I’m someone who has given a lot of apps a lot of permissions, setting that once is already a headache when you refresh your entire OS about once a year, but having to do that every month is a complete disaster. They could make it an option:
- Accept always
- Accept for 1 month
- Accept until app is closed
- Deny
The primary goal is to make sure users aren't being silently monitored after granting access one time.
The secondary goal is to make users complain enough that slow-moving enterprise apps update sometime this millennium to use the new API. The new API is a screen/window sharing picker provided by the OS, which means that the system captures consent (when the user hits the button to continue) rather than having the app silently start reading the screen.
"Accept always" means the application is never gonna fix their ****, because the existence of a workaround means it never gets prioritized.
Same with a lot of those other app permissions. You don't have to give an app access to read the desktop if it stops trying to silently scan the contents of the desktop. Even in privileged locations, the Open File dialog gives authorization to read the individually selected files.
Seems pretty simple. Sonoma and the macOS versions in the last year have already taken some things way too far. Some Apps need permission to every folder separately. Why can’t we just allow/deny access to the home folder as one instead of “App X wants access to your Downloads folder”, “App X wants access to your Desktop folder”?
If you want to give an app the ability to scan all your personal information, there is a permission to do this - it is called Full Disk Access.
Applications do not have an API to ask for this however; all they can do is open the screen and ask the user to enable it.
Apple get your ****ing act together and Make the Mac great again. Thank you!
They're obviously going the other way - just like the "app has accessed your clipboard" pop-over notifications on iOS, the goal is to limit broad API which have the potential for developer abuse by informing the user what is going on. At the same time, they usually provide new API which have reduced potential for harm and have reduced call-to-action for the user.
Let's not forget that the recent Crowdstrike issue that hammered mission-critical Windows systems was made
impossible on macOS a few releases back - because Apple removed the equivalent Kernel API to the one that Crowdstrike abuses on Windows. There's no way if this API access was left in behind an "always allow" consent that that wouldn't become a permanent part of the permanent installation instructions on Mac.