I respectfully disagree with your assessment. Even if the Feds are asking for the key, Apple could make the key, use it on the phone, and give the Feds the data without giving them the key.
Sure. Then it sets the precedent and the FBI goes after another phone in a criminal case against a living person. Then Apple is forced again to repeat this process. Then the defense attorney in that later case requires chain of custody information as part of the defense. Then the "key" is in the courts and part of public records.
I wanted to keep precedent out of the discussion becasue I felt that has been discussed rather accurately in the multitude of discussions on the subject. In fact, I think precedent is about the only thing the community (here on MR) has gotten right. People largely still seem to be calling this some sort of back door to be built into all iPhones, and that really isn't the case.
I don;t disagree about your statements on precedent at all. But if this does go through, that doesn't mean all of our phones are going to have some new and innate vulnerability that wasn't there before.
LotR, I believe I understand where you're coming from and the logic you're using, but I'm not sure all of us here agree with it, at least not 100%. The argument goes something like this:
(1) In order for Apple to load this version of software on this one phone requires some process of side loading it - through DFU or recovery mode or through whatever process would be required (I'm no expert on these mechanisms).
(2) This technique, once exposed and in "the public" {see above}, could also be used by whatever bad actors have the capability to recreate it - this might include hackers, terrorists, foreign governments, whomever...
(3) Even if physical custody of the phone is a requirement to implement the actual breaking-in part, there are several occasions that do not apply to all people but certainly do apply to some people where one must give up physical custody of one's phone. If it is during one of these occasions that the bad actor has access, then the hack might be implemented. Such occasions include such innocuous things as attending certain types of meetings, or taking a tech certification test as well as non-innocuous occasions like if someone is taken into custody, kidnapped, etc. or if the phone is simply stolen or lost. MOST of these occasions are not ones where the "victim" would be legally compelled to surrender their phone's info.
So while your fundamental point about this *not* being about a universally loaded back door that allows anyone with a passing interest to hack any phone anywhere in the world at any time is true, the scope *can* be much broader than just this phone, or even just the phones at question under legally issued warrants.
While I appreciate your trying to bring clarity to the discussion and keep it based on facts (as much as the future can yet be factual), which I too am endeavoring to do, and while I concede that many folks' impression of this risk is hyperbolic and not grounded well in real possibilities, I feel it important to point out in the same spirit that it is likewise hyperbolic to dismiss this as a "one time only" thing that could never fall into nefarious hands and put innocents at risk.
