Then, by proxy, Microsoft under anti-trust hearing should not happen in the first place because “customers can always install another browser in their system afterwards and Microsoft does not necessarily stop users from doing so”, or Windows N would not exist in EU because “yeah, I can install whatever browser I want afterwards and I have choice”.
The fact is, Microsoft did got accused of anti-competition due to bundling IE into every single copy of Windows, and Windows N does exist for EU customers. Why Apple has to be any different or somehow can be exempt by a similar accusation?
And IE can still be bundled in to Windows. People miss the main point of the Microsoft case:
Underlying these disputes were questions over whether Microsoft had manipulated its
application programming interfaces to favor IE over third-party web browsers, Microsoft's conduct in forming restrictive licensing agreements with
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and Microsoft's intent in its course of conduct.
It's not as simple as Windows having IE by default.
Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his findings of fact on November 5, 1999, which stated that Microsoft's dominance of the
x86-based personal computer
operating systems market constituted a monopoly,
and that Microsoft had taken actions to crush threats to that monopoly, including Apple, Java, Netscape, Lotus Software, RealNetworks, Linux, and others.
[5] Judgment was split in two parts. On April 3, 2000, he issued his
conclusions of law, according to which Microsoft had committed
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
tying in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
[17] Microsoft immediately appealed the decision.
I do not see Apple taking actions to crush threats to their competition. Spotify, Netflix, Steam Link and more are offered which compete with Apples Products. And there are still some family screen time apps.
More stuff for you:
Microsoft's Attempt to Dissuade Netscape from Developing Navigator as a Platform
79. Microsoft's first response to the threat posed by Navigator was an effort to persuade Netscape to structure its business such that the company would not distribute platform- level browsing software for Windows. Netscape's assent would have ensured that, for the foreseeable future, Microsoft would produce the only platform-level browsing software distributed to run on Windows. This would have eliminated the prospect that non-Microsoft browsing software could weaken the applications barrier to entry.
80. Executives at Microsoft received confirmation in early May 1995 that Netscape was developing a version of Navigator to run on Windows 95, which was due to be released in a couple of months. Microsoft's senior executives understood that if they could prevent this version of Navigator from presenting alternatives to the Internet-related APIs in Windows 95, the technologies branded as Navigator would cease to present an alternative platform to developers. Even if non-Windows versions of Navigator exposed Internet-related APIs, applications written to those APIs would not run on the platform Microsoft executives expected to enjoy the largest installed base, i.e., Windows 95. So, as long as the version of Navigator written for Windows 95 relied on Microsoft's Internet-related APIs instead of exposing its own, developing for Navigator would not mean developing cross-platform. Developers of network-centric applications thus would not be drawn to Navigator's APIs in substantial numbers. Therefore, with the encouragement and support of Gates, a group of Microsoft executives commenced a campaign in the summer of 1995 to convince Netscape to halt its development of platform-level browsing technologies for Windows 95.
