binaries, can’t run on Intel x86 architectures. Therefore, the court reasoned, end-users with Intel processors were subject to an Intel monopoly and by virtue of a network effect, the monopoly of Software Developers that made software that conformed with Intel’s x86 instruction set.
iOS end-users have a single store to acquire software from; it is run by Apple, and Apple sets all the rules. An iOS user has no choice but to submit to the systems and regulations of AppStore behavior Apple chooses to impose upon developers, including choice of apps to support and content choices and payment methods permitted. When the regulation of the store tends to benefit the store owner unfairly (by using network effects of hardware and software compatibility to force end-users to enrich Apple, devoid of competition), it is anti-trust prima facie.
2. There are a wealth of other similar 30% systems in the world — from Amazon to PlayStation to Xbox and so on. Even Target and Wal-Mart qualify, but have physical goods to contend with. Ars cannot, for the life of me, show me that an app store has higher costs of unit economics than a physically-stocked store, but Target and Wal-Mart only take around 20%. While I appreciate the cost and energy and innovative prowess required to conceive of iPhone and the AppStore, Apple is prohibited from tying software to hardware and limiting consumer choice in a way that in the majority of cases benefits themselves. A store is a store, whether physical or virtual, and many UCC rules about products and conformity and fitness and merchantability still apply. I have no issue with Apple charging a fair percentage for the use of the store and transacting fees and BOBO (billing on behalf of), and more. I do have an issue where AppReview cannot forge a clear and convincing method for when 30% applies and when it does not and that such rules change over time; more damningly, that app developers may not build competing apps to Apple’s own.
3. Lastly, I wish Ars had compared the iOS / Android state of the market in the US with the state of the market in China, where iOS is far from dominant and there is no Google presence. Android in China has *flourished* with (what feels like) hundreds of app stores in competition with each other for app developer attention. This has resulted in far more choice, price competition, deeper app compatibility with various Android OS builds, with app stores working in concert with carriers for billing, customer service, and deployment issues.
I think buy-in is very good for any consumer to perform, caveat emptor. BUT: I caution that software network effects are HARD for anyone, let alone your average consumer, to fully understand and think through. How would a consumer know that an app like Hey could be developed, made available, and offered for sale at a price 30% higher than if Apple permitted a web-store transaction to effectuate payment? They wouldn’t, unless they read gobs of news articles. It’s the volume of information that your average consumer has to digest to make truly informed choices that prevents consumers from the kind of buy-in I would want them to have. As a result, I think consumers are harmed when there’s a lack of transparency and more so when coupled to a lack of competition.
My $0.02.